In four days of talks in Syria, veteran UN and Arab League negotiator Lakhdar Brahimi talked to influential members of the government and the opposition, including Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad. His conclusion so far is that the government and at least a significant part of the opposition will go to Geneva for a second peace conference, dubbed Geneva II, without setting conditions ahead of time. The conference, he said, was open to all members of the Syrian armed and political opposition, with the exception of Al-Qaeda-affiliated factions. However, Brahimi was inaccurate on two points. First, not all the opposition agreed to attend. Second, many opposition members also either made demands or voiced reservations about the conference. Only the domestic opposition agreed to go to Geneva, hoping that it would be able to use the gathering as a first step towards fully-fledged political change in the country. The opposition abroad, meanwhile, raised numerous objections and has so far made no promises to attend. The only demand that the domestic opposition made is not exactly a condition either, as even the organisers of the conference see it as a valid starting point. The domestic opposition wants Geneva II to be based on the principles delineated in the six-point final communiqué issued by the Geneva I Conference in June 2012. The most crucial point in this communiqué calls for the formation of an interim government with full executive powers. The opposition abroad has offered a longer list of demands, including that the regime transfers power in full to an interim government; that Al-Assad has no part in the interim period; that Iran stays out of the conference and withdraws its fighters from Syria; that the Syrian National Coalition of Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (SNCROF) selects and leads the anti-government delegation; and that the UN pledges to take steps to implement the conference's results. Shortly after Brahimi left Damascus, the Syrian official media called his insistence on holding the conference within a few weeks “imprudently hasty”. The Syrian information minister claimed that Brahimi's remarks in Syria contrasted with his remarks when abroad. What seemed to irk Syrian officials more than anything was Brahimi's position that all the warring sides in Syria should be disarmed. This, Syrian officials say, cannot possibly apply to the government. Many Syrians are less than optimistic about Geneva II. Some believe the whole thing to be a gimmick aiming to jumpstart Al-Assad's career. This notion is far from fantastical, given recent remarks in which the Syrian leader said that he was contemplating running for office a third time in summer 2014. Brahimi's remarks on the future of Al-Assad were intentionally vague. He once mentioned that Al-Assad might be given a role in the interim period, without controlling its course. At other times he pointed out that the interim government should have full executive powers, in which case Al-Assad's presence would be superfluous. This ambiguity proved to be too much for the opposition Syrian National Council (SNC), which called on the Arab league to stop using Brahimi as a mediator. Abdel-Baset Seida, the former SNC chief and a member of the SNCROF, wasn't keen on going to Geneva either. Speaking to Al-Ahram Weekly, Seida said that “I believe that the general feeling in the SNCROF is not to participate... No one wants to stake his reputation on something so shapeless and ambiguous as this conference.” Seida believes that an interim government with full powers is a good idea, but he cannot see this happening as long as Al-Assad and his cronies are part of the political scene in Syria. “The country is practically run by gangsters who have killed Syrians and destroyed the country,” he remarked. Few believe that the Syrian regime is sincere about finding a solution to the current crisis, simply because any progress towards democracy will leave it out. There are also signs that Al-Assad is trying to scuttle the conference in more subtle ways, for example by dismissing one of Moscow's friends in Syria, former deputy prime minister Qadri Jamil, from office. Al-Assad has also advised Brahimi to stay “neutral”. Fayez Sara, SNCROF media and political adviser, was hoping that the Russians would do more to ensure that Geneva II would succeed. Speaking to the Weekly, Sara said that “the Russians, if they want Geneva II to succeed, must apply pressure on [Al-Assad] and stop giving him arms and ammunition.” Moscow is said to be determined to hold the conference regardless of whether major players, such as Saudi Arabia and the SNCROF, are willing to attend. Some say that Moscow's insistence on holding the conference is a sign that it in fact wants it to fail. If the conference is held within the next few weeks, there is every chance that the Syrian regime will come to Geneva with a cohesive agenda, while the opposition will still be divided and voicing contradictory views. The question of Al-Assad's fate is a major sticking point. So far, there has been no sign that either Russia or Iran is willing to let their long-time ally disappear from the scene. And the Syrian opposition senses that the two countries would exert great pressure to keep him as part of Syria's future political settlement. Munzir Khaddam, spokesman for the opposition National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change, had reservations about the conference but believed that the opposition should attend. “No one who goes to Geneva II will get all they want. This is the nature of political negotiations,” Khaddam said. The opposition, he added, could not abandon its quest to end tyranny in the country. “There is a demand that we cannot abandon in any event, even if we have to withdraw from the conference, which is to move to a truly democratic regime.” Louy Hussein, leader of the Building the State Current, was willing to settle for incremental change. Speaking to the Weekly, Hussein said that “there is no way the regime is going to offer substantial concessions before the conference is held.” The best way to democratise Syria was to go to the conference, settle on a government that would hold elections, and proceed from there, he pointed out. If the SNCROF continues to defy both Moscow and Washington by making Al-Assad's political demise a condition for the talks, some say that Washington will do its best to break up the coalition and form a new one that is more willing to negotiate. What is clear so far is that Geneva II cannot get off the ground without the main parties taking part. In other words, unless the SNCROF, the Free Syrian Army and Saudi Arabia all show up, the talks will be meaningless. This is not to say that holding a peace conference can be postponed forever. Unless some arrangement is reached in the near future, Syria runs the risk of disintegration, with various armed groups — some fanatical — running their own segments of the country. The Syrians may not have great hopes of a speedy settlement, but they also know that they need one. When a major portion of the population is displaced and homeless, and food shortages are reported in one-third of the country, the clock is surely ticking.
