Any hopes raised by President Mubarak's US visit were quickly dampened following the arrival of Sharon, writes Mohamed El-Sayed Said from Washington In contrast to President Hosni Mubarak's welcoming but reserved reception at Camp David early this week US President George Bush received Israeli Prime Minster Ariel Sharon in the Oval Office at the White House on Monday with a carefully choreographed display of personal warmth. Officials remain tightlipped on what occurred during the Mubarak-Bush meeting though Bush appeared ill at ease during the joint news conference on Saturday and commentators hardly needed a crystal ball to work out that the presidents' meeting had been a tense encounter between two men with almost opposed agendas. In the joint news conference President Bush exhibited almost total bias towards Sharon's position on several crucial issues. Yet observers still found it difficult to draw definite conclusions from the event given the continued optimism of Egyptian officials and of media coverage of the visit. But by the end of President Mubarak's visit evidence was accumulating that the Arab side, and those who sympathises with Arab views on ways to resume peace talks, had lost the battle for President Bush's ear even before it started. Which is hardly the case with Sharon. In his sixth meeting with Bush since taking office Israel's prime minister had effectively manipulated Congress and packaged himself as a determined anti-terror campaigner making common cause with the US administration. The seeming absence of chemistry between Bush and Mubarak -- something thrown into greater relief for those who recall meetings between Mubarak and Bush senior -- was not helped by Egyptian revelations on the eve of the visit on early warnings given the US about a possible terrorist attack barely a week before 11 September. Mubarak's meeting with members of Congress was characterised by bitter American complaints about Arafat and the Egyptian press. Nothing could have contrasted more with Sharon's similar meeting on Tuesday in which all the prime minister had to do was thank Congress for its fulsome support. Official America appears to be in no mood to accommodate Palestinian and Arab grievances or demands. And following Mubarak's departure the US media went into overdrive as it dropped hints as to the content of Bush's much vaunted Middle East policy statement expected in the next couple of weeks. According to US pundits, the status of Arafat is likely to be a casualty. While no specific scenarios have been put forward, the impetus to neutralise Arafat has gained momentum, fuelled by Bush's constant criticisms over the past few days. Bush's position towards Arafat may well not go as far as mirroring Sharon's, which would imply a freeze on US diplomatic contacts with the Palestinian president, and a de facto call for his removal. A less radical approach might be to demand the appointment of a new Palestinian negotiating team with Arafat firmly sidelined, a measure that might satisfy Sharon without pushing the Palestinian situation to the brink of the abyss. Bush's silence on Israeli atrocities and settlement activities, which continued unchecked throughout the meetings, was justified by a White House spokesman on the grounds that Bush's statements did not express everything that took place in the course of deliberations between the two men. Yet even the New York Times found Bush's wholehearted embrace of Sharon unpalatable. Its editorial on the day following the Bush-Sharon meeting ran: "The United States must resist Mr Sharon's demand that until [reforms] are in place there can be no negotiations on a Palestinian state." From the diplomatic point of view Bush will find it exceedingly difficult to side so completely with Sharon in his policy statement on the Middle East. He will feel bound to include some Arab demands, and the easiest way of squaring this particular circle will be to reiterate his vague commitment to building a Palestinian state. Other elements likely to be included in the policy statement as a sop to Arab leaders in desperate need of something to offer their own populations could include a carefully phrased demand for freezing settlement activities, hints that Jerusalem should remain open to all major religions, talk about Israeli redeployment of forces to allow for the reconstruction of the Palestinian infrastructure ravaged in recent months and possibly a rejection of the cantonisation of the occupied territories. None of which will be presented as firm commitments, but rather as subjects for negotiation. Such is likely to be Washington's strategy to pay lip service to Arab grievances while allowing Israel maximum room for its militant manoeuvring. But why has the picture that is emerging in Washington become so bleak? Personal and ideological factors are certainly playing a part: Bush's antipathy towards Arafat is no secret. Nor is his total absorption in his "war against terrorism". It is also possible that the Bush administration, having come to the conclusion that the Arabs will not condone further attacks against Iraq, feels there is no need to accommodate them on Palestine. Bush's growing hostility towards the Palestinian cause, should this be the case, is, then, his way of retaliating against Arab leaders who have refused to condone or support strikes against Iraq. Saudi Arabia's amicable foreign minister, Saud Al- Faisal, arrived in Washington yesterday, probably the final consultation between Arab and US leaders before the policy statement is issued. It may well turn into a last ditch attempt to influence that policy, and the odds against it succeeding are high.
