With Turkey having entered election year, it is only a matter of time before speculation turns to the likely consequences for foreign policy of the possible outcomes. With the political environment in Turkey capable of sudden change, the febrile atmospherics - featuring a surge in nationalism and heightened European Union skepticism - are not necessarily a good gauge of how foreign relations will pan out in a year. Foreign policy is the preserve of the government, supported by the ministry of foreign affairs. That's why it is the outcome of parliamentary elections, scheduled for November 2007 that is likely to be crucial. Given the role that both the prime minister and the foreign minister have played in the current administration and periodically throughout the 1990s, the impact of both personalities may well be significant again. However, the government and the Foreign Ministry are not the only foreign policy actors in Turkey. The Kemalist state, and the military in particular, has traditionally played the role of gatekeeper of the strategic orientation of the state. That has corresponded to a European vocation, and involved safeguarding both Turkey's territorial integrity and secular orientation. The presidency, though mainly titular in function, has agenda setting and formal powers that are worth taking seriously too. In short, the system has institutional checks and balances. There are three main scenarios for the parliamentary elections, which will provide the context for policy development in the future. These are: First, the re-election of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) with a parliamentary majority, and hence a single-party administration. This is the most likely outcome of the election. However, with presidential elections due in May and both the incumbent prime minister and foreign minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah Gul respectively, as possible candidates, the continuity of office-holders is not assured, even under this scenario. The key question for a second term AKP government will be whether the party will be as accommodating to the foreign policy agenda of the Kemalist state as during the 2002-2007 parliamentary term? Or will it seek serious Islamist-oriented policy revisions? A second scenario is that AKP emerges as the largest single party in Parliament, but, in the absence of a simple majority, is obliged to share office with one or two other coalition partners, possibly the nationalist MHP or the conservative DYP. This opens up the possibility of an AKP prime minister, but a non-AKP foreign minister. An MHP figure in the post might be a concern for the country's liberals. The key question is: How coherent will policy be with such internal ideological divisions? Third, a grand, anti-AKP coalition is formed by the other parties in the legislature, probably comprising the MHP, the DYP, and the Kemalist, nationalist CHP, the current opposition in parliament. The key question here is: Will foreign policy matter if the driving political rationale is a domestic one, namely to block the AKP? Beyond the polls, the foreign policy agenda in Turkey is likely to impose itself, almost regardless of which scenario emerges. Key policy issues will remain the EU, Cyprus, Iraq and relations with the United States. West and Middle East issues could emerge as follows: The EU: The period between 2008 and 2010 offers a new window of opportunity for political reform in Turkey. This will contrast with the slow progress during 2004-2006. With nationalism likely to dissipate somewhat after the elections, that opportunity will be taken under scenarios one and two above. The current accession negotiations framework will maintain momentum in the relationship, and keep the Foreign Ministry engaged. Worries will persist about long-term prospects for membership, but all accept this is unfeasible before 2014 anyway. Iraq: Turkey will have to manage the Iraq situation as long as there is violent conflict there. The existential nature of the Kurdish issue requires it. Moreover, relations between Ankara (embracing government, the Foreign Ministry, and military) and Washington can be relied upon to be edgy and uncertain as long as associated issues like Kirkuk and relations with the Kurdish Workers Party, or PKK, remain pressing. As during Operation Provide Comfort II in northern Iraq, there are many policy contradictions for Turkey in Iraq. The best that can be hoped for is muddling through at the margins until a new, more stable situation emerges, regardless of the electoral scenario. Israel and Palestine: Over the last five years a division of labor has emerged: The AKP government has been the conscience of the country in criticizing excessive Israeli coercion; the Kemalist institutions (military, military industries and intelligence) have continued business as usual with Israel, though with a lower profile. With public opinion behind the Palestinians, this division of labor is likely to continue under all scenarios. Iran: Ankara's support for the EU3 efforts and the pursuit of a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear challenge is likely to continue. However, the closer the onset of an Iranian bomb (and weaponization is possible during the five-year span of the new Parliament), the more urgent will become the deterrent debate for Turkey. While scenario three will see greater state-government coordination on the matter, uncertainty persists about the Islamist origins of the AKP, and whether leading personalities like Abdullah Gul and Bulent Arinc would perceive Iranian nuclearization in positive terms, as the acquisition of an "Islamic bomb. Philip Robinsis university lecturer in the politics of the Middle East at the University of Oxford. He is also a fellow of St. Antony's College. He is the author of "Between the EU and the Middle East: Turkish Foreign Policy under the AKP Government, 2002-2007. This commentary first appeared at bitterlemons-international.org, an online newsletter
