Al-Qaeda is using regional tensions to regroup and expand in ways that are ominous indeed for the future, writes Khalil El-Anani* Religious-inspired violence took 120,000 lives in Algeria in the 1990s alone. And the recent bombings in Algeria and Morocco are clear indication that the jihadists are not done yet. They are re- inventing themselves once more under the tutelage of Al-Qaeda. The revival of violence is not as surprising as it seems, for the raw material that supports violence is widely available. Fanaticism is not in short supply, and it is not hard for terrorist organisations to find recruits. People such as Osama Bin Laden, Ayman Al-Zawahri and Abu Musaab Al-Zarqawi seem to have captured the imagination of many among the younger generations. For years, researchers have been trying to explain the Islamic phenomenon in relation to the political and economic make-up of Arab societies. But the recent bombings in Casablanca and Algiers prove that the matter runs deeper than we have thought. There is a deadly virus in our midst, one that is passed on from one generation to the next. For Algeria, it all started last January when the Algerian Salafi Group, a successor of the Armed Islamic Group, said it joined Al-Qaeda. The Salafi Group pledged loyalty to Bin Laden and changed its name to Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Arab Maghreb. The new group promised to wage attacks across the Arab Maghreb -- Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia -- as well as in European countries, including France and Spain. Several geopolitical and logistical factors helped that group. One was inadequate security precaution taken in the desert region shared by Algeria, Mali, and Chad. The dispute between Morocco and Algeria over the western desert has weakened coordination between the intelligence services of both countries. France is said to be mediating between Algeria and Morocco to ensure that they step up their security efforts. Al-Qaeda likes to operate in peripheral and chaotic areas. This is why it went to Sudan in the early 1990s. It has operated in the border areas linking Ethiopia, Eritrea and Sudan. It enjoys certain privileges on the Pakistan-Afghan borders. And it sent its operatives to the jungle area separating Ethiopia and Somalia. Now, it is the turn of Algeria and Morocco. Al-Qaeda is regrouping. First, Al-Qaeda is trying to "activate" its sleeper cells all over the world, especially in areas where security is lax, as in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Second, it is trying to cooperate with existing jihadist organisations, especially those that haven't had any organisational links with Al-Qaeda but share its ideas, such as the Algerian Salafi Group. Third, Al-Qaeda is trying to exploit the psychological mood of the Arab street; namely, the hostility towards the United States, Israel and some Arab countries that was generated by the war in Lebanon. The events in Lebanon boosted the popularity of Islamists at the expense of conventional secular movements. Fourth, Al-Qaeda is hoping to bank on tensions between the West and the Muslim world. It is using these tensions to justify any attacks it may launch against the US and its allies inside and outside the Arab world. Fifth, Al-Qaeda is trying to highlight US failure in the "war on terror" as well as in Iraq and Afghanistan. Lastly, Al-Qaeda is trying to capitalise on official Arab failure to resolve the "core" problems of the region, in Palestine, Lebanon and Iraq. It now claims that the only solution is "jihad" against "Crusaders and Zionists". The strategy of Al-Qaeda consists of two main components. On one hand, it is attempting to keep a high profile, especially in the media, and thus refute any claims that it is a spent force. On the other hand, it wants to portray itself as the only group capable of confronting the US and the West. Al-Qaeda is also trying to "export" its message and win the loyalty of like-minded organisations. In short, Al-Qaeda is trying to boost its media capabilities, broaden its organisational connections, and enhance its operational impact. Concerning the media, Al-Qaeda has shifted its policy. Instead of trying to depict the US and the West as enemies of Islam and Muslims -- which was a rather crude form of propaganda -- it is now focussing on "substantial" matters such as Palestine, Iraq and Lebanon. Al-Qaeda is also criticising US interference in Arab domestic affairs, including on the political reform front. In the 55 speeches made by Bin Laden and Al-Zawahri since 11 September 2001 (25 by Bin Laden and 30 by Al-Zawahri), about 20 speeches blamed the US for the troubles in Iraq, Palestine and Lebanon. Iraq was mentioned in 11 of these speeches. As for its method of operations, Al-Qaeda is trying to move horizontally, creating more links with new groups, and making sure that all like- minded organisations are acting in tandem. It is trying to win over as many of the existing jihadist groups as possible. Its main targets are those groups that have engaged in "local" violence for years without achieving consequent political clout. Through newly recruited local subsidiaries, Al-Qaeda is hoping to compensate for the loss of some of its sleeper cells over the last four years. Al-Qaeda is also turning its attention once more to the "near" enemy, or Arab governments with close ties to the West. This choice of target would help it rally the support of local militant groups. Al-Qaeda is trying to cooperate with groups that are political and ideologically isolated in their own countries and thus lack moral and material support. The Algerian Salafi Group is an example. The group announced in mid-September 2006 that it had joined Al-Qaeda. The group is one of the largest armed organisations in Algeria. It broke away from the Armed Islamic Group in 1998 and currently has more than 600 men under arms, mostly stationed in tribal areas. Negotiations between Al-Qaeda and the Salafi Group are thought to have lasted three years. Through a strategy of expansion, Al-Qaeda has widened the scope of its operations in the Arab world. Over the past three years, it has mounted attacks in Iraq, Morocco, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and Algeria. According to Al-Zawahri, Al-Qaeda aims to "punish" Arab governments for their inaction on core Arab issues. The question now is not what Al-Qaeda is doing, but what we can do to stop the tide of suicidal madness that runs from Pakistan to Algeria. Al-Qaeda is more than an organisation or ideology; it is a phenomenon that has gripped our societies. It is a trend in which "latent" Salafi groups morph into "militant" ones continually. Hardly a week passes by without new jihadist groups springing up in our midst, from the Organisation for the Liberation of Andalusia in Morocco to the Soldiers of the Levant in Syria and Lebanon. And let's not forget the Islamic State of Iraq or the Tunisian Youth for Unification and Jihad. The fragmentation of the jihadist movement is likely to re-ignite religious violence in the region in a more brutal form than anything we've seen so far. And once things calm down in Iraq, a whole generation of jihadists will be ready to seek adventure elsewhere. * The writer is a political analyst with Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies.
