The Iranian agreement with the P5+1, the group of nations that includes the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany, has precipitated numerous conjectures over forthcoming developments in the Middle East and, indeed, the rest of the world. That the five permanent Security Council members would agree to share the same side on a negotiating table is, in its own right, a precedent in international relations. Moreover, this came on top of a landmark US-Russian understanding with regard to the Syrian crisis and the dismantlement of the Syrian chemical weapons arsenal. How could all this take place at a time when so many are talking about a new Cold War and Cairo and other Arab capitals are rejoicing at Russia's return to global leadership? Also, if the P5 have suddenly recalled their duty to protect international peace and security, what is Germany doing in the picture? One can only conclude that the international stage has already begun to change and that Germany has found a backdoor to permanent Security Council membership, sparing itself and everyone else the headache of having to alter the composition of this UN body formally. Certainly, it is no longer possible to ignore Germany, which has become Europe's leader and saviour from financial crisis and that is probably the only major power to emerge from the global economic crisis without a scratch. But where is this informal UN reform process, and associated developments in the world, taking us? The Iranian agreement with what I will now call the P6 is an interim one. The timeframe — six months — suggests that there exists a degree of common ground on fundamental concepts that could eventually enable a comprehensive agreement that would settle many nuclear matters and perhaps other matters of regional concern. On the other hand, the six-month timeframe is also a form of ultimatum. If a comprehensive agreement is not forthcoming by the end of that period, tensions will resurge and the possibility of a military strike against Iran will loom again. The obvious incentive and the latent threat, combined, carry the promise of a political and diplomatic process that will move forward towards a formula satisfactory to both sides. It is little wonder that they are both content and that each framed the results of the recent agreement as though it had won a diplomatic victory over the other side. Indeed, upon its return to Tehran from Geneva, the Iranian delegation was accorded a hero's welcome. It had asserted Iran's right to enrich its own uranium, a right not prohibited by the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, and Iran would continue to do so. But if Iran had no designs to produce nuclear weapons, why was it so intent on enriching uranium up to the 20 per cent level, which is a higher grade than necessary for any peaceful nuclear purposes? This was the question asked by sceptics on Tehran's claims regarding the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. It was also the basis on which Kerry claimed a victory for the P6 side since it introduced a ceiling to Iranian nuclear growth. According to the agreement, the Arak reactor will halt operations, Iran can continue to enrich for the time being, but to no higher than 3.5 per cent, while, in addition, it will have to dilute its stockpiles of uranium already enriched to higher grades to the 3.5 per cent level. Regardless of whether the agreement was a victory for this side or that, it remains an interim one. Like all interim agreements, it can either be an instrument to gain time or it can truly be a prelude to a larger accord. Many observers believe that, in this case, the latter is more likely because what is actually playing out is an attempt to reorder the Middle East, albeit by strategies and means radically different to those the US pursued following 11 September 2001 and that took the form of the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. The reordering process seemed necessary in light of three looming dangers. The first was the possibility of Iran attaining the capacity to develop a nuclear weapon, which would have led to the certainty of an Israeli or joint US-Israeli strike against Iran which, in turn, would fling open the doors to a regional conflagration. After all, while everyone knows how to start a war, no one can predict when, where or how it would end. The second danger comes from the rise in religious extremism in the region following the revolutions of the “Arab Spring” which catapulted the Muslim Brotherhood and their extremist or terrorist allies to the fore in a number of Arab countries. The third danger is the growing risks of rampant anarchy in the region, manifestations of which have already been felt in Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen. The danger, to which Somalia has long since succumbed, now looms over Sudan and Lebanon as well. No international or regional system can sustain such anarchy, which is why it had become necessary rearrange the situation through agreements and understandings on Syria and with Iran. Whether the measures taken so far are gradual or interim in nature, they are sufficient to plant the seeds of trust among parties that eye each other with suspicion, but that simultaneously share an interest in working together to confront dangers that threaten them all. In the interim, as these graduated measures await fulfilment they may stimulate psychological and concrete shifts in the region as a whole that may be conducive to successful talks on the Arab-Israeli conflict. As we know, Palestinian-Israeli talks are already in progress. So far, they have produced nothing but mutual grievances. Of course, this is part of the negotiating game and perhaps such gambits were also a way to kill time while Washington was concentrating on other talks. However, there are strong indications that something is brewing, especially in view of the concrete fact that regional balances of power have shifted as a consequence of agreements regarding Syrian chemical weapons and the Iranian nuclear programme. Regardless of how Israel raves against the Iranian-P6 agreement, there is no doubt that the strategic situation has fundamentally improved in Israel's favour, even if some continued Israeli whining might come in handy when negotiations get under way over a comprehensive deal that may be about more than the Iranian nuclear programme. As for Israel's insistence on maintaining a presence in the Jordan River valley, the demand has no logical grounds to support it. Meanwhile, the blow that Egypt has delivered to the Muslim Brotherhood movement marks the beginning of the end of the terrorist assembly in the Sinai and, perhaps, of the Hamas movement as well. This means that the forthcoming Palestinian state would not have an extremist and terrorist character. The environment has changed and this is reflected in Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. Interestingly, these are the first negotiating rounds free of leaks, which in itself is a positive sign. Another is that David Makovsky of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy has been recruited into the American negotiating team led by Martin Indyk. That Makovsky is a specialist on the Palestinian-Israeli border question may be a sign that what is taking place in the negotiating room is more positive than what is publicly admitted. Meanwhile, we simply have to wait and see how this attempt to reorder the region will pan out — a region that is so accustomed to surprises.
