Current international developments suggest an idea that, at first glance, appears far-fetched or impossible. As we have learned from world wars and major regional conflicts, books and studies on international relations, and the practices of experts in diplomacy and negotiations, a nation's power is relative, not absolute. The US may have been a strong power with respect to Russia, Canada and Mexico. Russia may have been a major power with respect to China, or Poland. Egypt may have been a strong power with respect to Sudan, Libya and various other Arab and African states. But never have the US, Russia or Egypt been strong powers in an absolute or permanent sense. Now, what I am about to suggest I had to mull over in my mind for a while, even before putting it to friends and colleagues. The idea, in brief, is that there is no state in the international order, at present, which merits the label “power”, in either the relative or absolute sense. Otherwise put, “weak” has become a general characteristic shared by the vast majority of major states. Indeed, many developments that have occurred during recent years indicate that one country after another has become ready to confess, frankly and without embarrassment, that they have lost a portion of their strength. In certain cases, they may also have admitted to having drawn up mid-range plans to reduce their international responsibilities, reassess their national interests, and downscale their sources of material strength, for example, by reducing numbers of troops, cutting back weapons spending, or closing up military bases abroad or at home. As we know, the US is doing precisely that, intentionally and with aforethought, at this time. Perhaps it is an Obama plan that the president brought with him from outside the establishment in order to enter history. Or maybe he adopted it after having come to power as the consequence of various domestic and foreign pressures and in response to successive social and financial crises, or as the result of mistakes he and his administration have committed. All such factors seem sufficient to cast his record outside of history, although it is premature to pass judgement now. All we can be certain of is that Obama is determined to re-tailor the US's place and role in international leadership in a manner consistent with the decline in the US's actual sources of strength and with the magnitude and complexity of international problems that no single state can solve on its own, however powerful that state may be. We used to hold — and many still do — that the US's strength declined because the strength of others increased. It appears that we have overestimated the notion of strength as a relative matter. It is now clear that the US has declined because its own sources of strength have declined, not because Europe achieved unity or an economic miracle making it the strongest ally in the Western equation. It is equally clear that the overall strength of those 27 “powers” has declined in tandem with the decline in US might. The social and political instability in such countries as Italy, Greece and Spain offers strong proof of this. So too do the divisions in opinion among EU states over essential issues that affect the very future of that federation: the possibility that Britain may withdraw, solutions to economic problems, the future of cooperation with the Arab order, the settlement to the Israeli-Arab conflict, trade agreements with the US, relations with Russia, and the question of the US's shift of focus towards Asia. Developments in Europe may have indirectly confirmed Obama's prediction. Or perhaps Obama was only speculating when he decided to reduce US ties with Europe. Whatever the case, it appears that he has come to the conclusion that Europe has entered its dotage and no longer has anything to offer but romantic lessons from its distant past. To Obama, Europe is no longer an asset on which the US can depend as a strong and reliable ally. He has only to point to the train of European withdrawals from the war in Afghanistan and to the growing reluctance in the continent to contribute forces and funds to wars and regional interventions outside Europe, as occurred during those tense hours that followed Obama's declaration of his intent to strike Syria. Further detracting from the value of that asset, from his standpoint, is growing EU interest in Russia. A trend spearheaded by Germany, it operates in accordance with that age-old principle that led European leaders throughout history to encourage the “Europeanisation” of Russia in order to keep it from opting for isolation or recoiling into itself as it continued to harbour doubts and suspicions towards countries in the west of the continent. Looking further east, I count myself among those who believe that China is an indirect cause of US decline. I also hold that the reason that Chinese rulers have yet to exercise an international role commensurate with their country's growing strength is because they remain intent on adhering to a plan of carefully calculated graduated escalation. In recent months, particularly during the Bali and Brunei summits of East and Southeast Asian countries, one noted that in situations where the US was not on hand, China found itself in the position of unrivalled leader. Nevertheless, it was amazing to observe how Beijing comported itself during those conferences, as though to reaffirm its determination to continue its ascent to the peak, but without taking reckless and precipitous leaps and bounds. In other words, in spite of its evidently growing military, economic and political strength, China is still a “weak” power. It was interesting to observe how it behaved with respect to the Syrian question, especially as this crisis intensified. At best, Beijing cautiously “imitated” Moscow's policy. Indeed, the Syrian example demonstrates that Russia, too, lacks the clout to steer the problem to the solution it has in mind, exactly as is the case with the US, which has proved, recently, that all its hard and soft power put together was not sufficient for it to impose its solution to the Syrian crisis. The Middle East offers other examples of the declining strength of many countries, and not just those at the top of the international order. Iran has illustrated this idea by means of its decision to back down on its confrontationist stance towards the US. Tehran would not have undertaken such a shift had it not felt the decline Iran's soft and hard power, which compelled its theocratic leadership to reveal another side of Iran, one that was more realistic and more consistent with the circumstances generated by the economic blockade, diplomatic isolation, and the mounting chaos in the countries of the Arab Spring. Turkey furnishes another example in the form if its declining political influence and popular appeal in most countries of the Arab Spring and other Arab countries, as well as in Western Europe where Turkey's hopes for its dream of succession seem weaker than a decade ago. The slump in Turkey's soft power in the region is, in part, due to Ankara's attitude towards politicised religion (ie political Islam) at a critical juncture in the evolution of the Arab order. The Gezi Park uprising has also detracted from Turkey's assets and made it appear on the brink of a grassroots revolution. Then, too, there is the question of Ankara's stance on the Syrian revolution that had negative repercussions on Turkey as a consequence of certain actions it took in conjunction with Qatar and, simultaneously, as a result of a tendency to meddle in the orientations of the Syrian forces to the disadvantage of the major revolutionary trend. The question of Turkey leads us to BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), whose assent as an international force has clearly begun to slow, with the possible exception of one of its members: China. Yet, as we pointed out above, Beijing has so far refused to translate its indicators of growing strength into actual practice at the level of international leadership. As for Brazil, its strength was shaken by the deterioration in some of its service sectors and by a popular uprising that was triggered by justifiable grievances amid corruption and tough economic straits. Evidence of Brazilian decline could be seen during the recent crisis between Brasilia and Washington over US National Security Agency spying on President Dilma Rousseff's phone calls, as Brazil (as well as Mexico) could not rally sufficient regional solidarity to counter Washington on this issue. There are many indicators of the decline in “international power”. This is not solely due to the weakness that has come to afflict many individual powers. It is also evidenced by manifestations of deteriorating cohesion in most international and regional alliances, such as the lack of commitment on the part of member nations to the conditions or plans of the alliance, an inclination to prioritise their own interests over the interests of their allies, or wavering loyalties. In some cases, the weakness has spread to the extent that it has diminished the performance and efficacy of regional organisations, such as the EU and the Arab League. If my assessment is correct, this growing weakness will not work in favour of world stability, especially in regions already rife with conflict and revolution. It will certainly not be to the advantage of the Arab world.
The writer is a political analyst and director of the Arab Centre for Development and Futuristic Research.
