US decision-making circles (the White House, Congress, the Pentagon) and think tanks were as stunned by the size and scope of the outpouring of all segments of the Egyptian people on 30 June 2013 as they were by the 25 January Revolution. They were equally surprised at the capacities of these movements to attain objectives that — to the American perception — were unattainable, namely: the downfall of president Hosni Mubarak, who had long retained an iron grip over the state through his regime's security/police apparatuses, and the downfall of the first elected civilian president after the 25 January Revolution, Mohamed Morsi, a senior leader of the most powerful and most tightly organised political force and Islamist organisation in Egypt — the Muslim Brotherhood. Decision-makers in the US were thrown into a quandary. How were they to respond to these massive grassroots movements in Egypt? How were they to reconcile the principles of freedom and democracy that the US espouses, and indeed on which the American nation was founded, with US interests abroad, given the potential repercussions of developments in a pivotal regional power such as Egypt on other countries in the region and, hence, on regional stability and security, US interests and national security, and the security of its foremost strategic ally in the region, Israel? The electoral processes that Egypt will experience in 2014, from the constitutional referendum (the second since the 25 January Revolution) to presidential and legislative elections, will be important factors in shaping the future of Egyptian-US relations this year. Nevertheless, any prognosis for the future of this bilateral relationship, which has been variously described as a partnership and a strategic alliance between two countries that influence the security and welfare of the region, requires an assessment of the US perspective on developments in Egypt following the mass uprisings in January 2011 and June 2013 as this perspective will also shape the future of this relationship in light of the results of the polls in 2014. US APPROACH TO 25 JANUARY AND 30 JUNE: US responses to the events of 25 January 2011 and 30 June 2013 essentially followed the same pattern. When millions of Egyptians first took to the main squares of the Egyptian capital and other cities, Washington initially demonstrated its support for the ruling regime, stressing that it was the legitimate authority. As the situation began to intensify, the American position began to shift. US officials began to urge Egyptian authorities to take steps to meet the demands of the people and there were reports of behind the scenes pressures to compel these authorities to make concessions. As the Egyptian grassroots movements gained impetus, the US shifted its position again and began to openly call for democratic measures, which implicitly meant a change in the government leadership. Then, in the final phase, Washington bowed to realities on the ground, signalled its support for the protesting masses of 25 January, and then 30 June, and acknowledged the end of the pre-25 January government (the Mubarak regime) and subsequently the pre-30 June government (the Morsi presidency and the Muslim Brotherhood regime). The US administration's hesitancy with respect to the 25 January and 30 June revolutions is indicative of two different points of view in the US establishment on how to handle developments in Egypt following such major turning points in the evolution of the Egyptian political system. One camp of opinion objected to the way that Washington handled developments in Egypt between 25 January and 30 June. They held that President Barack Obama should not have continued to support the Mubarak regime to the end. Their criticisms grew harsher as the Islamists gained more and more power in Egypt, first through People's Assembly and Shura Council elections in 2011-2012, and then through presidential elections that resulted in the victory of the Muslim Brotherhood candidate, Morsi, on 30 June 2012. According to the proponents of this school of thought, the Obama administration had chosen to pursue a policy in support of the Muslim Brotherhood, a radical Islamist group opposed to the recognition of Israel and that would promote policies prejudicial to Copts, women and the freedom of belief. They held that the US had no interest in supporting a regime that rejects the very principles and values on which the US is founded. For the most part, this camp of opinion consisted of staunch supporters of Israel whose intellectual and political bastions are to be found in the American Israel Public Affairs Committee and such pro-Israeli think tanks as the Washington Institute for Near Eastern Policy, the Heritage Foundation, the Hudson Institute and the American Enterprise Institute. The other school of thought is more realistic and its advocates are to be found in such independent think tanks as the Brookings Institution, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Council on Foreign Relations and the International Peace Institute. They maintained that the US government should emphasise the need for free, fair and transparent electoral processes in Egypt and offer Egyptian authorities all possible support to hold such elections, while refraining to interfere in any way in the choices of the Egyptian electorate. They did not oppose the Muslim Brotherhood's arrival to power, instead preferring to respond to the situation on the basis of the pragmatism that generally governs the US foreign policy approach. EXTENT OF US INFLUENCE ON EGYPTIAN EQUATIONS: Whenever a political crisis erupts in Egypt, one of the first questions that circulates through Egyptian political circles is whether the US had a hand in the matter and how and to what extent did it affect developments. In fact, the US has no exceptional power to impose its outlook on the course of events in Egypt or, for that matter, to predict how events will turn out. The revolutions of 25 January and 30 June made this palpably clear. The amount of US influence in Egypt primarily stems not from actual involvement in affairs in Egypt but rather from the belief among political elites across the ideological spectrum (liberals, seculars, Muslim Brothers, Salafis) that Washington is somehow pulling the strings. Thus, the US has become a player in the Egyptian political arena not because of its actual ability to control events but because the prevalent belief among Egyptian elites and people that Washington has this power. This is not to suggest that the US has no actual influence on events in Egypt, but merely that it acts not as a fabricator of situations but as a force capable of propelling situations, when they arise, in this direction or that. In other words, the US cannot engineer or prevent a major historical event such as a revolution. But it certainly carries critical weight in a specific situation, namely when there exists a sharp division between two roughly equal camps, which opens the way for the US to move in as an arbitrator/tipper of the scales. In this respect, the US judgement and its response to the developments in Egypt in the post-30 June period (and, hence, the fate of US military and economic aid) will be contingent on the rapid handover of authority to a civilian leadership through fair and transparent elections and the emergence of a government in which it is clear that civilians, not the army, rule. Equally, if not more importantly, the authorities that are governing Egypt in the current phase must not take measures adverse to US interests in Egypt and the region. THE FUTURE OF EGYPTIAN-US RELATIONS: Washington's reactions to the developments that followed both the 25 January and the 30 June revolutions point to the guiding principle of US foreign policy: pragmatism. The US does not try to create situations; it deals with the situations that exist. It strives to take given conditions on the ground and turn them to its advantage, regardless of those dimensions regarding human rights and democracy. Washington has persisted in the same approach it followed with the Mubarak regime for 30 years, which is to depend on ruling elites, regardless of human rights violations and stalled democratic transformation. It has yet to learn the lesson that when it comes to the crunch, it is the people not the ruling elites that prevail. This combination of pragmatism and the prioritisation of US interests over the values and principles that it espouses has led Washington to sustain strong relations with whoever governs Egypt, regardless of their ideological affiliation or the nature of their rule. It dealt with the Mubarak dictatorship, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces that assumed control in the post-25 January period, and the Islamist president Morsi in essentially the same ways. Which is to say that it will be ready to deal with anyone who comes to power, be he a military man, a leftist or liberal, a Muslim Brother or even a Salafi, as long as that government serves America's strategic interests in Egypt and elsewhere in the region. In spite of the many severe strains in Egyptian-US relations during the past 40 years, there never came a point when Washington, whether governed by a Democratic or a Republican administration, cut off military aid to Egypt. Congress may have railed and threatened to cut off aid if Egypt's rulers did not alter certain policies, yet officials in the US were just as aware as those in Egypt of how important this aid was — to US interests in the Middle East above all. For this reason, Pentagon officials have often cautioned Congress that it would be a mistake to sever or reduce military aid to Egypt, due to its high strategic value to the US, because no other country can serve US interests in the Middle East the way that Egypt does. Therefore, when the US speaks of cutting off or back military or economic aid to Egypt, or of linking such aid with certain conditions that the Egyptian regime must comply with, the purpose is to pressure Egypt into making as large concessions as possible in favour of US interests. But it is virtually certain that the US would never follow through on such ultimatums, at least in a definitive or permanent manner. Egypt is of pivotal importance in the Middle East, which is why US decision-makers are more concerned about safeguarding Egypt's domestic stability so to ensure that Egypt can continue to perform its much needed roles in preserving regional security, in respecting the peace agreement with Israel, in the fight against terrorism, and the prevention of nuclear proliferation, and in safeguarding international shipping lanes through the Suez Canal and US naval and aerial navigation rights. The writer is associate editor of Al-Siyassa Al-Dawliya published by Al-Ahram.
