In Egypt's contemporary history, the year 1974 was one of its most important years. It was the year that witnessed the early or embryonic changes that later constituted major transformations or policy shifts impacting Egypt's state and society. Moreover many such shifts, with their inevitable impacts, continue casting their shadows on Egypt's current affairs. It is simplistic to assume that such changes happened overnight. Rather, like the tip of the iceberg, the shifts reflect much deeper and older changes that had been fermenting for years underneath. For instance, the inauguration of the “Open Door” policy in June 1974 has been attributed to the interaction of multiple internal and external factors that have their origins in the 1967 setback, if not earlier, with the rising economic difficulties that accompanied the second five-year plan. Moreover, many of these changes were interrelated if not interdependent. Sadat's “Open Door” policy, for example, cannot be separated from restoration of Egyptian-US diplomatic ties with its related increasing closeness of Egypt to the US. In fact, the changes introduced by Sadat in 1974 constituted a form of reorientation of Egypt that has profoundly impacted state and society. In less than a year, Sadat laid the foundation for Egypt's separate peace with Israel, reformulated Egypt's foreign policy towards a fully fledged strategic alliance with the US, and redirected the orientation of the Egyptian economy to eventually become a semi-capitalist economy with predominant neoliberal policies In 1974, Sadat had his highest popular support and no less important had raised Egyptian expectations. To remember the background of the whole year one has to start with the late months of 1973. More specifically, October 1973 when Sadat made his courageous decision of launching war against the Israeli occupation of Sinai. Egypt's victory in the October War catalysed many subsequent transformations. Being his most glorious achievement, the October War established Sadat's legitimacy credentials, giving him latitude to move forward on many policy shifts that he had not been able to pursue in the early years of his presidency. In other words, Sadat in 1974 has ceased to act as mere successor for Nasser. Rather, October's Victory gave Sadat the green light to move ahead with his own vision for Egypt. The first change came early. On 18 January 1974, Egypt and Israel signed their disengagement agreement separating their military forces along a 20-mile north-south line on the east side of the Suez Canal. And it can be said that the agreement was the start of the road to Egypt's reaching a separate peace with Israel. Sadat signed the agreement with its secret annexes under Kissinger's auspices whose shuttle diplomacy has succeeded in distancing Egypt from Syria, which signed its disengagement agreement in May 1974. No less significant have been the recently declassified Israeli documents of the exchanged oral messages between Meir and Sadat just two days before signing the agreement. In his message, Sadat was clear in establishing his objective, stating: “When I made my initiative in 1971, I meant it when I threatened war. I meant it. When I now talk of permanent peace between us, I mean it.” Ten days later Sadat sent another oral message to both Meir and Dayan stating the imperative to undergo a similar process of military disengagement along the Syrian front, in order not to “put any difficulties for Sadat in the Arab world”. Moreover, the agreement has illustrated Sadat's deeply held belief that the “October War is the last war.” As such, the agreement, both in form and content, and all its surroundings, secret annexes and oral messages, established the new pattern favoured by Sadat in addressing the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. The pattern was repeated in the second disengagement agreement, the Camp David Accords, and finally in the peace treaty with Israel. Specifically, the first disengagement agreement stipulated some restrictions on the Egyptian army presence and armaments in certain zones, a provision repeated in the final peace treaty in 1979. Still, such restrictions entailed a growing security threat as manifested by the recent increase in terrorist attacks in Sinai. On 28 February 1974, after a seven-year hiatus, Egypt and the US restored normal diplomatic relations. Egypt had cut its diplomatic relations with the US in June 1967 following the Six-Day War. The restoration of relations marked a new phase, not just in the two countries' mutual relations but also in the nature of these evolving relations. Symbolic of the new pattern of Egypt-US relations was the famous visit of president Nixon to Egypt in June 1974 with exuberant crowds turning out to greet him. Since that day Egypt started to build a special relationship with the US, reaching its zenith in the aftermath of the signing of the Camp David Accords where part of the provisions stipulated US aid to Egypt's economy and army. Sadat made a full turn in Egypt's orientation towards the US and its regional — and even global — strategies. Sadat's famous statement, “ninety-nine per cent of the cards are in the hands of the US” was highly expressive of the new paradigm. Close ties with the US occasionally compromised Egypt's right to make its own free choices. According to Joel Mijdal, “one after another American presidents, from Richard Nixon to Barack Obama, had worked hand in glove with Egyptian strongmen in executing US policy throughout the region.” There should be little wonder about the current hostile stand of the US administration vis-à-vis the 30 June Revolution that perhaps was the first “no” uttered by Egyptians against the interventionist role of the US in shaping Egypt's internal affairs. In June 1974, Law 43, pertinent to the investment of Arab and foreign capital, was issued. The law ordained the “Open Door” policy as described by the Sadat regime. Basically, the new economic policy was geared to attract foreign capital, particularly from the oil producing Arab countries, to partner with the Egyptian private sector, thus becoming the major driver of economic development in place of the burdened public sector that suffered financial and managerial crises. However, a widening gap opened between the promise and performance of the new policy. Social unrest culminated with the famous “Bread Riots” of January 1977 that seriously challenged the regime. The riots marked a new phase in Sadat's rule. According to Raymond Baker, “more fundamentally, the disturbances originated with the social strains generated with Sadat's Open Door economic policy”. It can be said that the Open Door policy had long-term detrimental impacts on Egyptian politics, economy and society. Such impacts lasted and intensified in the Mubarak era. Other developments found their roots in 1974, including the Sadat regime's endeavours to consolidate power. For example, the fierce anti-Nasser campaign was launched and/or orchestrated by the regime where writers, poets, journalists, former politicians and even ex-members of the Revolutionary Command Council metamorphosed and competed in denouncing the Nasser era and its values. It should be remembered that Mustafa Amin was released from prison in 1974, while his twin brother was allowed to return back to Egypt. Meanwhile, Mohamed Hassanein Heikel, the chairman of Al-Ahram at that time, was removed. In this campaign, no stone was left unturned across the whole 18 years of Nasser's rule. It was not just the supposed intellectuals who participated in this campaign; ordinary people were encouraged to raise lawsuits aimed at tarnishing the Nasserite regime's image. Torture lawsuits, mostly raised by the recently released members of the Muslim Brotherhood, were typical of the trend of politically motivated legal cases. Accordingly, the campaign was used to prepare the stage for the shifts of 1974 and the years after, where the regime endeavoured to justify its decisions through harsh criticism of the Nasserite regime. Another serious development related to the Muslim Brotherhood association, which say its cadres released as part of Sadat's efforts to counter the force of leftists. More significant still was the association's growing contacts with Islamists inside Egyptian universities. According to Abul-Fotouh, such contacts began in 1974 where the association expressed its willingness to merge with the Islamists under the leadership of the association. Nearly atrophied, the Muslim Brotherhood found new muscle in student Islamic movement across Egypt. Like a kiss of life, the merger with Islamists gave the association its second birth — a development that had far-reaching political repercussions that have continued to this day. Not unrelated to the rising trend of Islamic fundamentalism was the famous incident of the Military Technical Academy in April 1974, represented by Abul-Fotouh as “the first attempt of forcefully overthrowing the regime in our generation.” A few years later, some members of the group involved in the incident formed Egypt's main jihadist association. No less important was the Abd Salam Farag group that joined other militant Islamist leaders from Upper Egypt in the assassination of Sadat in 1981. Many of the changes introduced by Sadat in 1974 have become real challenges that need to be addressed by Egypt's next president. In other words, after 40 years, the coming president has to deal with a legacy that has been frozen during the Mubarak era. Amending the peace agreement with Israel to permit Egypt to safeguard its eastern borders, and redrawing the bilateral relationship with the US, have become thorny issues. However, the file of social justice, which has been poorly addressed if not put on shelf for almost 30 years, should be the top of the priority of the coming president. The writer is a political analyst.
