The coming days are critical for thereafter Iran will be able to do little to reverse the momentum towards sanctions or worse, writes Mustafa El-Labbad The Iranian nuclear crisis has turned another corner now that the grace period that the UN Security Council gave Iran to put a halt to its uranium enrichment programme has come to an end. The month-long period was charged with heated exchanges between Tehran and Washington. Iranian officials -- including Ali Larijani, head of the Supreme National Security Council, Foreign Minister Manuchehir Mottakki, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and even Supreme Guide of the Islamic Republic of Iran Ali Khamenei -- used various interviews and press conferences to lash out at American policy and insist upon Iran's "unrelinquishable rights". On the other side, top American officials leaked information regarding Washington's resolve to use military force against Iran; part of a campaign aimed primarily at provoking Iranian officials towards greater intransigence as the end of the grace period neared. Ever since the 35-member Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) declared that it could not say for certain that Iran's nuclear programme was intended for peaceful purposes, the US has been getting its way on the Iranian nuclear case. Because of the IAEA decision, the case was handed over to the UN Security Council, where Washington wanted it. The Security Council called on Iran to bring to a complete halt its uranium enrichment programme and charged the IAEA's director, Mohamed El-Baradei, with the task of reporting on whether Iran complies. In other words, Iran was cornered as the accused that has to prove his innocence; and, following the end of the grace period, the accused that could or would not prove his innocence. Iran stands charged with striving to possess nuclear weapons. Iranian officials have refuted these charges in no uncertain terms. Yet, as eloquent as they have been in their defence, they failed to notice that the ground beneath their feet has shifted. As of February, the question was no longer whether or not Iran had the right to enrich its own uranium, but rather the extent to which it did or did not comply with the UN Security Council. It did not comply. As a result, the permanent members of the Security Council will now be deliberating over the type of penalties that can be imposed on Iran -- any further pleas and protests on the part of Tehran will only be regarded as a deliberate disruption of court proceedings. Iran and the IAEA Charter -- in accordance with which member states are entitled to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes -- have been sucked into a dynamic that makes the resolution to the Iranian nuclear question contingent not upon principle but upon balances of power within the Security Council. Consequently, it will avail Tehran little to insist upon its rights and protest against American double standards on everything pertaining to the Middle East. It is also doubtful that Tehran will benefit much from the widespread popular support it has in the Arab and Islamic world; a factor that may have been operable during the period that preceded the IAEA Board of Governor's decision to pass the Iranian nuclear case over to the Security Council. Now, it is only Iran's ability to play upon differences between the five permanent members of the Security Council that will have any real impact on what follows. If Iranian leaders don't play their cards right, Tehran will be in an even more awkward and distressing position. Any sanctions resolution, however mild from an economic or political point of view, will establish a new legal reality: Iran as a state to be penalised in accordance with the provisions of international law. At that point, if there is anything to be said about the independence of Iran it will be in the past tense. It follows, therefore, that from now until the next Security Council meeting may well be Iran's last opportunity to reach a compromising solution that will preserve its right to enrich uranium, albeit in a narrower scope and under strict international supervision, and that will dispel the prospect of UN sanctions and may eventually remove the issue from Security Council scrutiny. The forthcoming few days will be crucial for the future of Iran and the region as a whole. Against the backdrop of that US-engineered dynamic of steady and relentless escalation against Iran, Tehran must play power politics more expertly than ever. President Ahmadinejad's announcement that his country had succeeded in making an important breakthrough in uranium enrichment was a clever move, as it forced a new reality on the region. Since then, however, the Iranian performance has been far less astute, guided as it was less by calculation than by effusions of "national pride" and "national self-esteem," to use the oft-cited terms of the Iranian leadership. Perhaps it would have been better for Iran and for the region had the Iranian leadership responded positively and rapidly to Moscow's offer to enrich Iranian uranium on Russian territory. Had it handled negotiations well, it probably could have come up with an agreement that satisfied Iran's technological needs and maybe even ensured that Iranian experts were present at every phase of the process. Now, as the situation is threatening to blow up in their face, Iranian leaders have indicated they would "consider" the Russian offer if the Security Council dropped the case against Iran. Unfortunately, and mainly for Iran, this suggestion is not enough and comes at least two weeks too late. Iran possesses some not inconsiderable deterrent capacities: its regional alliances extending across the Fertile Crescent into occupied Palestine; its strategic position overlooking the Straits of Hormuz; even its relatively advanced missile system. However, it lacks a fundamental condition for its nuclear ambitions -- an international cover. The Israeli, Pakistani and North Korean nuclear programmes all evolved under the wing of a major power, whether the US or China in the latter case. This does not apply to Tehran. Moscow and Beijing may object to the way Washington is handling the Iranian nuclear case, but that doesn't mean they support Tehran's nuclear ambitions. Iran, therefore, does not have that many avenues open to it. Of course, it can withdraw from the additional protocol to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, as it can withdraw from the treaty itself, but the consequence would be to incur greater international wrath and play into American hands. Its only real recourse, therefore, to extricate itself from the defendant's cage is to swallow its pride, accept the international and regional initiatives aimed to spare it the impact of sanctions and make some concessions. For Tehran to put off compromise until sanctions are in place, by virtue of a Security Council resolution or another mechanism, is to place itself at the mercy of even harsher pressures ultimately aimed at stripping Iran of all its technological achievements and negotiating cards. The world of international relations is a fluid and dynamic one. Crisis management in this world cannot rely on one approach alone, least of all an obdurately intransigent one. Flexibility and good timing is key. Iranian folk culture has a considerable store of wisdom that leaders in Tehran would do well to draw on. Particularly appropriate under the current conditions is the Persian saying: "You can't count your chickens until the winter is over."
