Geneva II is not off to an auspicious start. Even before Al-Qusair Battle, the conference was already in the doldrums. Since Sergei Lavrov and John Kerry agreed to hold the conference, the Syrian opposition had all sorts of doubts about it. The conference is about finding a settlement to the current crisis, and the opposition doesn't want that. It wants Bashar Al-Assad out. It was hard, however, for the opposition to pooh-pooh an event organised by two major powers with EU blessings. So it decided to make impossible conditions instead, saying that Al-Assad should step down and the interim government should have full powers, etc. That would have been fine if the opposition had any power on the ground. But it is hopelessly divided, endlessly fractious, and constantly bickering, thereby unable to bring a unified position to the negotiating table. To be fair, some of the benefactors of the opposition don't want a settlement either. So they keep pushing the opposition to stall. Interestingly, the Syrian regime met the inflexibility of the opposition with a show of flexibility on its part. It didn't, for example, ask for the opposition to stop its military operations, or even put down its arms. The regime acted with acumen, leaving its enemies to blunder. The success of the Syrian army in Al-Qusair may change the course of the ongoing war and force international and regional parties to rethink their position. Because the regime is in a better position, some of the opposition's backers may be even less enthusiastic about talks. Let's take a look at how things have changed for the Syrian regime and the US and its Western allies (Arab and regional powers are less influential and can be disregarded for now). The Americans are likely to be less keen on negotiations now. Washington cannot possibly hope for substantial concessions from Syria or Russia at present. The armed opposition was America's best leverage and it doesn't seem very convincing right now. This may explain why the Obama administration, while denouncing the capture of Al-Qusair, is paying attention to France's accusation that Damascus has used poison gas against its opponents. Previously, Secretary Kerry was in the habit of discounting the matter on the assumption that evidence was too thin. The Americans are now thinking of putting off Geneva II until July, perhaps even later. This doesn't mean that the US is abandoning the idea of the conference, for Washington doesn't want Moscow to be running the show alone. But a bit of waiting has suddenly become attractive. The Americans, meanwhile, may encourage their European allies to send arms to the resistance in the hope of reviving its fortunes. Damascus, for its part, was never too eager to go to a conference in which it will be asked to make concessions. Syrian officials and their friends at home will see no point talking now that the battle has been won and the ragtag army of terrorists and traitors — as the regime describes the opposition — is turning tail. Meanwhile, others will want to go to Geneva II to consolidate the government's gains. In short, the consensus on attending the Geneva II conference is now shattered. Likely, it is Moscow that will decide what's to happen next. Russia's opinion may carry a lot of weight in Damascus, simply because Damascus sees the war not as a domestic conflict but as a battle with outside forces led by America. So there is good reason to believe that Syria will follow Russia's advice on the matter.
