During the Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak eras, Egyptian foreign policy was influenced by Egyptian realities and the regional and international system as well as the character of the president and his ideology. In the first era, the Nasserist era, Egyptian foreign policy witnessed confrontation with the US and the West on Egyptian demands, such as the arming of the Egyptian military and the financing of the High Dam. American reluctance was due to Egypt's support for national liberation movements and resistance to American plans in the region, while the confrontation climaxed in the 1967 war that in the final analysis was a settling of scores with Nasser's regime. The Sadat era ended — particularly after October War — with a drastic change in the orientation of Egyptian foreign policy, where it shifted from total cooperation with the Soviet Union to cooperation and partnership with the US and the West, climaxing in the shift from war and confrontation with Israel to dialogue, cooperation and peace. As for the Mubarak era, it was a continuation of Sadat's policy. Mubarak committed to the peace treaty with Israel, and to regional cooperation with the US, which peaked with joining the international coalition formed by the US against Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. Regardless of some clouds that emerged from time to time in Egyptian-US relations, such as withdrawing the Egyptian ambassador from Tel Aviv in 1982, the Achille Lauro incident in 1986, and Egypt's opposition to Washington's vision on promoting democracy in the Middle East, the basis of American-Egyptian relations remained solid, particularly in military and security relations and the continuation of American assistance to Egypt. In spite of Egypt's reservations on the US war plan against Iraq, the Suez Canal remained open to American warships passing to the Gulf while Egyptian airspace opened to American overpass flights. In addition, Egypt offered gestures towards Israel, such as the QIZ (Qualified Industrial Zones) agreement and selling Egyptian gas to Israel. Such moves were certainly satisfying for and blessed by the US. During the last decade of the Mubarak era, the impression among experts and public opinion was that Egypt was subordinate to the US, and accordingly Egypt's regional role and status were diminishing. Although foreign policy issues were not among the slogans of the 25 January 2011 Revolution, foreign policy concerns started to arise in the following weeks: calls for an independent foreign policy, restoration of Egypt's regional role and the Palestinian issue were among the demands of demonstrators. Thousands of demonstrators gathered around the Israeli Embassy in Cairo, meanwhile, carrying hostile slogans. The first foreign minister after the revolution, Nabil Al-Araby, responded to these demands. He declared that Egypt would respect the peace treaty with Israel as long as Israel respected it too. He criticised the closure of Rafah Crossing, describing it as against international humanitarian law. He demanded a new page with Iran be opened and that Egypt sign international treaties it had neglected such as the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. It seems that the ruling military council, in response to these demands, believed that Egypt's internal troubled situation did not allow for a bold and assertive foreign policy. Therefore, its foreign policy reactions were cautious and timid. They were keen to keep the status quo, repeatedly asserted that Egypt would respect all international treaties, including the peace treaty with Israel, and underlining the willingness to continue military and security cooperation with the US while Egyptian-Iranian relations remained unchanged. Later, foreign policy issues were among the interests of the Muslim Brotherhood regime and its president. Within the first six months of his regime, former president Morsi visited a number of regional and international countries to assert himself and his regime on the international level. In assessing these visits, particularly to countries like Italy, Germany and Russia, observers and analysts concluded that the visits were without content — that the leaders of the foreign countries, particularly Russia, Germany and Italy, were not convinced. If the major slogan and motivation of the 30 June Revolution was national independence and keeping Egypt's identity, the implication for foreign policy was asserting an independent foreign policy and equal and balanced relations with foreign powers. The transitional authority established after 3 July 2013 was a response to these national expectations. Foreign Minister Nabil Fahmy, in his first press conference and following statements, responded to these demands followed by a number of foreign visits to major powers, including Russia, Japan, India, South Korea and recently European countries. The message was that the foreign policy of Egypt is building a broad and balanced base of international relations to guarantee choices. But he was keen to indicate that building relations with one major power would not be on the expense of others, clearly in reference to the US. In dealing with relations with the US, Fahmy described these relations as “troubled”. However, he was keen to establish dialogue to deal with the complicated bilateral and regional issues between the two countries. In interview with Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper on 27 January 2014, he said: “It is very important to establish a strategic dialogue between Egypt and the US. This dialogue will be positive because it will cover issues of interest to the two countries and how to deal with them.” What is the future of Egypt foreign policy following the 30 June Revolution? In my view, the point of departure should be to recognise the established fact that any effective foreign policy should be based on the internal situation of the country and its capabilities. International experience proved that China was not recognised as a respected and influential international power until it achieved its second revolution under Deng Xiaoping, where it became the second economic power in the world. On the other hand, the former Soviet Union collapsed as an empire because its regime failed internally. The debate in the US on the future of American power indicates that a powerful American foreign policy starts at home, and America will not be able to keep its status as a superpower unless it seriously deals with its internal problems (debt, healthcare, education, environment and the political system). For Egypt, it will maintain a respected and influential foreign policy in the region and the world when it succeeds to build a consistent political system, a healthy economy that does not depend on foreign assistance, an advanced educational and technological base, and an open culture interacting with the world. The writer is executive director of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs.
