The next phase of Al-Qaeda may make previous incarnations appear tame, writes Khalil El-Anani* It's been 10 years since the International Islamic Front for the Combat of Jews and Christians, aka Al-Qaeda, was born. That was on 22 February 1998, but the process that led to Al-Qaeda's formation started long before that. It was 20 years ago, in 1988, when Osama Bin Laden and his Egyptian comrades fell out with Abdallah Azzam, who until then was the uncontested leader of the Arab mujahideen in Afghanistan. Since its formation, Al-Qaeda mutated more than once. The most spectacular mutation was on 9/11, a watershed that ended Al-Qaeda's existence as a conventional organisation with hierarchical structure and clear lines of command. In later years, Al-Qaeda was to become a doctrinal framework available for all those wishing to perform the "absent tenet" of taking arms against perceived wrongdoers of various creeds. With the Soviets out of Afghanistan, Muslim combatants enrolled in Al-Qaeda, swearing allegiance to Bin Laden, Abu Obeid Al-Banshiri (Mohamed Amin Al-Rashidi) and Abu Hafs Al-Masri (Mohamed Atef), and pledging to fight for the cause of "beleaguered" Muslims everywhere. With the formation of the Islamic Front for the Combat of Jews and Christians, the militants were no longer focussed on the Soviets, but rather everywhere. They tried their hand in Dar Al-Salam and Nairobi in 1998, and then hit the jackpot: 9/11. That wasn't the last mutation. Al-Qaeda's doctrine is currently being "hijacked" by small groups who claim to be its affiliates. These groups are generally more hardcore than Al-Qaeda. Dwelling on the fringe of the fringe, some are rewriting the goals and approach of the mother organisation to suit their own purposes. The mutation is clear in the cases of both Iraq and Algeria. The new groups see Al-Qaeda as nothing but a steppingstone to wider opportunities, for example, establishing an Islamic caliphate, or the utter defeat of "imperialism and Zionism". Three characteristics of the new groups are worth noting here. First, while Al-Qaeda pledged to fight Jews and Christians "wherever they may be," new fringe groups want an "Islamic state" established at any price, even over the dead bodies of their coreligionists. In Iraq, following the assassination of Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, groups of Muslim extremists abandoned their earlier goal of resisting US occupation in Iraq and started focusing on the creation of the "Islamic state of Iraq". Consequently, they turned against other sections of the Iraqi resistance and the very Sunni tribes and clans that used to aide and abet them. Now these same groups are locked in mortal combat with the so-called Awakening Councils -- interestingly enough against the best judgement of Al-Qaeda leaders. A few months ago, Bin Laden called on the Iraqi mujahideen to close ranks and set aside their differences. The new groups ignored him. Second, the new groups are less scrupulous in their recruitment patterns. Over the past few months, they've sent women as well as the handicapped and elderly on suicide missions. In Iraq, nearly 20 women blew themselves up in suicide attacks over the past two years. In Algeria, one of the two suicide attackers of 11 December 2007 was a 64-year- old man. Recently converted Europeans were also sent into action, including Belgian woman Muriel Degauque, who blew herself up in Iraq in 2005. The recruitment of women as suicide bombers is a sure sign of the moral bankruptcy of these groups as well as an indictment of societies that lack a modicum of humanitarian conscience. Who will ever forget Sajida Al-Rishawi, the woman who re-enacted a suicide attempt her husband had carried out in an Amman hotel in late 2005? She was hailed by some as the "mother of Arab women suicide bombers". Third, the new groups have little use for the doctrinarian proclivities of Al-Qaeda. Acting on a hodgepodge of political and religious principles, these groups appeal to a lower domination of recruits, many with low education and perhaps a criminal record -- as has been the case in Algeria and Morocco. They have also proved attractive for former militants who repented and then went back to a life of violence. The profile of their recruits doesn't match the one seen in Afghanistan in the early 1980s. No wonder then that such groups often turn against each other, as we've seen in Iraq for most of last year. In Algeria, anyone who challenges the leader of "Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb", Abdul-Malak Droukdel, aka Abu Musab Abdul-Wadoud, or dares to swear off the insurgency, is summarily executed. By rule of thumb, it seems to me that the pendulum of jihad swings every 10 years or so (1988, 1998, 2008). So perhaps we should get ready for the next mutation. One possibility is that a new fundamentalist organisation even more morbid than Al-Qaeda may emerge in an attempt to fill the void left by the demise of conventional jihadist groups (in places such as Egypt). Another possibility is that present new groups would shed their loose affiliation with Al-Qaeda and develop a more independent style (Lebanon, Mauritania, Egypt, Sudan and Somalia). We may even see a power struggle evolve for Al-Qaeda's mantle. Should this happen, the day may come when the likes of Bin Laden and Ayman El-Zawahri seem moderate in comparison. * The writer is an expert in political Islam and author of The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt: Aging and Fighting for Survival.
