Of course it's premature to bid a final farewell to The Peace Process. Like hope, the Middle East peace process springs eternal. Like Proteus, it constantly shifts its shape. One year it's all about West Bank settlements. The next year the focus is Jerusalem. For six months the action may shift to Damascus as US-Syrian rapprochement seems to be in the offing. After that, opening up Gaza becomes the cause du jour. Next, Istanbul captures our attention as the Israeli-Syrian track heats up. Soon our gaze shifts back again to Washington for high-level Palestinian-Israeli meetings. But wait; are we on the eve of a potential breakthrough between Hezbollah and Hariri? That fizzles, but soon we are dazzled by the capital-hopping schedule of a peripatetic Special Envoy. Then Foggy Bottom becomes the center of the universe as the Secretary of State makes an impassioned speech on the need for redoubling America's commitment to stabilize a democratic government in Lebanon or to finally send an ambassador to Syria or to ink a new aid agreement with Palestine or to announce a new strategic understanding with Israel or to warn Iran one more time that if it wants to end its isolation it must . . . blah, blah, blah. It's exhausting, and almost entirely fruitless. Process does not produce results. It simply provides channels through which people committed to producing results can do so. Even high-energy American diplomatic facilitators and mediators must have willing partners to facilitate and engaged parties among whom to mediate. Middle East protagonists are not a bunch of hot-headed kids who will shape up if we just sit them down opposite each other and force them to talk out their differences: “Why are you mad at Johnny?. . . Johnny, did you say that? Tell Billy you didn't mean it. Billy, did you hit Johnny? . . .Tell him you're sorry. Shake hands. Now you boys run along, and remember to play nice!” A slight variation of that condescending tone frequently recurs as a theme in the speeches of Obama administration officials. On Friday, December 10th, Secretary of State Hilton, appearing at the Brookings Institution in Washington, claimed that “Unfortunately, as we have learned, the parties in this conflict have often not been ready to take the necessary steps. Going forward, they must take responsibility and make the difficult decisions that peace requires.” Grow up, kids! Eat your vegetables. We know what's best for you. Communication is a necessary condition for conflict resolution, but it's not a sufficient one. More talks won't produce results unless and until each of the parties in conflict is A) serious about reaching a deal and capable of implementing it, and B) considers the opposite side likewise serious about reaching a deal and capable of implementing it. Right now Abbas doubts Netanyahu's commitment to a two-state solution and Netanyahu doubts Abbas's ability to deliver on a deal, certainly in Hamas-run Gaza but also in the West Bank. Let's not rush back from indirect talks to direct talks to indirect talks one more time. Secretary Clinton has already launched a new round of “two-way conversations” (read “indirect talks”) “on the key questions of an eventual framework agreement.” I propose a time-out for The Peace Process, since the funeral still seems to be a bit premature. During that time out, the United States will only send George Mitchell & Company to the Middle East if there is a specific request for his presence from one or more governments in the region. “Diplomacy-on-demand” one might call it. If there is no demand for an American go-between, then we don't provide one. And even if they want us, we won't play unless our own pre-conditions are met. Israelis and Palestinians should understand that it is costly, in terms of presidential power, prestige, and time, to have the U.S. engage at the highest level in Middle East peace-making. Some practical demonstrations of their serious commitment should precede the next round of American mediation. This does not mean, however, that until that time comes the United States withdraws from the region or from involvement with the conflict. The mistake – the terribly costly mistake of the Obama Administration regarding Israeli settlements that resulted in the waste of the last two years – was not that the U.S. tackled the issue but rather that the call for a settlement freeze became linked to the resumption of Israeli-Palestinian talks. This had never before been a Palestinian pre-condition. Perhaps it should have been, but it wasn't. The Americans not only elevated the profile of the issue but tied it to the talks. Doing so inevitably caused the Israelis to look at a settlement freeze or moratorium, whether a full or a partial one, as a concession required for the restart of negotiations. But tough negotiators like the Israelis want to get something back for something they give. Towards the expiration of the initial freeze, they made their requests. An ill-conceived package of permanent American deal-sweeteners was offered to the Israelis in exchange for a 90-day continuation of the freeze. Fortunately that deal fell through. Instead of trying again to slow down or stop Israeli construction in order to restart the Israeli-Palestinian talks, I suggest that the United States take on Israel, publicly or privately, without regards to negotiations with the Palestinians, on the limited issue of stopping the establishment of any new settlements or outposts in the West Bank. Coupled with this, the U.S. would insist that Israel prevent any further confiscation or constructive taking of privately-owned Palestinian land in the West Bank by the state, the IDF, or the settlers. This stoppage would remain in force until there is a signed peace treaty with the Palestinians. If this administration is truly committed to “two states for two peoples” and if it genuinely considers a resolution of Israeli-Palestinian conflict to be a vital American national security interest, then it ought to be willing to tackle on its own the key impediments to producing a two-state solution. Obviously one of those impediments is the establishment of new settlements eating away territory that would otherwise become part of a Palestinian state. One caveat is that the U.S. shouldn't bite off more than it can chew. If Obama and his team don't believe they can win a fight with Israel (or Congress) over the dismantling of unauthorized outposts which the Israeli government itself calls illegal, then they shouldn't try. Since another key final status issue is Jerusalem, the U.S. could also confront Israel and demand that it change its policy of allowing the eviction of Palestinian families from the homes in which they have lived for decades in the Sheikh Jarrah and Silwan neighborhoods of east Jerusalem. If, as Secretary Clinton made clear in her speech, behavior modification on the part of the Israelis and the Palestinians is called for, then the U.S. should name the behavior and put some muscle behind insisting that it change. Another mistake the Obama administration made was to ask Arab countries to offer concessions to Israel, such as overflight rights and upgrading of commercial and diplomatic relations, in return for an Israeli settlement freeze. Any reciprocal concessions should have been asked of the Palestinians, not of Arab states. Certainly American diplomats have received an earful of complaints from the Israelis about the Palestinians just as they have heard a litany of grievances from the Palestinians about the Israelis. They could take on the Palestinians too. After all, although it can't dictate policy, the U.S. can still exert considerable leverage over the Palestinians as well as the Israelis. What change in official Palestinian behavior would make the biggest contribution in moving towards peace with the Israelis? More of a crackdown on would-be terrorists? A reduction of incitement against Israel by Palestinian media? An educational program to combat anti-Semitism? Scheduling new parliamentary and presidential elections? How about an end to the PA's efforts to delegitimize Israel in international organizations and forums? Without creating any linkage between its efforts, on the one hand, to rein in Israeli construction in the West Bank or to stop evictions of Palestinians in east Jerusalem, and, on the other hand, efforts to alter Palestinian behavior towards Israel, the United States can move both parties towards one another, without even hinting at a resumption of talks, direct or indirect. ** Read more from Michael Lame here BM
