The countdown to the trial of deposed president Mohamed Morsi, scheduled for Monday 4 November, four months after he was removed on 3 July, has begun. Anticipation is high about what will happen. The Muslim Brotherhood has said it will mobilise nationwide demonstrations to protest against “a military coup against the legitimate president”. “It is not clear how the day will go. We anticipate escalation from the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist factions ahead of the trial. Security measures have been planned and they could be tightened if things took a bad turn,” says a government source. It is not clear whether Morsi, who is supposed to appear in court with 14 other people to face charges of inciting violence, will be present at the trial given that he refuses to recognise his removal and insists that as “the legitimately elected president” he remains immune to prosecution. The world is keeping a close watch on the run-up to the 4 November trial amid carefully voiced concern over the circumstances under which Morsi was detained in an undisclosed location prior to the levelling of any legal charges. “In our assessment Morsi is facing what are essentially political charges but whatever we think of the basis of this trial we need to see a fair trial by an independent jury otherwise we will have to show some sign of dismay, one way or another,” said a visiting European diplomat. She added: “The European Union has refrained from qualifying the removal of Morsi as a coup but has made it clear that whatever the qualification of his removal the political process that follows needs to meet certain criteria for the world to be reassured about the democratic process in Egypt; we have received some promises in this respect from the authorities but we have not seen them kept.” During recent weeks the EU and the US have made several protests against the authorities' handling of the Muslim Brotherhood following the removal of Morsi. “We acknowledge that the Muslim Brotherhood resorted to violence but we still believe that the state has been far too heavy handed with the demonstrations,” said a European ambassador in Cairo. Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies political economist Hanaa Ebeid says the view from a Western perspective is far from positive. Having just conferred with several European interlocutors Ebeid said she sensed “unmasked unease” in European quarters towards political developments in Egypt. The EU has been more cautious in showing dismay over political developments in Egypt than the US where the administration announced the suspension of a portion of military aid to Egypt following the killing of more than 50 Muslim Brotherhood supporters on 6 October. But today, says Ebeid, “there is reason to worry that some sort of harsh reaction could come from the European Union should similar scenes” occur with the Morsi trial. The Muslim Brotherhood is promising to show considerable “force” on the day of the trial. On their Facebook pages leading names from the group, including the daughters of Deputy Supreme Guide Khairat Al-Shater, are promising to give the authorities a hard time during the days ahead. “The way the state reacts to protests will be crucial in keeping the current mood of anger, tension and political polarisation away from boiling point,” says Ebeid. Morsi's trial is only one of several possible political flashpoints in the next few weeks. “The 4 November session is likely to be procedural with the judge referring the trial to a later date, probably after the completion of the constitution drafting process,” says political analyst Mohamed Agati. The event, he argues, counts more for its symbolic significance and what it might reveal as to where the authorities stand on the impartial enforcement of the law versus manipulating the legal process to secure political gains. The same, says Agati, applies to other pit stops on the transition road, including security management following the expiry of the state of emergency on 14 November, the ongoing debate over the drafts of two bills on political protests and terror and “certainly the drafting of the constitution which should be ready by 2 December despite political haggling inside the drafting committee and on the street”. Presidential and government sources insist they are committed to observing the rules of fairness and respect of human rights. In the words of one, “despite the pressure that police officers face every day in confrontations with terrorists there is a growing trend to delay the adoption of the laws on demonstrations and the combat of terror pending the election of a representative parliament”. He added that any constitutional articles granting extraordinary arrangements for the security bodies — army or police — will be transitional “and this will be stipulated in the text of the draft offered for referendum”. Sources inside the drafting committee speak of “considerable” and “heavy” pressure from “members who speak on behalf of the security bodies and who wish to include in the text of the constitution language that would be to the liking of the security and the military”. In the words of one, “there are close to five members inside the committee who are openly opposed to language that prohibits the trial of civilians before military courts; those who oppose them are less than five and those who support them are in the majority.” Meanwhile, Islamists are not hiding their concern at what they qualify as “attempts to dilute” Islamic identity articles. “This is not the wish of the people and nobody is authorised to do so,” says Ashraf Thabet of the Nour Party. Agati is convinced the tug-of-war between the Islamist and non-Islamist camps will be demonstrated most aggressively over the constitution. “If the final product fails to sufficiently please those who wish to side with the authorities, as it might well fail to please those on the Islamist side, then we could enter a prolonged political crisis that could easily overshadow the trial of Morsi,” says Agati. Amr Ezzat, a researcher at the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, is convinced we are already in the prolonged political crisis. “The Muslim Brotherhood and their sympathisers refuse to realise that they were well and truly rejected and the ruling authorities are failing to observe some of the key basics of any state of law. At the same time each side believes the other will give in,” he says. Ezzat argues that while the prosecution is “being an anti-Muslim Brotherhood advocate — not just in the case of Morsi but in almost all cases involving Islamists, Islamist sympathisers and even leftists who have been arrested during the past months” the Muslim Brotherhood and its allies are pursuing escalation “which is not always necessarily coordinated among all groups” and that presents the state with obvious security challenges. “As long as Muslim Brotherhood incitement continues, and while Morsi faces hard to seal charges of incitement to violence, there is considerable incitement from the state against the Muslim Brotherhood,” he says. In the absence of serious attempts to check the pace of escalation on either side we are heading towards a worse crisis, he warns. The decisive moment, says Agati, will come with the vote on the constitution — the Islamists have vowed to garner a firm no vote — and with the parliamentary elections that will follow “if the constitution passes”. (see p. 4)
