Why do we want to build a strong civil society? The question forces itself on the political and social domains. The panoply of challenges connected with stimulating the components of the Egyptian state throw into relief many problems related to the structure of the Egyptian state, the prevailing social culture, and weaknesses in social and political structures. But the primary concern is that the whole of Egyptian civil society, with all its branches and organisations, is incapable of representing and organising society. Weak and ineffective, civil society is unable to take part in decision-making processes. A major part of this problem are the continued dominance of the communal over the civic aspect in the character of civil society organisations and their activities, and of the political/religious use of civil society organisations. If, today, we want to reshape the relationship between the state and society in a way that increases civil society's responsibility and role in development and the democratic transformation, then we must acknowledge how weak and fragile our civil society organisations are and their consequent inability to assert themselves or assume major responsibilities. A quick review of these organisations, their roles and the values they promote, is sufficient to confirm this conclusion. Therefore, it seems crucial, at this moment, a time when relations and patterns of interaction between various quarters of government are being reformulated, for civil society to reorganise itself so that it can be an effective partner, alongside the private sector and the government, in the processes of building and development. Foremost among the restrictions and dangers that hamper and threaten civil society is the continuing political and religious agendas of some nongovernmental organisations (NGOs). These are mostly community associations, although the phenomenon includes labour and occupational syndicates as well as social and sporting clubs. In spite of the government's attempts after 30 June 2013 to confront this danger, some politically oriented religious movements have infiltrated these organisations and imposed political and social barriers that prevent the government from taking definitive action against them. This reality compels us to draw on some lessons from the past, when attempts were made to counter religious/political exploitation of community organisations. CIVIL SOCIETY'S EVOLUTION AND ITS RAMIFICATIONS: Looking back over recent history, one observes that the politico-religious use of civil society organs was intimately connected with the proselytising of certain religious groups and movements. These interests made use of grassroots contacts, created through the provision of social and economic services and socio-political support systems. There were repeated warnings of the mounting dangers of this phenomenon. But the government continued to approach the problem using conventional methods, such as legal restrictions and police intervention. But even that was lacking after the 25 January Revolution, when the government's grip weakened and the power and influence of the Islamist trend increased, especially following the Muslim Brotherhood's rise to power. This was clearly reflected in the detrimental impact that this period had on civil society, where religious groups had made considerable inroads since the 1990s. In some cases, the negative effects were such that some NGOs and some civil society activists became a part of the problem, worsening the polarisation and social fragmentation. This undermined one of civil society's most important functions and roles, namely the ability to manage diversity and plurality or, otherwise put, to act as a crucible for fusing differences. One also observes in the record of the evolution of community work in Egypt the presence of many channels for politico-religious use of NGOs, whether by ruling regimes or certain socio-political forces, or, at times, even both working together. However, it is necessary, here, to recognise the different phases of this utilisation. For example, when NGOs first emerged, a considerable portion of the work of these organisations (including Muslim and Christian philanthropic organisations) was channelled into elevating national political and social awareness and, specifically, into resisting the British occupation. In contrast, in a later phase, following Egypt's defeat in the 1967 war, some Islamist groups succeeded in reasserting themselves in civil society organisations following a period of clampdowns on their influence. The 1970s saw a rapid surge in the numbers of Islamic societies (from 5.17 per cent of all NGOs in the 1960s to 31 per cent in the 1970s), ushering in a new period that was characterised by a distinct and growing forum for the ideas and political agendas of Islamist groups. An example of this was the Islamic Guidance Society. The spread of Islamist groups continued during the 1980s, if at a slightly slower pace (by 1991, 34 per cent of the 12,832 NGOs were Islamic or Islamist, in contrast to nine per cent Coptic). The growth continued at about the same pace until the 25 January Revolution. The foregoing evolution underscores the importance of the incubation environment and the part politics plays in shaping that environment and the position of religiously oriented societies (whether Muslim or Christian) in it. In Egypt, these date back to the creation of the Islamic Charity Society in 1878 and the Coptic Philanthropic Society in 1881, although it should be pointed out that they were preceded by foreign cultural societies and societies with foreign links. In fact, the history of NGOs dates back to 1821 with the establishment of the Greek Society in Alexandria. Other precursors were the Egyptian Institute Society for Studying the History of Egyptian Civilisation, founded in 1959; the Maarif (Knowledge) Society, a society with a religious heritage component, founded in 1875; and the Geographic Society, founded in 1975. The Islamic Charity Society actually began as the Committee for Aiding Poor Egyptian Muslims, which was founded in 1878. When this committee was placed under the sponsorship of the Khedive, the nature of its mission changed to a certain extent, as did its name. The first Islamic NGO in Egypt, it included among its members the Imam Mohamed Abduh and the nationalist leader Mustafa Kamel, and was associated with many of the pioneers of the late-19th century and early-20th-century enlightenment in Egypt. Another similarly spirited organisation, the Benevolent Endeavours Society (Al-Masai Al-Mashkura) based in Menoufiya was founded in the late 19th century by a number of nationalist figures, including Abdel Aziz Fahmi Pasha and Ahmed Abdel Ghaffar Pasha. Its mission was primarily educational and it founded numerous schools in the Egyptian Delta. Some studies attribute the relatively late arrival of religious NGOs, which emerged 17 years after cultural NGOs, to a variety of reasons. Prime among them was that people didn't feel there was a need. Traditional systems or organisations already served those community needs. The mosque played a central role in Muslims' lives. It was much more than a place of worship as it also furnished a space for the community to meet and for the distribution of alms and charity. In addition to fostering social solidarity and cohesion, the mosque also served as an educational and cultural establishment. Therefore, the broad functions of the mosque were a reason for the relatively late emergence of Islamic charity organisations. The Islamic Waqf (religious endowment) was another institution that served to promote social cohesion and solidarity. In addition to helping the poor and needy, other ways of benefitting from the waqf system economically and socially had evolved during the Ottoman era. Similarly, the spread of Sufi orders, which offered another social and economic support system, was instrumental in delaying the start of religiously inclined NGOs. On the other hand, we can point to a number of motives or incentives that strengthened the religious component of community societies. A chief motive was the need to counter the spread of European evangelical missions, the drive toward which end was spearheaded by Coptic leaders such as Butros Ghali Pasha, as well as Muslim religious and political elites such as Sheikh Mohammed Abduh, Abdallah Al-Nadim, Ahmed Lutfi Al-Sayyid and Sheikh Rashid Rida. This drive, it should be added, was simultaneously instrumental in raising the national consciousness. In her study, The Emergence and Evolution of Islamic Community Associations Until 1952, Amani Qandil notes the rapid spread of religiously oriented societies in Egypt in the early 20th century. Before 1914, the number of these had risen to 20 Islamic and 11 Coptic organisations. Their activities fell under two general categories: charity and religious work and, secondly, provision of social services such as education and healthcare. However, she also notes that they were driven by an interest in politics and, specifically, in political and governmental reform. In this connection, a movement of politically oriented Islamic NGOs were formed. One of the early groups was the Legal Society of Workers in Kuttab Schools and Sunna founded by Sheikh Mahmoud Khattab Al-Sobki in 1912. Al-Sobki was a reformist and opponent of colonialism who urged resistance through the boycotting of British goods and products. In the post-World War I period, two more Islamist societies would appear: the Muslim Youth Society (1927) and the Muslim Brotherhood Society (1928). A Christian Youth Society had been in existence since 1911. AN ENVIRONMENT CONDUCIVE TO RELIGIOUS UTILISATION: The use of community organisations by religious groups reflects the many social problems and deficiencies connected with the community and social and political elites. It is indicative of the interrupted process of building civil society and a consequence of Egypt's long political stagnation, the inability to build a democratic order, the intervention of the state in community work and its use of civil society institutions as an instrument of control and self-perpetuation, and the weakness of the cultural and ethical component in community work. Naturally, it is important to acknowledge the complexity of the environment surrounding NGO work. There is interplay between domestic factors and regional and international considerations and pressures, with various major issues and challenges related to the concepts of national sovereignty and national security, especially when coming to the question of foreign (Western and Arab) funding. There is also the politicisation of human rights that has contributed to turning this cause into an instrument for intervening in other countries' domestic affairs — a phenomenon that has been particularly pronounced with respect to Egypt over the past three years. Nevertheless, granting the foregoing, we must underscore several essential points in this context. Civil society has yet to develop strong roots in Egypt. It has not helped the processes of development and democratisation, nor has it served as a vehicle for the management of plurality in a manner that builds on, and optimises, these factors as a source of strength and enrichment for society and the state. Civil society has tended to be more of a passive recipient rather than a proactive agent. It does not interact with or influence aspects of globalisation that shape humanitarian issues, as in the manner of international NGOs, which have proven themselves major players in the international field. The interrupted and unsteady development of civil society in Egypt has led to distortions, especially as pertains to the responsibilities and values that should prevail. In addition, civil society has not been able to compliment parallel organisations (philanthropic societies, for example) in a manner and to a degree that would strengthen these organisations' grassroots roles in development and rights issues. Aside from a few exceptions, there remains a gulf between community organisations and civil society organisations. This, in turn, testifies to the failure to organise and channel resources and social capacities towards development and progress. The relatively low number of societies whose activities have been frozen (1,054) compared with the total number of community associations (more than 46,000) is not merely a question of quantity. It is important to take into account the wider picture as shaped by all the other components of civil society (including syndicates, teaching staff clubs, etc), as this wider picture reflects the distortions and imbalances in the overall patterns of roles, responsibilities and values. These combine to hamper civil society's functions as a melting pot for diversity, a driving force for community action and a vehicle for the peaceful management of conflict and the promotion of cooperation and integration with other components of the state. Christian societies are subject, to some degree, to the supervision of Church authorities, whether in terms of setting their agendas, identifying their prospective beneficiaries, or defining the scope of their work. It also appears there are a few exceptions to this, including the Coptic Evangelical Organisation and some Catholic societies that have a non-parochial developmental and national focus. Clearly, it is essential to address the flaws and weaknesses that riddle civil society organisations. The task is all the more urgent as we stand on the threshold of parliamentary and municipal elections. For both elections, community organisations of a religious nature will play a major role in determining how many segments of society will vote. Efforts to meet this challenge should focus on shaping a new set of values that support the development of a real and robust civil society. Such a civil society is an indispensable step towards creating the components of a modern democratic state. The writer is editor-in-chief of the monthly magazine Ahwal Masriya.
