“If he threatens war, that will be his problem, because we will beat him again, as in 1967,” William Quant mentioned, quoting Golda Meir — the hawkish Israeli prime minister — commenting on Anwar Al-Sadat's rejection of her proposal on a peace initiative that had been transmitted through Henry Kissinger a few months before the October 1973 War. The initiative Meir proposed in 1973 came as a reply to an earlier proposal by Sadat calling for a partial withdrawal of Israel from the Eastern bank of the Suez Canal. In reality, Sadat was not just threatening to wage war, and definitely Israel could not repeat its 1967 attack. Sadat conclusively dismissed the likelihood of reaching a diplomatic solution to the stalemate condition across the Suez Canal frontline that had existed since the ceasefire in August 1970. According to a recently declassified Israeli document, Sadat's dismissal of a potential political solution was firmly stated by Hafez Ismail to German emissary Lothar Lahn, mentioning: “From now on, the Arabs' fate is in their own hands.” On the other hand, a new Egyptian army was built, excluding all the inadequacies that led to the setback of 1967. Nevertheless, Meir's attitude remained arrogant, reflecting the prevalent false sense of superiority among Israeli leaders, dominant in the aftermath of the 1967 war. According to Shalomo Ben Ami, “The Yom Kippur War was, in many ways, Israel's punishment for its post-1967 arrogance — hubris always begets nemesis.” Scientifically, a delusion is defined as a false fixed belief. The power of delusion disastrously misled Israel to face a real existential threat during the early days of the October war. The recently announced details of a secret meeting between Meir, Moshe Dayan and other Israeli leaders illustrate the desperate conditions Israel faced during the early days of the October war, where Dayan was quoted as saying: “Since the situation is very bad, it would be worthwhile, since we don't have a lot of time and a lot of options, that we prepare to show the nuclear option.” Within the same context, a recently disclosed Israeli document quoted Meir talking about her suggestion on the second day of the war to go to meet president Nixon, saying: “Ask me now how I would have done such a thing, I don't know. But out of desperation, when something dramatic must be done in order to move them.” According to The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology, Israeli decision makers systematically discounted evidence that Egypt was about to launch its onslaught on Israeli forces because such evidence was deemed inconsistent with their core belief that Sadat would not attack. The October War ended the careers of many Israeli army leaders and even some politicians, including Meir herself. On the other hand, 6 October 1973 meant a lot for President Sadat. Sadat's decision to start the war on Israel was his masterpiece, eliminating the ambiguities that surrounded his performance as a president during his first three years in office. The October victory was the rock upon which Sadat's legitimacy then rested. Many doubted that Sadat would be able to withstand the exceptionally tough conditions Egypt witnessed in the aftermath of Nasser's death. Abraham Rabinovich mentions: “Sadat had been regarded when he took office as a grey interim figure filling Nasser's shoes, until some more charismatic personality took power.” Ambiguities had adversely impacted Sadat's credibility both inside and outside Egypt, particularly with his unfulfilled promise of 1971, that he described as the year that would terminate the then-status quo of no peace, no war. Domestically, these years were politically and economically tough for Sadat's regime, facing pressure from different societal forces, especially among university students and workers demanding a termination to the stalemate status, as he promised in 1971. Tremendous were such pressures, particularly that some intellectuals were calling for more than the restoration of Sinai — demanding a more free society and state. On the international level, Sadat did not fare well, facing rising scepticism among the various actors, mainly the Soviets as well as the Americans. For example, according to a new Israeli study, Yigal Kiipnis argues that the 1973 conflict might have been preventable if Sadat's diplomatic overtures had been given a greater chance. Within the very same context of scepticism, Primakov in his book Russia and the Arabs has been pointing to a growing sense of mistrust of Sadat among Soviet leaders. Sadat's moves during the prelude to the October war were seen as perplexing, reflecting his eagerness to settle the crisis of the Israeli occupation of Sinai with its devastating consequences on both state and society. In effect, such perplexing moves added much to the success of what has been known as the deception plan that effectively misled Israel's Mossad and the CIA. Erik Dahl stated that the Egyptian surprise attack of the October war was seen as a blow to Israel's pride and an intelligence failure ranked with Pearl Harbor and Tet. In the aftermath of the October victory, Sadat deservingly emerged as a fully-fledged leader whose legitimacy was derived from his own concrete achievements, rather than just being a successor to Nasser. Despite the fact that Sadat's war decision rightfully made him a national hero, there have been reservations felt among certain sectors, particularly intellectuals, on Sadat's future direction and moves. Similarly, Sadat's management of the war period exposed his style of leadership as well as some of his personality traits. Hinnebusch highlighted a greater impact for external actors, stating: “Global forces played the most immediate role in shaping Sadat's course after October.” For Sadat, as well as for Egypt, the October victory was a watershed between two regimes, with fundamental shifts in policy orientation and direction. The policy shifts were evident during Sadat's management of the war. Yet these shifts had earlier origins, before the war that had made them visible. For example, Sadat stopped almost all coordination with the Syrian leadership just days after an initial unified war effort during preparations for the surprise attacks and during the early days of the war. This shift was further consolidated by signing the first and second disengagement agreements, while the Jerusalem visit and Camp David Accords represented Egypt's full retreat from the Arab camp. It should be remembered that Sadat eagerly pursued reaching a peaceful solution to the Sinai occupation and that he had already a secret channel with Henry Kissinger long before the October war. Sadat was pragmatic, caring little about ideological commitments, despite his claim about the virtues of the village. Within the same context, Sadat's relationship with the Soviet Union was a classical example of political pragmatism. Put differently, the October war jointly fought by Egypt and Syria using Soviet arms ended with Egypt pursuing a separate peace compromise with Israel under American auspices. The October war saw Sadat begin forging Egypt's strategic alliance with the US. The visit of Kissinger in the aftermath of the war was crucial in pushing towards this. Sadat was able to directly communicate his inner views and moves. Within months the US had become the major influential actor in the Arab-Israeli conflict, if not in all Arab politics. However, long before Kissinger's visit, and according to Michael Oren, Sadat lost little time in signalling his openness to Washington, informing Nixon in 1971: “You would be mistaken to think that Egypt is in the sphere of Soviet influence … If the United States proves friendly to us we shall be ten times as friendly.” Sadat's favoured solo diplomacy was behind many such shifts that ultimately transformed Egypt's policies and directions. Sadat favoured what has been dubbed as “electric shock” approach that alienated many of his subordinates, including the chief of staff in 1973, and two ministers of foreign affairs. Many have claimed that Sadat relentlessly started to differentiate himself from Nasser's policies and orientations. October's victory enabled Sadat to accelerate his path of faster “de-Nasserisation”. Measures like the “open door policy” in 1974 and the Political Parties Law 1976 were landmarks of this process, yet it is important to note that such shifts started early, with Sadat's repeated moves to distance himself from Nasser's legacy. Perhaps among such early steps was what he had called the “corrective revolution” on 15 May 1971 — of which nothing remained save for a small town and a bridge that carry its name. In essence, 15 May was to get rid of Nasser's inner circle of aides who deliberately opposed Sadat's views and actions. Within the same context one should understand Sadat's reconciliatory move towards the Muslim Brotherhood, aiming at balancing his bitter leftist opponents. However, Sadat's tactical success with his strengthening of Islamists eventually became the greatest strategic failure, one that is still casting its dark shadow across the whole political scene. Sadat's decisions were historic, bearing in mind the complex context of the Cold War with its risks and opportunities. The impacts of the 1973 victory reshaped Egypt's policies and relations on regional and global levels. Domestically, Sadat's brave move added much impetus to the regime's aim of inducing a transformation of Egypt's state and society.
