CAIRO – Whatever happened to Egyptians over the past three decades will be food for thought for many years to come. Ousted president Hosni Mubarak and his gang ruined all facets of life. It will take much time to fix what was damaged over 30 years. In his new book ‘Egypt in the era of Hosni Mubarak 1981-2011', published by the American University in Cairo Press, Egyptian intellectual Galal Amin delves into the core of Egypt's dilemma, which grew like a snowball over the years and blew up on January 25. Amin, who is a well-known professor of economics at the American University in Cairo, analyses the political, economic and cultural aspects that got so distorted during the Mubarak era. "Sure enough, the sky began to darken before a single year had passed since Mubarak's ascension to the presidency, and, little by little, we began to despair of any real political or economic change occurring. Then we could gradually sense that a powerful alliance between certain domestic and foreign interests had been formed and dictated all major decisions, from foreign policy to Arab politics, to the stance towards Israel, and to domestic economic policy," Amin wrote. A soft state is a state that passes laws but does not enforce them. The elite can afford to ignore the law because its power protects them from it, while others pay bribes to work round it. "In the soft state, then, corruption is generalised and the payment of bribes is widespread; the weakness of the state encourages corruption, and the spread of corruption further weakens the state," he wrote. "When we read what Myrdal wrote at the end of the 1960s, it never occurred to us that his ideas might apply to Egypt; for in those days Egypt was far from being a soft state," he said, referring to Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal's concept of the soft state. The economics professor elaborates on symptoms of the soft state in Egypt. "One day in 1992, an earthquake struck, lasting no more than 40 seconds and of an intensity that the Japanese might consider child's play, and suddenly the whole Egyptian government almost collapsed to the ground under the weight of its own weakness." The question is: What gave rise to the soft state in Egypt about a third of a century ago, towards the middle of the Sadat era, after 20 years of a strong state under Nasser? "Towards the beginning of the 1970s, a powerful wind began to blow through the world, which, in line with prevalent terminology, we might call 'the wind of globalisation'," Amin explained. "One prominent example of the difference between the ruling regime in the 1970s and that of the 1960s is illustrated by the central role played by Othman Ahmad Othman and his company, Arab Contractors, and by his relationship to the state. Under Nasser, Othman, with all his wealth and power, was more like a government employee taking his orders from the head of state and anxious not to lose favour. Under Sadat, it was as if he had become a partner in the business of government." Mubarak gave a rather strange explanation for the colorlessness of his regime, saying that he did not subscribe to a policy of 'shock therapy'. He neither closed the doors of the economy, nor opened them wider. He did not go to war with Israel, nor did he oppose Israeli attacks on other Arab countries, according to Amin. The writer admits that regardless of how one feels about the policies of Nasser or Sadat, "one has to say that most of the men who surrounded them, whether giving advice or implementing policies, were for the large part political men." "Politics ran in their blood, occupied their minds, and governed their behaviour…That began to change gradually in the Mubarak era, until we finally came to see the arrival of ministers or even prime ministers about whom we knew virtually nothing before they assumed their posts." Making matters considerably worse in the past 20 years has been the interference of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in Egypt's economic policies since 1987, when the Government's inability to service its foreign debts on time became apparent, according to Amin. In 1991, Egypt signed the Stabilisation and Structural Adjustment agreement with the IMF, which involved gradual government withdrawal from many of the functions the public had been accustomed to since the 1960s, and expedited the privatisation of public-sector companies. "In judging the economic performance of a country like Egypt, three standard indicators are usually used to assess its success or failure. What has happened to per capita income, that is, the rate of growth in total output minus the rate of population growth? What are the major components of this income? Or, in other words, what is the relative contribution to total output coming from agriculture, manufacturing, petroleum products, tourism, and services? What has happened to income distribution among various segments of society? Is it becoming more or less equal?" Mubarak continued to borrow from abroad for as long as such loans were available, until the creditors had "sucked the last drop of blood from the Egyptian economy and they, themselves, had no desire to continue". "During the first five years of the Mubarak era, Egypt's external debt continued to grow until the total military and civilian external debt reached $45 billion. That is, it rose by 50 per cent over five years…By 1990, the total debt reached $47.6 billion, that is, 150 per cent of the gross domestic product." "But while the Government was saying this, the Egyptian poor were fighting in lines in front of bakeries to get as much subsidised flat bread as they could. The size of the loaf had shrunk over time and its colour had darkened, and in any case the owners of the bakeries were now refusing to hand out loaves in the numbers the poor were requesting." Roughly 40 per cent of Egypt's 85 million population live on less than $2 a day, according to the World Bank. "The middle class in Egypt today is a defeated and humiliated class. No wonder it also has little enthusiasm for national issues and its productivity is low in both the economic and cultural spheres." Amin gives a snapshot explanation of the reasons why the country's middle class was enervated. According to him, it suffered a series of blows that slowed its growth rate sharply, lowered its standard of living and made it even less distinguishable from the lower class. It was inevitable that this would be reflected in a further weakening of its patriotic sentiment as well as in a lower ability to participate in political, economic, and cultural life.
