Egypt and the fifth general

While the door has been opened to a brighter future for Egypt, all depends on how the delicate work of removing the army from political life proceeds

The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has done well by announcing its support for both a democratic transition and a handover of authority to a civilian government via free elections that would take place directly after a return to order and responding to popular demands raised by the revolution of 25 January. Maybe Field Marshal Hussein Tantawy, the head of SCAF, is the last general to take power in Egypt since string of military men held high positions starting in 1952. It is high time to end military rule and return authority to its real source: the Egyptian people.
General Muhammad Naguib lead the country for a period that lasted less than two years, and to this day we don't know if his inclination towards democracy and civil rule in the 1954 crisis was genuine or just a tactic to counter Gamal Abdel Nasser and his cronies in the Revolutionary Command Council. Regardless of this question, it is clear that the 1950s was not an era where democratic thoughts and values could have triumphed. It was an era of nationalistic “upsurges” calling for the end of colonisation and the freeing of countries from foreign occupation. It was quite acceptable at that time to sacrifice public freedoms and democracy in return for freedom from occupation and some social gains. And that is what the general succeeding Naguib, Nasser, did when he established a regime ruled by the military and the intelligence services. At the same time, he started a far-reaching development process that helped better the conditions of the middle classes. It was not until the defeat of July 1967 that Egyptians saw the folly of trading freedom and democracy with stable livelihoods and personal security.
Sadat was the third general to rule Egypt. During his reign the banners of Nasser's socialism and single party rule fell, but the conditions were not ripe to undermine the culture of the “oneness” and paternalism of the state vis-à-visEgyptian society. Therefore, Egypt remained, throughout Sadat's time, hesitant and confused between glamorous slogans calling for freedom and political pluralism and the realities of an older culture left over from Nasser's regime. According to Mohammed Osman Ismail's memoirs, former governor of Assiout during Sadat's reign: “Sadat pursued the exit of the Egyptian army from politics because of his belief that Egypt's transition to a civil state is the only guarantee to release its pent-up potential.” In reality, we do not know how genuine this account is but it is certain that Sadat's efforts to eject the military from politics were not vigorous. This is proven by the fact that he appointed a general from the military establishment, Mohamed Hosni Mubarak, vice president in 1975. Arguably, this might have been because Sadat felt that it was just not time for a civilian to take up the vice president's position. After all, this appointment was on the back of the October 1973 War. A civilian vice president might have been interpreted as Sadat downplaying the military's victories. Better still, perhaps it was also because Sadat was reversing the values and ideas of his predecessor, Nasser, in politics, economics and the military. As a result, he needed the army to protect these transformations and to be a part of them. In any case, Sadat's assassination was at the hands of men affiliated with the army, which means that he failed to keep the military onboard.
The fourth general, Hosni Mubarak, increased the militarisation of society by giving retired military men high positions in governmental institutions and companies. He also fuelled the army's role in the economy in an unprecedented manner. Some estimates indicate that the army used to control a third of Egypt's economy. Therefore, this situation calls for a delicate remedy in the relationship between the army and civil society at this new stage after Mubarak's rule has ended. It must not be forgotten that the tremendous burden of protecting the country internally and at its borders falls on the army. What must not also be forgotten is the honourable stance that the military establishment has taken towards the 25 January Egyptian Revolution, as well as the goodwill that SCAF exhibits with regards to handing authority to civilians.
The fifth general, Mohamed Hussein Tantawy, will enter Egyptian history as the man to pull the military out of Egyptian politics. If Tantawy, along with SCAF, must realise that what existed in the 1950s and until the 1980s has now ended forever. Moreover, the young generations in Egypt will never again approve of a formula that swaps democracy and freedoms for security and sustenance. Perhaps the slogans of ordinary people who participated in the revolution are the best proof of that. Most of those who participated in the revolution aimed at restoring freedom and dignity before social justice. Nevertheless, without the fifth general's decision on starting this transition, ousting the army from politics will not happen, even at the hands of a popular revolution. This relates to complications arising from crossing the culture of the military with the culture of the militarisation of society over a long period. And the popular revolution's leaders have to be aware of this by persisting, on the one hand, in calling for civilian rule, and on the other, pressuring the military establishment to withdraw from the political arena. It is an arduous process, because separating Egypt with a potential bright future from Egypt that savoured military rule for more than half a century requires a special kind of awareness. Attaining a bright democratic future takes time and takes vigilance, to aide the fifth general in making the historic decision of removing the army from politics and establishing a new relationship between the people and the army.
The writer is an expert at Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies