For Libya, 2014 was a year of intensifying political polarisation and armed conflict that have relentlessly propelled the country over the precipice into civil war, and perhaps partition. Developments this year carry over from last year's violence that peaked with two particularly bloody incidents. The first took place in Al-Kufiya district of Benghazi in June when clashes erupted between anti-militia protesters and the Libya Shield 1 Brigade, leading to hundreds of casualties, the vast majority of whom were civilians. It was one of the first signs of the emergent regional conflict in the country. The second incident took place in November in the affluent Gharghour district of the capital, Tripoli, when militia groups opened fire on protesters, precipitating clashes that, again, resulted in hundreds of civilian casualties. The two events were the strongest indicators and preludes of the internal conflict in Libya that, in turn, led to a real division in the political, social and security scene in the country, which entered the phase of comprehensive security breakdown in 2014. Opening on a note of intensifying tensions and violence, 2014 inexorably led the country to acute polarisation that by the end of the year was crowned with two rival parliaments and two governments, each claiming legitimacy and each determined to exclude the other. One of the parliaments is based in Tobruk and the other in Tripoli. Each authority has its own military wing and its own military “operation” while the country is gripped by civil war for the first time since the 1930s when Libya was under Italian colonial occupation. On 14 February 2014, retired General Khalifa Haftar took the world by surprise with his announcement of the suspension of the General National Congress (GNC), the government of Prime Minister Ali Zeidan and the August 2011 Constitutional Declaration, which is the roadmap for the post-Gaddafi interim phase. The announcement, broadcast on television and circulated on YouTube, in which Haftar stated he had secured control over the key institutions of the state, was sarcastically dismissed by some as a “television coup” with no tangible existence in reality. But Haftar's action did stir alarm and confusion among government authorities, namely the GNC and the Zeidan government, which at the time was not on the best of terms with the GNC. As a consequence, some of the proliferating militias were called into play, further complicating the situation. Then, on 16 May 2014, Haftar officially launched “Operation Dignity” with the stated aim of purging Libya of terrorism which he accused the GNC of supporting. Before this, the political crisis was mounting between the constituent blocs of the GNC, which had extended its term beyond 7 February when it was officially due to end according to the Constitutional Declaration. In an effort to resolve this, the GNC created a committee to amend the Constitutional Declaration and to draft a bill of law for parliamentary and presidential elections. The amendments and elections law were quickly drafted and passed in order to stem mounting pressures from adversaries. Around that time it was increasingly clear that Libya was becoming another focal point for a regional conflict as rival factions in the country sought to strengthen their positions by soliciting outside support. The trend further complicated the Libyan crisis and as divisions sharpened each side became increasingly convinced that armed conflict was the answer. The folly of believing in their capacity to resolve the conflict in their favour, the priority they gave to their factional interests over the higher national interest and the welfare of the Libyan people, and the fact that outside backers were probably pushing them in this direction ultimately drove the country into full-fledged open warfare with Tripoli and Benghazi at the centre of fierce battles over the control of these highly symbolic cities.
THE BATTLE IN THE EAST: The warring parties in the east and their positions with respect to the security situation and the war on terrorism are now distinct. The two sides to the conflict that have been raging primarily in and around Benghazi and Derna consist of the forces fighting beneath the banner of retired general Khalifa Haftar and the forces arrayed behind the Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries (SCBR).
HAFTAR'S FORCES: In addition to the forces under the command of Haftar, this side comprises a number of former Libyan army officers who had taken part in the war with Chad during the 1980s. Because they stand accused by revolutionaries of being loyal to the Gaddafi regime, the post-revolutionary chiefs of staff refused to assimilate them into the new Libyan army when it was being reconstructed. As “remnants” of the former regime, they are also regarded as legitimate targets by extremist groups, while they also harbour what might be termed a historic enmity with their adversary since the time they were with the Gaddafi regime. Such factors are what motivated those officers into joining Haftar's forces as a form of self-protection against extremists and in order to help the country eliminate terrorists. Haftar was also able to rally to his side the Hassan Al-Juweifi Brigade. Based in northern Cyrenaica, it is the largest Libyan army regiment in the east. Another group, calling itself Awliya Al-Damm (Guardians of Blood), drawn together by the fact that their family members were murdered by terrorist forces that have proliferated under the total absence of national security agencies and an effective central authority, also joined Haftar's campaign. Haftar also forged alliances with major eastern Libyan tribes, such as Al-Obeidat, Al-Baraa, Al-Awaqir and Al-Arafa, which he was able to persuade to join him in his fight against terrorists. In addition, he depended on general support from the public in the east, especially the inhabitants of Benghazi and Derna where security conditions have deteriorated sharply, as well as on the support of advocates of the federalist movement who seek autonomy for Cyrenaica and who stand to benefit from the elimination of Islamists in the east, which is where Islamist forces have their major stronghold. More recently, Haftar was able to secure the confidence of the new parliament that was elected in national polls on 25 June to replace the GNC. As tensions mounted, the parliament officially declared its support for Haftar and, moreover, appointed one of his men as chief of staffs, in an open challenge to the parliament's adversary in the West. The move enhanced its domestic and regional impetus and furnished a justification for assistance from various regional parties. It also facilitated the inclusion of albeit feeble government forces in the Haftar campaign. These include the police forces of the Benghazi Security Directorate, inclusive of their Central Security and Auxiliary Security units; the commando forces led by Colonel Wanis Boukhamada, a regiment of the official army that was carried over from the previous era; and the forces of the Joint Security Chamber, a 6,000 troop force combining soldiers, police and revolutionaries. Government forces had long been helpless in the face of the turmoil in Benghazi due to confusion among official authorities, as represented by the GNC and the interim government, and the consequent lack of a unified vision on how to address the mounting security challenges during the interim period. Their predicament was aggravated by the fluid loyalties of the forces of the official security agencies, the conflicting decisions issued by ruling authorities, whether the interim government, the conflict-ridden GNC, the Ministry of Defence or the General Chief of Staffs.
SCBR UMBRELLA: The Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries (SCBR): The SCBR umbrella consists of the Ansar Al-Sharia organisation, the 17 February and Rafallah Al-Sahati regiments and Libya Shield 1 and 2. Alongside them is a coalition of other radicals in Derna where more extremist groups, such as the Islamic Shura Army, prevail. Derna has emerged as the stronghold of the jihadists who openly challenge the development of a modern Libyan state. In January 2014, the US branded the Ansar Al-Sharia in Benghazi and Derna as a terrorist organisation. It accuses at least 15 of its members of being involved in the assault against the US Consulate in Benghazi on 11 September 2012. Foremost among these are the organisation's leader, Mohamed Al-Zahawi, Ahmed Bou Khatala (arrested in April 2014) and others who live in Benghazi's Leithi district, which has become known as the Libyan “Kandahar”. Earlier this year, the Libyan government, for the first time, explicitly blamed Ansar Al-Sharia for the attack against the Benghazi Security Directorate on 2 May 2014. The ensuing clashes claimed dozens of dead and wounded from Benghazi security forces (the army, police and commandos) and from Ansar Al-Sharia militiamen. Following the arrest of a number of these militia fighters, Ansar Al-Sharia carried out a series of abductions of security forces to use as hostages to barter for the release of its detained members. The many months-long conflict between the Haftar campaign and SCBR militias appears to have settled into a kind of stalemate in and around Benghazi, with one side advancing here and another advancing there without either being able to gain a strategic advantage. The protracted fighting has exhausted the city of Benghazi with its many neighbourhoods, since October, becoming a battle theatre leaving most of the houses riddled with bullets or damaged by mortar bombs, if not entirely destroyed.
THE CONFLICT IN THE WEST: In western Libya, the warfare appears to be fired more by tribal conflicts than by conflicts with extremists. The militias affiliated with the mountain city of Al-Zintan are the chief rivals to those affiliated with Misrata on the coast. The Al-Zintan forces have come out in support of Haftar's Operation Dignity and, prior to that, they were among the opponents to the GNC's move to remain in power after its term had expired on 7 February. In order to prevent Al-Zintan militias in cooperation with the forces from some other tribes from seizing control of Tripoli as a way to support Haftar's campaign, Misrata and its allies launched the “Libya Dawn” operation. Occurring on 13 July 2014, which is to say about two months after Haftar launched “Operation Dignity” against the SCBR in Benghazi, the purported aim of the Misrata-led operation was to quell the revolt against legitimacy and protect the 17 February Revolution. Just as Operation Dignity has its own bases of support, so too does Operation Libya Dawn. These are primarily drawn from anti-Gaddafi revolutionaries and Islamist political parties and forces that took to the streets in massive demonstrations of support in Tripoli and Benghazi. The GNC also came out in support of the Libyan Shield militias and revolutionary brigades against what it called a “coup against legitimacy” waged by Haftar. So too did the office of the chief mufti, which some sources claim is funded by certain Arab countries, pronounce its support for the same militias. Fighting beneath the Libya Dawn standard are the forces of the Libyan army and the most salient brigades and shields that the government created following the fall of the Gaddafi regime. Also arrayed behind this standard is a coalition of 22 towns and cities that represent the urban centres in western Libya. The Central and Western Libya Shields, the Third Force and the Misrata, Al-Zawya, Nalut, Gharyan and Tajoura brigades are among the chief formations in Libya Dawn. The operation succeeded in taking control over Tripoli and its surroundings in August. Subsequently, the western forces that allied with the Haftar drive, namely the forces from Al-Zintan and Al-Mashashiya and Bedouin tribes, initiated a drive to recapture the capital after having received authorisation for this purpose from the parliament and the government of Abdullah Al-Thinni. The conflict in western Libya is more complicated than that in the east as it is essentially a protracted social conflict with historical roots. In addition, social and tribal alliances have recently been damaged by the sharp polarisation in Libya today.
