Geneva II, the conference that is supposed to bring about a negotiated settlement to the war in Syria, is not going to be easy. The questions surrounding Syria's future are much larger than any international gathering can address. Lakhdar Brahimi, the veteran Arab League and UN negotiator, seems to be satisfied with the preparations so far. He has just concluded what some people called a successful tour of the region, and will be soon meeting with the Americans and Russians to see what can be done before the conference is finally convened in the second half of this month. But with only two weeks or so before the Syrians — divided opposition and government alike — and regional powers send emissaries to Geneva, it is not yet clear what agenda the conference will have. The organisers of the conference have told the prospective participants that they shouldn't make conditions before the meeting, and it is understood that Geneva II will be based on the general principles approved in Geneva I, but apart from that, there is little information to go by. As the date — which is not final yet, but perhaps around the 23rd of the month — for holding the conference approaches, diplomats from around the region have sprung into action. On Monday, Arab foreign ministers met in Cairo to coordinate their policies and figure out ways to tackle the problems ahead. On Tuesday, the Russians and Americans held consultations with UN officials in Geneva. The Syrian opposition, or at least the Western-backed National Syrian Coalition of Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, sometimes called the Doha Coalition, is going to congregate in Istanbul 9 November to state their position. This is a crucial meeting, for without a “credible” presence of the opposition, Geneva II cannot possibly take place. The Syrian government, though reluctantly, has promised to attend the conference. But almost in the same breath, embattled Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad, whose term runs out May 2014, declared his intention to run again for office. So even if Geneva II gets off on time, and with all those concerned in attendance, the gap between the negotiating parties may prove insurmountable. And without immense pressure from the international community, on all parties concerned, there is very little hope that the deal — whatever it is — reached in Geneva will stick. So far, there have been signs of slight but significant changes in the positions of some of the Arab and regional players, for many seem to be now positively disposed towards a negotiated settlement. A negotiated settlement acceptable to the opposition must lead to “an interim government with full powers”, as the final communiqué of Geneva I stated. Apart from that, everything seems perplexing, if not deliberately ambiguous. We don't know, for example, anything about the constitutional and legal framework for the transitional period. How long would it last? How much power would the new government have? Will Al-Assad stay — even nominally — in power? Will the country write a new constitution, and when? And on what constitutional basis would actions be based until the rules of the game, written in a new constitution, are spelled out? Is Syria going to go through a period of revolutionary legitimacy, or slide into a pattern of compromise that suits some but alienates many? And what will happen to the militias that the disgruntled may still be able to arm? And what, too, will happen to the money that keeps pouring into the country from outside donors, both individual and institutional? What opinions are going to endure, and whose opinions are those? Little is known about the structure of the coming state. Even less is known about its political affiliations and cultural identity. Anything seems possible, for any deal reached will dissatisfy some. The Islamist hardliners of Al-Nusra Front, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, and many who see Syria as a potential battleground for puritan Islam, if not global jihad, are already distancing themselves from the secular opposition. Some say that the future may involve a battle in which the Islamists will find themselves not only fighting government troops or the Free Syrian Army, but a combined force of the two. Should this happen, will the fighting spread into other countries? Will it turn into a sectarian war, with ethnic variations, that wreaks havoc across the region? Will local groups continue to fight on, and can they rely on the financial and military backing of foreign quarters? Will the Russians convince the Americans to embrace their views, or will they give in to American preferences? Is there a middle ground to be found between Moscow and Washington's interests? And how close would this middle ground be to true Syrian interests? Apart from politics, there is a whole range of security issues. Amidst the bombings and the troop movements, while new militias form and older ones decline, or switch sides, something else has been happening. Lawless gangs of no particular political affiliation started terrifying the population, robbing and stealing, killing and abducting, for financial gain or any number of other reasons. How can a country beset by political differences get its act together and clamp down on the lawlessness at a time when its own identity and structure are unclear? Other questions have to do with economy, with reconstruction, finance and prospective donors. These questions are not easy to answer, and they call for immense firmness on the part of major powers, prudent flexibility on the part of Syrians, and strict adherence to UN principles as exemplified by UN Security Council Resolution 2118.
