The moment for commitment

Something has changed in US policy towards the Middle East, following Mubarak's visit to Washington. The Arabs need to strike while the iron is hot, urges Hassan Nafa'a*
President Hosni Mubarak's recent visit to Washington was his second call on the new US administration, the first having taken place a few months after George W Bush assumed the presidency. This visit, however, came at a more crucial moment.
Mubarak's trip was his first to Washington since the events of last September that generated a momentous upheaval in US policy priorities on both the domestic and foreign fronts. Developments in the US and the international arena in the aftermath of 11 September pulled the rug from under Arab-US relations. Suddenly, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the largest and most pivotal nations in the Arab world, became the targets of a vicious media assault that sought to portray their societies as the most anti-American in the Arab and Islamic worlds and the most fertile for the breeding of "Islamic terrorism." As mutual acrimony and suspicion grew due to tendentious mudslinging, the two sides began to realise that it was urgent for them to act to safeguard their relations.
Mubarak's visit also came at a time when the Arab-Israeli conflict had entered its most dangerous phase since the beginning of the peace process. All efforts to restore calm and implement the Tenet plan and Mitchell recommendations had failed. Meanwhile, Washington stood by, arms folded, as the situation in the occupied territories deteriorated as a result of Sharon's dogged determination to escalate the intensity and scope of confrontation.
Although Mubarak in his previous visit to Washington had taken stock of the Bush administration's reluctance to become more actively involved in resolving the conflict, the Egyptian president has since come to feel that US policy has crossed some unacceptable red lines as far as the Arabs are concerned. Mubarak was particularly dismayed by the green light Washington gave Sharon to press ahead with his policy of putting the Palestinian Authority in a position where it would have to choose between extinction or capitulating to Sharon's "peace" terms. As violence spirals ever more precariously out of control, Egypt feels that Washington should recognise that its hands-off policy, far from wearing out the Palestinians and Israelis so that they would be amenable to talks, is allowing the situation to turn into a disaster for the entire region.
The visit coincided with the interval between the US's swift victory in Afghanistan and the second phase in the war against terrorism. Reports, both official and semi-official, which have surfaced in the Western press, all confirm that, among other targets, this phase will set its sights on Hizbullah, Hamas, the Jihad, the Iraqi regime and, perhaps, other centres of resistance to the US military presence in the region and to the Israeli occupation. Egyptian and American analyses diverge markedly over this issue, too, and Egypt felt compelled to alert Washington to the dangers its policy poses to the stability of the Middle East and the stability of its allies in the region.
Mubarak's visit thus took place against a backdrop of heightened disparity between Cairo and Washington in terms of their outlooks and policy orientations. Indeed, such was the sense of urgency over the need to meet and discuss their differences that the two leaders brought forward the date of their meeting, originally scheduled for April. As Mubarak set off for Washington he was acutely aware of the difficulty of his task in view of the current mindset of those involved in decision-making in the US and the extraordinary psychological climate that prevails there at present.
Mubarak took with him to Washington a number of messages. First, while Egypt is aware of the exigencies of developing a unique strategic relationship with the US and remains committed to this end, Egypt is not, nor should it be perceived as, a supplicant. Rather, Cairo firmly believes that the US needs Egypt as much as Egypt needs the US. Stability and prosperity in the Middle East are impossible in the absence of close Egyptian-US cooperation and this cooperation will not flourish until it is freed from its contingency upon the Egyptian-Israeli equation. It is, therefore, imperative for Egypt and the US to determine a set of mutual interests that can be pursued independently of concerns over the fluctuations in Egyptian-Israeli relations.
The US's absolute support for the extremist right-wing government of Israel -- led by a notorious war criminal -- is jeopardising prospects for peace. Mubarak went to Washington to say that only through cooperation between Egypt and the US -- on the basis of full commitment to the principles of Madrid and international legitimacy -- would it be possible to find a way out of the current impasse. In other words, the prospects for peace can only be salvaged if the mediating parties stop taking sides and abide by an autonomous set of established principles and terms of reference.
Cairo is convinced that any military action against an Arab state or organisation under the pretext of fighting terrorism will not only fail to serve the peace process but will generate further instability, deepen anti-American sentiment at all levels of Arab and Islamic societies, and weaken Washington's friends and allies in the region. Mubarak, therefore, hoped to persuade Washington of the crucial importance of focusing on devising the means to reach a final, just and comprehensive solution to the Arab- Israeli conflict. As for future phases in the battle against terrorism, these should be undertaken within an international framework in accordance with agreed upon mechanisms, and then only after reaching a clear and universally acceptable definition of what exactly constitutes terrorism.
In spite of the fact that the current US administration seems to speak only in the language of might and sees the Middle East through Israeli eyes, several developments occurred at the time of the presidential trip that may have facilitated Mubarak's mission. A renewed wave of Israeli belligerency reached such heights of brutality that even Washington was unable to defend. This, along with a qualitative shift in the Palestinians' strategy of resistance, has compelled the Western media to place the Palestinian cause in its true context: a struggle for national liberation. It has further stimulated highly placed members within the Israeli army to declare their opposition to Sharon's use of excessive force and breathed new life into the Israeli peace movement. As a result, popularity ratings for Sharon have plummeted so drastically as to threaten the collapse of his government.
The second major development was the peace initiative recently announced by Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah. This initiative, which is consistent with Arab principles and simultaneously capable of appealing to public opinion in both the US and Israel, affirms that the crux of the dilemma in the Middle East does not reside in the Arabs' refusal to recognise Israel and establish normal relations with it, but rather in Israel's refusal to accept the principle of land for peace and return to the pre-1967 borders.
Certainly, President Mubarak did his utmost to clarify Egypt's positions to Washington and certainly, too, people in Washington listened intently to what the Egyptian president had to say. But whether his visit succeeded in producing substantial changes in the outlook of US foreign policy is another question altogether. Certainly it was encouraging that the US secretary of state criticised Israel more harshly than usual. Bush's press conference, in which he voiced his concern over developments in the Palestinian territories, reaffirmed his appreciation of the Saudi initiative and announced that US special envoy Anthony Zinni would shortly be returning to the region in a renewed effort to restore calm and jump-start peace talks, was similarly encouraging. It is noteworthy that the Bush administration made these announcements following Mubarak's return to Egypt rather than during his stay in Washington. It is even more significant that immediately afterwards Sharon announced that he had relinquished his condition for a seven-day cease-fire before entering talks and that he was now prepared to negotiate even while "under fire." All of these developments are indications that something has begun to change in Washington's Middle East diplomacy, although they do not evidence a significant shift in the US's policy outlook towards the Arab world and its interests.
Nevertheless, the overall effect of these developments has been to give the lead to the Arabs, especially now that it appears that the Saudi initiative will form the focal point of regional and international peace-making efforts in the forthcoming phase. Regardless of the doubts and apprehensions -- some well justified -- that this initiative raises, it may come to constitute a watershed in the conflict with Israel. The importance of the Saudi initiative, when it is fully formulated and officially presented to the forthcoming Arab summit, will not reside in whatever proposals it offers to breathe life into the moribund negotiating process. Indeed, it is doubtful whether it will contain new and original ideas or promote concrete mechanisms for implementation. Rather, its significance will reside in its capacity to create an opportunity for the Arabs to unify their positions on the conflict -- should they summon the will to do so.
In any event, Israel will never accept this initiative. I do not think it excessively pessimistic to say so in view of that country's record towards peace. Naturally, the Israeli government will make a perfunctory show of accepting the initiative to appease public opinion and attempt to wring every drop of advantage out of it, but only after having emptied it of its substance. If Israel were willing to withdraw to the 1967 borders, relinquish its sovereignty over East Jerusalem and accept a just solution to the refugee issue on the basis of UN Resolution 194, then peace between the Arabs and Israelis could have been achieved a quarter of a century ago. So far nothing has occurred -- either in Israel or at the regional or international level -- to render the current ground rules and conditions of the peace process conducive to the implementation of the Saudi initiative, which reflects the long established Arab position.
For the Saudi initiative to see the light of day a radical shift must take place in the balance of power inside Israel and/or at the regional and international levels. Since this is not about to occur any time soon, it would be mistaken at this juncture for the Arabs to treat the Saudi initiative as the ultimate formula for a solution over which the Arabs, in Beirut, must declare their stance. Rather, what is essential is for the Arab world to rally around a single frame of reference for a settlement -- one that conforms with the principles of international legitimacy and that has the potential to appeal to public opinion internationally and in Israel. Since we know in advance that the government in Israel will never take this initiative seriously, what the Arab leaders meeting in Beirut should ask themselves is what comes after the Saudi initiative.
Certainly it makes little sense for the leaders simply to approve the initiative and then each head back to the problems of their own country. Rather, they should take the occasion to assert their practical commitment to the realisation, whether through peaceful means or war, if need be, of the principles of the initiative, and allocate specific roles and duties towards this end.
In other words, the question the Arabs should be asking themselves in Beirut is not whether or not to accept the Saudi initiative, but rather how should the Arab world commit itself to a platform that represents the minimal Arab conditions for peace?
* The writer is professor of political science at Cairo University.
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