The 30 June 2013 Revolution signalled a new era in Egyptian-American relations, described by Egyptian Foreign Minister Nabil Fahmy as “troubled”. Washington and Cairo came into contest over a number of conflicting concepts: Legality: In the beginning, Washington regarded Mohamed Morsi as the legal president elected democratically while the provisional regime argued that Morsi's legality was replaced by revolutionary or popular legitimacy. Military coup: While Washington does not describe the army's intervention as a military coup, its behaviour appeared as punishing the regime through suspending parts of its military assistance, such as orders of F16 planes and Apache helicopters. The transitional regime insisted that the army's intervention, based on the demand of over 30 million Egyptians who took to the streets, was far from a military coup, as the military from the beginning declared that they would not intervene in politics and government. A civilian interim president and a civilian government took power. Peaceful demonstrations: Washington regarded the Muslim Brotherhood's demonstrations as peaceful, and that they must be treated as such. The American argument contrasted with the reality on the ground all over the country, where demonstrators used armed violence amounting to terrorism by killing innocent Egyptians, destroying public and private buildings and cars, burning churches and universities, assassinating army and police officers, and recently bombing police headquarters in Mansoura. While the US administration criticised banning the Muslim Brotherhood, the banning by Egyptian authorities of the Brotherhood was in response to its violent and terrorist record. The last contested concept was “inclusiveness”. Washington urged Egypt to develop a genuine stable and democratic system. The Brotherhood should be included in the political process. The Egyptian authorities from the beginning extended an open hand to the Brotherhood, inviting them to join a national dialogue and reconciliation drive, peacefully reintegrating them into the political process. The Muslim Brotherhood rejected all initiatives, along with the committee tasked to draft a new all-inclusive constitution for all Egyptians. Their immovable demand was to restore Morsi's regime and ignore the reality created by the 30 June Revolution. In the process, the US administration sent contradictory signs. On the one hand, the US president in a statement before the UN declared that former president Morsi, although he was democratically elected, failed to rule democratically and abused power. On 3 December, John Kerry described the 30 June Revolution as a revolution believing that the Muslim Brotherhood hijacked the 25 January Revolution. He even called for establishing a strategic dialogue between Cairo and Washington. On the other hand, the US administration criticised the interim government in Egypt on a number of issues, including its decision to ban the Muslim Brotherhood. It also was reserved in reaction to the results of the referendum on the new constitution, and recently it did not invite Egypt — a key African country — to the expected American-African conference in Washington. Such contradictory reactions were justified by observers with the idea that within the US administration there are two schools towards Egypt: one that believes that it is in the interest of the US to keep cooperative relations with Egypt, recalling Egypt joining the international coalition to deter Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, opening the Suez Canal to US warships during the war on Iraq, and keeping to its peace treaty with Israel. The second school, headed by Susan Rice — who has the ears of the president — and some presidential advisors, raised the issue of American values on democracy and human rights. In review of these reactions, what decides which school will prevail is the outcome of the current political process in Egypt — the success of implementing the roadmap (namely, a new constitution, and parliamentary and presidential fair and transparent elections). Finally, the history of Egyptian-American relations indicates that in order to have a healthy and mature relationship both countries should lower their expectations of the other. Washington should stop expecting that Egypt will fully conform to its plans for the region, and consider that there is a new factor in the politics of Egypt — namely public opinion. On the other hand, Egypt should stop putting all its eggs in the US basket and start building broad and diverse international relations. The writer is executive director of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs.
