Events continue to suggest the existence of multiple decision-making centers attempting to control the formulation of state policy in Egypt and seize executive power. This has led to chaos, the most striking manifestation of which was the crisis that followed November's Egypt-Algeria World Cup qualifying matches. These various power centers worked to aggravate the situation by mobilizing the media, both state-run and privately-owned television channels. Official television refused to give Foreign Minister Ahmed Abul Gheit a chance to comment on events as they unfolded, while head of the Egyptian Football Association Samir Zaher and Information Minister Anas el-Feqqi both openly ridiculed Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif remained absent from the scene, as if obeying instructions to remain on the sidelines--perhaps to avoid a possible clash with one of several competing power centers. The power center that initially stirred up the crisis during the World Cup match, however, was effectively silenced before the two teams met again for the African Cup match. That was made obvious when President Mubarak and PM Nazif both stressed that the match had been played between "two teams, not two countries." Abul Gheit even went out of his way to call Algerian counterpart Mourad Medlesi to try to ensure the same scenario wasn't repeated. Egypt's Minister of Information met with representatives of state and private television channels for the same reason, while Zaher refrained from making any fiery statements. Since executive bodies managed the process this time around by exercising their legitimate powers, no crises erupted. But how could the regime have allowed such a chaotic exercise of power in the first place? We recently saw a similar farce, this time in parliament. Business tycoon and head of the NDP's planning and budget committee Ahmed Ezz--who is also the NDP's secretary-general for organizational affairs--had a falling out with both Culture Minister Farouk Hosni and Supreme Council of Antiquities Secretary-General Zahi Hawass over a proposed amendment to the draft antiquities law. Hosni and Hawass feared the amendment would open the door to antiquities smuggling and called for the support of the opposition, which vehemently attacked Ezz. Even journalists from state-owned newspapers joined the attack, while those papers' chief editors refrained from commenting. The debates within parliament's legislative committee revealed the extent to which chaos has permeated the regime's institutions. What did Ezz have to do with an antiquities draft law in the first place? Why did he ask for a translation of Italy's antiquities law--which permits trade in antiquities--and send a copy of it to Parliamentary Speaker Fathi Sorour? Why didn't Ezz first discuss the issue with other leading officials of the ruling party? If anything, the confusion reveals deep rifts among leading members of the regime. Yet more confusion was sown when President Hosni Mubarak announced in a recent speech in Kafr el-Sheikh that the draft real estate law required further study and discussion. The announcement dealt a blow to the the NDP majority--which had already approved the law--and to the PM and finance minister. But why did President Mubarak initially approve the law--in the face of such fierce opposition--and then suddenly change his position? There's nothing wrong with changing positions. Gamal Abdel Nasser, for example, reversed his decision to raise rice prices; so did Anwar Sadat when he yielded to public pressure to reduce prices. The problem now, however, is that the finance minister has accused the rich of opposing the new real estate law since it would reveal the extent of their wealth, whereas President Mubarak has insisted the law should be amended to protect the interests of the poor. Where does the truth lie in all this? Are upcoming legislative elections the reason for the president's apparent opposition to the minister and the minister's supporters within the party? Or is the president merely responding to warnings that the law could lead to street riots? Who is Mubarak with? Who is he against? Translated from the Arabic Edition.
