The “peace process” in the Middle East lurches along from crisis to crisis. Since President Obama took office, George Mitchell has served as his special envoy to the region, with his energies focused primarily on bringing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to a peaceful conclusion. Yet the primary diplomatic subject of conversation about the conflict in 2009-10 has been 1) how to re-start direct talks between the parties, and 2) how to keep them going. A few substantive matters have also been on the agenda – continued Israeli settlement activity in the West Bank and east Jerusalem; an easing of the Gaza blockade; and the Jewishness of the state of Israel that Palestinians will be asked to acknowledge. But no meaningful discussion has taken place on the most basic issues: refugees, Jerusalem, borders, security. THE OLD NEGOTIATORS: Saeb Erekat, the PLO's chief negotiator for many years now, gave an impassioned, if slightly irrational speech, at the Middle East Institute's annual conference last week, before going on to the Woodrow Wilson Center for a public conversation with Aaron David Miller. During his MEI talk and the Q&A, he repeated the phrase “two-state solution” dozens of times. Since President Obama favors a two-state solution, Erekat asked rhetorically, why wouldn't he support a UN Security Council resolution in support of a unilaterally-declared Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders? But Erekat certainly knows that the President won't support such a move, as the U.S. State Department spokesperson P. J. Crowley made clear the next day. According to Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper coverage of the Wilson Center event, Erekat said that “we have concluded the issue of negotiations, and now is the time for decisions, for everybody knows the form of the solution, we know where territory exchange will take place and we have found a solution to eastern Jerusalem and the mechanism that will determine this, and we also know the solution to the issues of refugees and security.” This is a demonstrably false statement. The Abbas and Netanyahu governments have not discussed Jerusalem and refugees, the conversation about borders has not begun in earnest, while both sides wrangle over a continuation of Israel's settlement moratorium (or rather the partial slowdown of building in the West Bank). Perhaps Erekat was referring to former Prime Minister Olmert's offer to Abbas in 2008, but that offer was not accepted by Abbas and is no longer on the table. Regarding the final status issues, the two sides have not yet agreed on almost anything. I say “almost” because one element of a future deal has been clear since Israel evacuated all settlers and soldiers from Gaza in 2005: a Palestinian state will include 100% of the Gaza Strip. If previous negotiations are any guide, it will also comprise more than 90% of the West Bank, but whether that's closer to 90% or to 100% is unknown. A narrowing of differences does not constitute a meeting of the minds. Why do the parties continue to employ the same representatives, like Erekat, in round after round of negotiations when these representatives have failed time after time to achieve peace? When is failure in the Middle East ever grounds for dismissal? Perhaps the same negotiators are allowed to remain in place because the political leaders they serve don't think previous failures were their fault. Erekat quipped that the title he has selected for his autobiography is “I did not miss an opportunity.” This is, of course, a retort to Abba Eban's caustic assessment that “the Palestinians never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity.” Eban overstated the case. The Palestinians have seized some opportunities and missed others. If they had missed all the opportunities, their leaders would still be sitting in Tunis rather than in Ramallah. If they hadn't missed some opportunities, today they would be sitting in Jerusalem. Self-reflection is not a luxury that only winners can afford. It's a necessity for today's losers if they intend to change their future fortunes. The Democratic Party, after its shellacking in the mid-term elections, could use some honest self-reflection on how it lost support from vast swaths of the American electorate. But whether today's losers are Democrats or Republicans, Palestinians or Israelis, it's always easier to blame opponents for one's own failures. The drubbing the Democrats took in the November election provides a perfect excuse for the Obama administration to review its foreign policy as well as its domestic agenda. A thorough assessment of our Middle East policy could be undertaken. If it is, the people who conduct the review should not be the same people presently implementing U.S. policy in the region. George Mitchell flat-out failed in the Middle East under Presidents Clinton and Bush in 2000 and 2001. If the Americans think that failure was the Israelis' and/or Palestinians' fault – instead of Mitchell's – for not following through on the Mitchell Report's recommendations, then it makes some sense to invite him back for another go at it. But given his lackluster performance over the last two years, a reassessment of his previous tenure in the region is called for. Were there lessons to be learned from 2001? Did anyone in the Obama administration have that conversation with Mitchell before he was appointed special envoy in January of 2009? The question is relevant because the Mitchell Report's insistence on a complete settlement building ban didn't work when proposed in 2001. Yet somehow the same building ban proposal became the key component of Mitchell's drive to restart talks in 2009. Regrettably, many months have been wasted over this on-again off-again pre-condition for the resumption of face-to-face talks between Israelis and Palestinians. If the Palestinian negotiating positions and demands remain essentially the same today as they were ten years ago, then it makes sense to keep the same players to present the same arguments for the same deal. But if fresh thinking and flexibility are called for, then negotiators like Erekat, who have been at it since before Oslo, are probably not the best choice of interlocutors for the future. As Erekat demonstrated in his Wilson Center conversation with Aaron David Miller, he possesses a prodigious memory for dates, places, meetings, and who said what to whom. But encyclopedic knowledge of recent history can impede as well as aid the effort to turn a new page in Palestinian-Israeli relations. The Israelis change their negotiators with each change of government, which occurs on average every two years, and each prime minister keeps close watch on the negotiations as they progress or falter. The prime minister's chief negotiator – Barak's Gilad Sher, Olmert's Udi Dekel, Netanyahu's Yitzhak Molcho – have much shorter tenure in their position than do their Palestinian and American counterparts. The downsides of a short term as negotiator include a steep learning curve and the potential for rehashing issues previously laid to rest. However, since earlier efforts have not succeeded, the upside is that new participants, looking with new eyes, can bring new ideas to the table. The American, Israeli, and Palestinian polities all have their own timetables for elections. A change of political leadership, therefore, cannot be synchronized. But appointed officials can be thanked for their service and summarily retired. I suggest that it's time for a clean sweep of all the American, Israeli, and Palestinian negotiators now working on behalf of the Abbas, Netanyahu, and Obama administrations. They have labored mightily and have precious little to show for it. If they are removed from office, they should not be replaced by previous negotiators from earlier administrations, since those go-betweens failed as well. Saeb Erekat should be allowed to make a gracious exit from the ranks of Palestinian negotiators, along with Nabil Shaath, Yasser Abed Rabbo, Ahmed Qureia, and Hanan Ashrawi. They have all been on the job too long. Let's thank and then bid adieu to George Mitchell and his team; likewise to Netanyahu's negotiators. Whatever the three parties have been up to collectively for the last two years, it hasn't worked. To quote Al Gore from his 1992 convention speech, “It's time for them to go.” THE NEW NEGOTIATORS: Who should replace them? American, Israeli, and Palestinian societies all have produced sufficient numbers of brilliant young and not-so-young potential negotiators: diplomats, scholars, entrepreneurs, journalists, and others. We need not worry there will be no one to replace the old hands. Here's a simple proposal for the next generation of Israeli and Palestinian negotiators: Requirement #1: All Israeli negotiators must be fluent Arabic speakers. All Palestinian negotiators must be fluent Hebrew speakers. Requirement #2: The number and percentage of attorneys on the teams will be severely restricted. So will the number and percentage of professional military and security personnel. Requirement #3: Once negotiators for the next round are selected, and before they say one word to each other about who should get what and what belongs to whom, they will spend several weeks traveling and living together, alternating between Israeli and Palestinian communities. Together they will spend time in east and west Jerusalem. They will visit the Western Wall and the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount and walk through the Muslim, Christian, Armenian, and Jewish quarters of the Old City. They will go to Silwan and Sheikh Jarrah, to Abu Dis and Beit Hanina, to Pisgat Ze'ev and Ramat Eshkol, to Gilo and Har Homa. They will tour the Jordan Valley and visit the Allenby Bridge. They will walk in cities, towns, villages, refugee camps and settlements throughout the West Bank. They will visit Israeli “unauthorized outposts”, Palestinian houses built without permits, and Palestinian villages which are separated from their fields by the wall/fence/barrier. They will view the wall from both the west and the east sides and drive along restricted roads and open-access roads. They will wait in line at checkpoints, as Palestinians do everyday, and they will observe at checkpoints, as Israeli soldiers do everyday. They will go to prisons and police stations. They will visit wounded Palestinians and Israelis in their hospital beds and rehabilitation centers. They will walk through cemeteries and attend funerals. Of course, all of these visits are subject to security concerns. In the West Bank certainly some Palestinians and Israelis will not welcome this joint group of negotiators to their communities. If possible, they will spend time inside Gaza, but at least they can visit the border crossings from Israel and Egypt, and they can see Sderot. Throughout their travels, they will meet with people – ordinary people as well as elites. Mostly they will ask questions, in what American politicians now call a “listening tour”. Somewhere along the way they will also meet each others' spouses and children. Maybe they will go to the beach together or out to dinner or share a meal in one another's homes. Only after they have gotten to know one another a bit and only after they have been exposed to a small fraction of the fears, worries, and hardships, the problems and the unique dilemmas faced by Palestinians and Israelis everyday – as well as the incredible accomplishments of both societies – only then will they be allowed to talk politics and peace plans with their fellow negotiators. None of this will guarantee that the next round of talks will prove any more successful than previous rounds. But coming to their work with fresh experience of the complexities of the conflict, and without the baggage of prior failures, may allow a new set of negotiators to create an environment within which to effectively tackle the tough issues at hand. **Read more from Michael Lame on his rethinkme.org blog BM
