Egypt's departure from geo-strategic constants after Nasser has led directly to the region's current woes, writes Hassan Nafaa* For most countries geo-strategic factors generally play a crucial role in shaping foreign policy. Nowhere does this seem more cut-and-dry as the case of Egypt, for which such factors are so critically and organically connected with the most vital functions of the state, which are to protect the survival of the people and to safeguard their peace, security and stability. Egypt is a predominantly agricultural country that has to feed a population of 73 million and exponentially rising. Yet its cultivable land amounts to about five per cent of its total land area and agriculture is totally dependent on irrigation in view of the scarcity of rainfall and the limited availability of renewable subterranean water resources suitable for agriculture. As for the sources of irrigation water, these are located thousands of miles beyond our southern border, where they collect into the tributaries that converge to create one of the longest rivers in the world. The countries through which this water system passes are known collectively as the Nile Basin nations. These glaringly apparent facts compel strategies for ensuring the continued flow of sufficient quantities of Nile waters to meet the country's diverse and growing needs under every conceivable contingency. Towards the realisation of this no less than life-or-death aim, policymakers must formulate a perpetually vigilant foreign policy with Nile Basin countries, entailing: constant monitoring of events and developments that could adversely affect Egypt's rights to Nile waters; pre-emptive measures to prevent the infiltration of hostile foreign influences into the affairs of this region, or measures to curtail such influences if they already exist; and the creation of an institutionalised framework for policy coordination between Nile Basin countries in order to safeguard regional peace and stability and to further cooperation in everything pertaining to the fair and equitable distribution, development, control and exploitation of their water resources. At the same time, a combination of historical and geographical factors has rendered Egypt's national security, stability and independence largely contingent on events beyond its north and northeastern borders. Since virtually the dawn of history, most invasions have originated either from across the Mediterranean or from across the Sinai. Most invading forces quickly discovered that the only way to perpetuate their hold on Egypt was to control the Levant (Greater Syria or present-day Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Jordan). In addition, most invading forces seeking to dominate the Levant quickly discovered that the only way to perpetuate their hold on that region was to occupy Egypt. It is only natural, therefore, to regard Egypt and Greater Syria as a single geopolitical entity. In light of these equally evident constants, Egypt requires a strategy capable of preventing any foreign power from controlling the Levant and an active and dynamic foreign policy aimed at building and sustaining regional and international alliances that meet this end. Such a policy would logically entail refusing to enter into military alliances with regional or international powers with declared or hidden agendas to dominate the Arab Levant; taking the necessary measures to pre-empt any non-Arab power from asserting its influence in the region in a detrimental manner and to forestall all attempts to isolate Egypt and sever it from its natural northeastern geo-strategic extension; and, thirdly, to create an institutional framework to promote the closest and most effective forms of coordination among the Arab states in the region in the formulation of common priorities and steering political actions in a manner that best promotes security, peace and stability. The history of the modern Egyptian state, founded by Mohammed Ali at the beginning of the 19th century, testifies to the fact that Egypt's revival and progress were linked, on the one hand, to its autonomous sources of strength by means of which it could exert its influence and, on the other, to developments to the south, in the Nile Valley, and to the north, in the Fertile Crescent. However, it is also important to note another essential fact: geo-strategic considerations do not inevitably or automatically translate themselves into foreign policy decisions. Rather they pass through the filter of given regimes and, specifically, the mindsets of the leaders of those regimes. Accordingly, it is possible to observe that the general orientation of Egypt's foreign policy remained relatively constant and generally harmonised with the above-mentioned geo-strategic givens until the death of Gamal Abdel-Nasser in 1970. Under Anwar El-Sadat, and specifically following the 1973 October War, our foreign policy diverged sharply from its long held course and has continued in that trajectory until the present day. A brief review of certain features of the previous foreign policy orientation would help light the way to restoring lost harmony. In particular, it is useful to take stock of the some interesting facts. First, the Arab nationalist trend that characterised Egyptian foreign policy under Nasser did not begin with Egypt's unity with Syria in 1958 but rather with Egypt's leadership of the process, from 1943 to 1945, that led to the formation of the Arab League. Second, Egypt's entrance into the military equations of the Arab-Israeli conflict did not start with the Czech arms deal that precipitated the tripartite invasion of 1956, but rather with King Farouk's decision, backed by a unanimous vote in the Egyptian parliament, to take part in the 1948 war. Third, Egypt's policy of nonalignment did not begin with Egypt's participation in the Pandong Conference of 1955, but, again, before the revolutionary period, during the Korean crisis when Egypt abstained in the UN Security Council vote on a US-sponsored resolution favouring military intervention. This is not to say that Nasser's foreign policies were identical to those of the interwar period. However, it seems reasonable to claim that Egypt's foreign policies under Nasser were a natural extension of those of the earlier period, with the differences being in degrees as opposed to in kind. It was the rupture in kind, which began after the 1973 War, that has rendered Egypt's national security increasingly vulnerable and weakened the Arab world to the extent that most Arab countries, including Egypt, now face the threat of disintegration and partition into petty entities based on religious, ethnic, tribal and other such pre-state affiliations. A glance at events on the other side of Egypt's southern border is sufficient to confirm the impression that Egypt no longer carries a portion of its former weight in the Nile Basin and that the US and Israel, in cooperation with Ethiopia, are now the primary forces that set the agendas of and shape the interactions between its players. Sudan is indeed on the verge of fragmentation and Egypt is virtually helpless to prevent the consequent rise of chaos that could lead to situations that might imperil its rights to the Nile waters and, hence, the very survival of its people. Similarly, a glance to the northeast is sufficient to confirm that the violence and fragmentation that is taking place in Iraq and Palestine could spread to neighbouring countries, notably Iran, Syria and Lebanon. In that event, countries such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which still believe themselves cohesive and immune to such deterioration, will not be able to withstand the storm. That storm will be of such ferocity that when it finally subsides our region will no longer be recognisable; it will be a desolate and frightening place. I believe that if Egypt does not immediately begin to overhaul the basic tenets of the foreign policy it has pursued since 1973 we will not be able to ward off that spectre, regardless of the delusions of grandeur that some Arab countries are experiencing as a result of their skyrocketing oil revenues. Yet my suggestion that Egypt should revise the foundations of its foreign policy should not be construed as a call to adopt a confrontational stance towards the US and Israel. Rather, it is merely an appeal for a process of rational reflection upon what is needed to reposition ourselves and then the Arab order so as to launch a new and more robust foreign policy drive on foundations more in keeping with our geo-strategic needs and assets. Of course it is both unfair and incorrect to blame Egypt alone for the current deterioration in the Arab world. All share the responsibility and, perhaps, it would even be accurate to say that there are other Arab countries that are even more at fault than Egypt. However, at this critical phase we do not have the luxury to enter into the maze of apportioning blame. Instead we must summon our sincere energies to set into motion a change of course, for otherwise we will all share the same dismal fate, at which point reproach and remorse will avail us nothing. I further believe that if that process of reassessment and reorientation is to succeed it has to be led by Egypt. The international and regional situation not only permits but also beckons for its leadership. Unfortunately, there is a major problem that stands in the way of Egypt responding to such appeals and undertaking an initiative of this sort. This problem resides in the current policymaking centres, which appear either semi-paralysed or semi- comatose and in need of some miracle to snap them out of this condition. If something of this nature does not occur we have only our prayers to fall back on to halt the continuing slide to the brink. But I do believe there is an opportunity at hand. As a first step towards that much needed change in course, Egypt should declare its opposition to the forthcoming Annapolis conference and, instead, work to promote inter-Palestinian reconciliation, the realisation of which would be the condition for Cairo's agreement to attend the upcoming US peace meeting. * The writer is a professor of political science at Cairo University.
