While the football crisis will eventually die down, with calm and relative peace restored, it is indeed a new kind of crisis: one largely out of the hands of those in power, writes Abdel-Moneim Said I hesitated quite a while before deciding to use the term "crisis" to describe the events surrounding the recent Egyptian-Algerian football matches that took place in Algiers, Cairo and Khartoum. A crisis entails two general aspects. One functions at the decision-making level, whereby government officials in each country suddenly find themselves compelled by an unanticipated development that threatens the "supreme values" of their society to take difficult decisions in a short period of time. The other aspect pertains to the existing system of relations and interactions between two or more countries that is suddenly thrown off kilter or undergoes some other radical change in nature as the consequence of an event or series of events. What links these two aspects is a perceived threat to interests or values that one or all of the parties concerned deem so "major" and "inviolable" and they could even be driven to the use of force. So we learned in our political science classes. "Supreme values," we were taught, always involved such notions as the "survival" of the state, the preservation of its territorial integrity, disputes over resources and other matters crucial to the rivalry between nations. Apparently, however, our textbooks did not go far enough. The onset of the 21st century brought an unprecedented type of international crisis. One was triggered by certain cartoons appearing in Denmark and culminated in speculation and conjecture on the "clash of civilisations". The crisis manifested itself in a rush of events, which generally unfolded in the cultural and social arenas but which occasionally erupted into violence and armed clashes in various regional theatres. The "Egyptian- Algerian crisis" could be added to this type of crisis in that it was not precipitated by the causes of survival, territorial integrity, major material interests or strategic balances. Indeed, if these had been the operative factors, close and cooperative relations would have logically prevailed. However, logic seems to take a back seat in this new type of 21st century crisis that is driven by popular cultures instead of small and specialised groups of "decision-makers". Here it is passion fed by rumour, paucity of facts and information, and the most chauvinistic brands of "dignity", "honour" and "revenge" that hold sway over matters that are at once very simple and very complex. Consequently, it was no coincidence that satellite television played the lead role in the Egyptian-Algerian crisis. Clearly, this media did not see it as its job to present the facts or even to ascertain the facts, let alone to look for information to round out the facts, to consider alternative opinions and other such tasks that were customarily brought to bear when dealing with conventional crises of the last century. Rather, it threw itself completely into the mood and method of a "populist" crisis of the first order. Granted there were populist crises in the 20th century. Then, however, "the people" were a weapon to be fired up or cooled down as decision-makers thought fit. Today, however, in the Egyptian-Algerian crisis, as was the case in the Danish cartoon crisis, a whole new set of players entered the fray, shaping events into a completely new type of phenomenon. Political parties heaved into action, notably some opposition parties. The Wafd Party held discussions on the Egyptian-Algerian football crisis during its annual convention. The Ghad (Tomorrow) Party demanded that Algeria make an official apology to Egypt. But the situation went much further. As tensions rose between Cairo and Algiers, syndicates, tourist companies, athletic organisations, economic organisations and a whole gamut of governmental and non- governmental social and cultural groups and individuals were swept up into the maelstrom. Granted, in the wake of every new crisis there is a tendency to presume that it was unique; that its dynamics, in whole or in part, defy the analytical frameworks we derived from our study of various previous types of crisis. The presumption is not without foundation, although it is impossible to imagine that it could be entirely valid. Crises share some common "semi-structural" properties, certain mechanisms governing the interplay between the conflicting parties, as well as certain boundaries that alter from one crisis to the next but which none of the parties can transcend or ignore. This is not the first time tensions have flared over an athletic event between Egypt and Algeria. There have been precedents in the past three decades that erupted in various degrees of violence, the worst being in the recent matches. This suggests the existence of a structural problem that we should attempt to identify and define. Perhaps Egyptian athletics authorities, which are more experienced in this domain than other athletic authorities, sensed something of the sort. It was they who requested that the last tie- breaking match be held outside Africa and the Arab world. Their suggestion was Cyprus, which is close enough for fans to attend yet, as part of Europe, is culturally remote enough to permit for an amicable ending regardless of the winner. This brings us back to the roots of the problem. Crises only occur against the backdrop of an "environment" of tensions volatile enough to erupt. In warfare, it is often said, "Woe to he who fires the first shot," because that is the shot that releases all the demons that are so difficult to be brought under control again. In football crises, we could say, "Woe to he who throws the first stone, because that stone is equivalent to the match that ignites whole forests in fire." But then what is the combustible fuel that these fires thrive on? Professional football can furnish a particularly charged competitive environment. Getting a stab at the World Cup in football is a dream of sports loving fans around the world. Although Brazil always qualifies for the finals and is the country to have come away with the cup the most often, the excitement and passion around the match generates a mass frenzy that is not quelled by distinction or victory. If this applies to Brazil, imagine then the case where victories are scarcer. Still, football and the mass mania surrounding it is only part of the problem. In the Algerian case, in particular, we cannot discard the fact that the spark that lights the fires of inter-Arab strife always comes from the party that least appreciates the dangers. So imagine the Egyptian-Algerian case against the backdrop of Egypt's prospect of reliving the rapture of the tie it scored against formidable Holland in 1990 and Algeria's prospect of reliving its defeat of venerable Germany in 1982, entering this achievement into its national annals alongside the revolution of a million martyrs. Much has been said about the nature of inter- Arab relations. While this is not precisely the subject here, one can only conclude from their contemporary history that Arab governments and peoples are not especially tolerant of one another. In spite of all the talk about Arab nationalism and our "eternal" historical and cultural bonds, there is some kind of mutual repellent. In the Arab world, it is commonly believed that this element consists of existing regimes and the lack of democracy. However, this does not account for the antipathy that exists between Arab minorities in countries whose rulers are not involved in Arab affairs and whose systems of government are unquestionably democratic. Still, the state of Arabism aside, something was amiss in the emotional and psychological vibes between the Algerians and Egyptians, and this discord had nothing to do with material interests but rather things that psychiatrists might be better equipped to explain. In their jargon, the symptoms of the illness began to surface in the first match in Algeria, when fighting broke out among the Egyptian spectators. Although those responsible for athletic and political affairs acted wisely at the time and brought the situation under control, that "bout" was not the end of the illness. The Egyptian team, which had seemed doomed to fade from the football scene early this year, began to recuperate. With grim determination it won its next three matches, creating among Egyptian football fans the impression that "luck" had now turned in their favour. "Luck" is a mysterious general, but he has a powerful effect on the "magic" of the game. The Algerian fans, by contrast, were suddenly gripped by deep anxiety. Until now they had felt that their two-point lead had given them a clear shot at the finals, but now that victory was threatened, not by Egyptian players and their reignited fighting spirit but by "Egyptians" who, in some undefined way, couldn't be trusted. The scene was thus set for the crisis, which as we know began with the hurling of accusations and suspicions that the media, in turn, found great for upping their distribution figures and selling more advertising space. It was also an ideal occasion for creating a special kind of bond with spectators, one brimming with ardour and charged with zeal, increasingly ready to be mobilised on the patriotic march as the call of mutual interests faded and appeals for calm were drowned out or silenced by charges of treason. As generally happens in such cases, the "crisis" suddenly began to spiral. This process was triggered by a single incident that occurred four days before the match of 10 November when the bus taking the Algerian team from Cairo Airport to their hotel was pelted with stones. This afforded the head of the Algerian Football Federation, Mohamed Rurawa, the opportunity to appeal to FIFA to classify the forthcoming match as "high risk". He succeeded with the result that FIFA sent over several international observers instead of the usual one. Tensions were notched up further when the Algerian media broadcast fabricated images taken from previous -- and not even football- related -- violence to create the impression that Algerian spectators had been wounded or killed after the Cairo match. The response of the Algerian masses was immediate. Rioting crowds attacked Egyptian firms in Algeria, such as EgyptAir, Orascom Telecom, Al-Suweidi and Arab Contractors. In other words, the target was the $6 billion of Egyptian investments in Algeria, Egypt being the largest investor in Algeria outside the oil and gas sectors. In addition, the thousands of Egyptian employees in those firms were compelled to leave Algeria in fear for their personal safety. With that development the situation began to spin out of control as angry mobs backed by the sensationalist media took the helm and propelled the football match frenzy to the level of a national crisis. The rest of the story in Khartoum and Om Durman is now history. Marikh Stadium was destined to become the scene not of a football match but of a facedown between two peoples. While the Algerian government had operated on that premise in the four days that preceded that match, the Egyptian government during this period still believed that it was possible to keep the event a football match in spite of the risks. This difference in the outlooks of the Algerian and Egyptian governments had its own repercussions after the match. Egypt recalled its ambassador to Algiers to protest the behaviour of Algerian hooligans in Khartoum as well as the poor security measures the Algerian government had taken to protect the 15,000 Egyptians living and working in Algeria. To Algerians, Egypt was no longer their "big sister" and to EgyptiansAlgeria was no longer the "land of a million martyrs". There were two new countries now. Or perhaps there was a big element of the old in them waiting to re-emerge. Whatever the case, the material results were quite astounding: one bus in Cairo and eight buses in Khartoum were damaged, 21 Algerians were injured in Cairo and 23 Egyptians were injured in Khartoum, and 14 Algerians died and hundreds were wounded in Algeria in the course of the excesses of their wild celebrations of their football and material victories over Egypt! Crises generally draw to a close in three ways. The first is to accommodate to the crisis so that it ultimately drops below its critical point, eases its pressures on the people and decision-makers, and fades from memory as it is superseded by new events. The second is through an active process of restoring calm that is set into motion when the parties involved awaken to the exorbitant toll the crisis is exacting of them all, and the mutual benefits to be had from reconciliation. The third is to escalate the crisis either to exact revenge or to force the other party to cave in. I believe we can rule out the latter scenario. Most likely some commotion will continue for a while, but eventually -- true to the conventions of the Arab crisis management school -- the time factor plus an element of mediation will combine to lay the current crisis to rest, that is until the next one flares up. When and where that crisis will erupt is impossible to predict, but flare up it will.
