In the first decade of the 21st century, Washington beckoned to Islamists in the Middle East to warm up before they would be given the cue to seize the reins of power from military men. The US was increasingly concerned that its long-standing allies (especially Egypt) had exploited its huge financial and economic aid for personal gain. In particular, the US suspected that its Middle Eastern allies were obsessed with a centuries-old Arab tradition of bequeathing power and control to one's heir and would use US money and anti-al-Qaeda sentiment to ensure a smooth power inheritance process. Trappings of power Fathers in positions of state power who were dreaming of bestowing power on their children had to back pedal treacherously on their commitments to Washington, resuming their supply of logistic and intelligence assistance for the US's massive and global hunt for al-Qaeda's terrorists. These fathers of ME power had real fears about potential dangers to their children's future tenures should they not distance themselves a bit from Washington in its controversial anti-terror war. Washington got wind of the allies' slackened enthusiasm when Egypt's ex-president Hosni Mubarak declared that the Palestinian problem was providing ammunition to al-Qaeda's alleged holy war across the world. Acting as a spokesman for his Arab counterparts, Mubarak repeatedly advised the US that a final and lasting settlement to the Palestinian crisis would deny al-Qaeda's terrorists a launching-pad for their alleged holy war against American and Israeli interests, regionally and globally. Mubarak's new definitions and extraordinary explanation of Washington's rationale for its embarrassing performance in its anti-al-Qaeda war gave ex-president George W. Bush's administration goose pumps. A feeling of uneasiness that overwhelmed Americans and Israelis at that time morphed into unmanageable fury in 2000 when Arabs convening in the Lebanese capital campaigned for a full-fledged normalisation of ties between Arab countries and Israelis in exchange for Palestinian land. Arabs' move to break the monotony of the Palestinian problem became a pressing need after their image was lowered so much in the eyes of their people that their thrones began to shake perceptibly. Looking aghast at the key speakers in Beirut's summit, the Americans also wrung their hands nervously when Arab heads of state and kings led by the Saudi monarch decided to intensify their campaign of land for peace formula. Arabs went to great lengths by starting to muster international support and sympathy for the downtrodden plight of Palestinians in the face of the Israeli arrogance and hostile feelings. Due to a decades-long game, Tel Aviv promptly rejected the Arabs' appeal for peace, even before Arab leaders and kings had time to board their planes to return to their respective homes. Acts of blackmail It was apparent that Washington had real concerns and that it was too late and too risky to wean its long-standing allies, a move which could cause a huge disruption in its anti-terror war. This was especially true since the US had started to muster the courage to argue the US's mandate in the ME, suggest new objectives and even rebel tacitly. Abnormal obstinacy, stubbornness and garrulousness stirred up Washington's suspicions that its men in ME had started acts of blackmail, in addition to deteriorating enthusiasm to play their roles in US counter-terrorism operations. US's ex-president George W. Bush decided to castrate the maverick Mubarak, and his administration approved. He got a wink from his Secretary of State, Condoleeza Rice, that the military man's (Mubarak's) arch foes, Islamists in general and the Muslim Brotherhood in particular, had mastered their homework assignments perfectly and were ready for testing. The US's former Secretary of State, who was known for her involuntarily right-to-left head shaking and vice versa, reassured her president in this regard after the MB's big men underwent several inspection parades at the US embassy in Cairo and in different locations overseas since 2005. Regardless of their ultra-conservative religious manifesto, which is more conservative than the MB's, Salafist groups flunked US's tests. Since they reared their heads in the country in the 1970s of the last century, Salafis have been seen by security authorities at home as a benign tumour on the Muslim body. Mubarak's territories of weaknesses Infamous for his religious conservatism, rash actions and a phenomenal, intemperate outburst, Bush scavenged easily for Mubarak's many areas of weaknesses: dictatorial ruling; abuse of power; a growing number of poor citizens, who were – and are still – struggling to keep their heads desperately above the water; growing anti-Mubarak discontent; a big catalogue of social problems; phenomenal corruption cases in the most powerful circles; and Mubarak's very old age and associated diseases. (To be continued...)
