The success of “political Islam”, with its flagrant blend of religion and politics, in penetrating civil society is one of the country's foremost challenges and a potential impediment to the development of a modern democratic state. This success exceeds the use of religion as a tool for mobilising political support and action (as reflected in community work) to promote political ideas (as was clearly the case during the period of Muslim Brotherhood rule). It operates at a more dangerous level, namely the conflict over the state's identity, as has been evident since the 30 June 2013 revolution. It was during this period that the resources of community organisations were turned to the service of the Muslim Brotherhood project. Indeed, this phenomenon compelled the government to freeze the assets of 1,054 community associations linked to the Muslim Brotherhood. Nevertheless, this measure is not enough to confront a reality that forces itself on the nature of the relationship between the state and these types of community organisations (and other components of civil society). There is a constant in the approach by successive governments to these associations: government strategies for neutralising them never try to alter their ideological foundations and seek only to prevent them from becoming a source of funding and support for certain political groups. This approach has failed. Evidence of this can be found in the fact that Islamist community associations no longer confine themselves to supporting Islamist candidates, as was the case before 25 January 2011, and indeed now openly support the Muslim Brotherhood and its clash with the state. Indeed, partial elections at the Cairo University teaching staff club on 25 April 2013 illustrate a new development in the strategies used. The pro-Muslim Brotherhood members took advantage of the fact that most club members did not vote (only 183 out of 12,000 members took part). The strategies have gone beyond mass propaganda, organisation and mobilisation to focus on particular segments of the Egyptian elite. In addition to the failure of the government's methods of dealing with those associations, there is another weak spot. It relates to the government's philosophy of community work in which the caretaker/service provider model prevails over the developmental/rights advocacy model. The motivations for establishing societies and the nature of those in charge of them clearly show a continued preference for the perpetuation of traditional society and culture. This preference relies on particular ideological, sectarian and kinship affiliations over factors that reflect social priorities, developmental needs and rights that support the concepts of citizenship and civic-mindedness. As difficult as it is to determine the extent of the exploitation of religion in politics in Egypt, a number of indicators show that its reach increased after 25 January 2011 and that the phenomenon is restricted to the Islamist trend. This is reflected in the map of community associations over the past three years and in the growing social and public activism of this trend behind the guise of community associations and community work. It is also reflected in the emergence of the Salafists as part of a broad framework for the use of religion. The clampdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, rather than curbing the political use of religion, has strengthened the Salafists, as seen in their growing political role in which they are now capitalising on their history of doing community work. Today, we see a new discourse at work, one that elevates that status of and the right to the political use of religion. This discourse promotes the exploitation of the religious-cultural component for social status. It draws on this component in the creation of social leaderships and bodies that mobilise the public for elections and other political activities to support a movement or group. In view of this development, it seems necessary to identify the areas where religion and politics overlap, as reflected in the map of community associations. The grassroots movement that took to the streets on 25 January 2011 and brought new players into the Egyptian political arena cast into relief civil society's ability of civil society to mobilise the masses and to use its political and religious mechanisms in the process. The impact and influence of NGOs on events was limited. But the emergence of new actors and awareness of the role played by “virtual civil society” (over social networking sites) raised the question of how to expand the role and influence of civil society. Hopes were raised by the possibility of creating organisational and legal structures for youth coalitions and social initiatives beyond existing community associations. However, practical realities compel us to make the following observations. Socio-cultural factors, cumulative experience and the religious component remain crucial in the creation of community organisations. The combination of such factors has impeded any drives to address deficiencies and strike a balance in the field of community work, bearing in mind that 75 per cent of existing associations, which now number around 46,600, are charity organisations. There has been a striking increase in the number of community associations of a religious nature. Of the 4,600 created over the past three years, from 2011 to 2013, 2,900 had a religious base. Political affairs have tended to receive greater attention than social affairs. There is a relatively low participation of youth civil society organisations. In contrast to the high participation of youth in protest movements over the past three years, there are only 311 youth associations and, moreover, 60 per cent of these were created between 2003 and 2006. The foregoing features on the community association map underscore the need to reorganise civil society to make it more effective, more influential and more capable of contributing to the development of a modern state. This would enhance the public's ability to participate and entrench the values of citizenship, civil liberties and human rights. If, after the 30 June Revolution, we are to restructure the relationship between the state and society, it is crucial to restructure civil society, inclusive of its various organisations, roles and functions, responsibilities and values, so as build a strong, independent civil society that is immune to infiltration and exploitation. The crucial issue here is to avert the religious-political use of civil society organisations as this effectively strips such organisations of their “civil society” character and turns them into the instruments of political forces. That trend, in turn, works to deepen social divisions, aggravate political and social polarization, and intensify sectarian and ethnic divisions. It does not promote the welfare of the nation or the wellbeing and cohesion of society. The lesson we must grasp immediately is that the political use of religion can be highly detrimental to society. The absence of law, exploitation of social and economic circumstances and, above all, exploitation of the religious component of the Egyptian character towards the attainment of socio-political ends and social status have contributed to the continued political use of religion. Given this reality, discussion of the future is contingent on an ability to transcend a perspective that is limited to remedies. The issue is much greater than attempts to control the use of religion in politics by reviewing connections between community associations and political forces that support violence and terrorism. What is needed is comprehensive legislative reform that covers all laws affecting NGOs, syndicates, cooperatives, municipalities and other bodies that work directly with the community. This reform should to make it possible for individual citizens and the community to control and eliminate extremist ideas being spread through community activism. They need to steer civil society in a direction that promotes the fulfilment of people's basic needs and respects the authentic values of the Egyptian character. The writer is editor-in-chief of the monthly magazine Ahwal Masriya.
