When Assad announced on the 7th April, the 67th anniversary of the founding of the ruling Baath party of which he is also head, that "the project of political Islam has failed" many observers were puzzled by the exact meaning of his remarks. Which political Islam was he referring to, and how had it failed exactly? Iran and Hezbollah, stalwart backers of his embattled regime are the literal embodiment of political Islam. Both are working examples of a theocracy-driven social, military and political order, so other than them being Shia Muslim, how would they differ from the political Islam he was referring to? But his statement needn't be enigmatic; once it is viewed in the context of the occasion he was addressing, and the extraordinary circumstances that both Syria and the region as a whole are going through. The Baath party itself is a fusion of old school socialism and Pan-Arab nationalism. This amalgam by design lends itself to a secular form of governance, albeit totalitarian, and is thus fundamentally at odds with political Islam in that the former bases identity on ethnicity (Arab) while the latter bases it on religion (Islam). Ironically, both espouse ideologies which transcend the borders of their own states and are regional in scope; the notion of exporting the "revolution". The Baath party was founded in the heady days after independence from French colonial mandate, and mirrored similar-minded political organizations across the non-Gulf Arab states which were struggling to form a national identity after centuries of rule by the Ottoman Empire. This cacophony of nascent, competing political ideologies actually created a working form of multi-party parliamentary democracy, most notably in Syria in the late 40's and early 50's. This short-lived experiment was ended however after army coups plunged the country into political turmoil. From those early days, the Baathists found themselves competing with other like-minded political groups, but at complete odds with the other major movement also vying for leadership and a chance to shape the future of the nation; the Muslim Brothers and their dogma of political Islam. The standoff became tense after the Baath came to power in a military coup in 1963, and turned into a violent insurgency by the late 70's and early 80's, one which was ruthlessly put down by the incumbent president's father, Hafez el Assad. From that point on, it was enshrined in Syrian political and social life that the Baath's main nemesis was the Muslim Brothers, and by extension political Islam. Merely being a member of the group became a capital offense, and they were ruthlessly purged and hunted down. School kids were made to chant "our goal is to crush the Muslim Brothers, the criminal agents of Imperialism and Zionism" at assembly just after singing the national Anthem. In Syria, hatred of political Islam was indoctrinated from birth. Like father like son, Bashar el Assad now faces various incarnations of political Islam, the major constituents of the uprising against his rule and current civil war, and seeks to rally his loyalist base around the resurrected bogeyman of the Muslim Brothers, painting his battle with his foes as solely that of a struggle for the soul of the nation against religious extremism. He draws parallels with the ascendency of political Islam in other Arab Spring states, and its subsequent fall, depicting a region-wide conspiracy of which his country is a victim. Particular bile is reserved for the main backers of his Islamist opponents, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. But Turkey, the only shining example of successful political Islam in the region, is problematic. While he might be able to deride Gulf nations as backwards fiefdoms, he can't ignore the startling economic success of his neighbor, or its essentially free and democratic system of governance. Nonetheless, Syrian media is rife with news and analysis about how Prime Minister Erdogan is failing and unpopular. Every small protest against him is a headline worthy and exaggerated, every domestic disturbance or scandal no matter how minuscule is reported and sensationalized. Even though the ruling APK party won recent local elections by a comfortable margin, it was never reported in Syrian state media. For Assad's regime there is no distinction between the moderate political Islam espoused by the Muslim Brothers, or the radical Al Qaeda and Jihadist version. They are all painted with the same brush any of his opponents are; terrorists and extremists. But this once again raises the vexing question, if political Islam is anathema to the Syrian regime's ideology, then how come its closest and staunchest allies are a theocracy (Iran) and its satellite militant group (Hezbollah)? How does the Syrian state account for such a discrepancy and contradiction? The short and simple answer is that it doesn't bother to. It ignores the issue entirely and simply paints the elephant in the room the same color as the walls. You won't find the subject discussed in the media, nor is it addressed in any meaningful way by any Syrian officials. The closest hints at any form of reasoning are veiled comparisons between the treacherous "Wahabism" of the Islamists and their backers, and the Iranian axis of "resistance". It is safe to say that the Syrian regime has no ideology other than that of self-preservation. All the rhetoric about secularism, Arab Nationalism and resistance against Imperialism are empty slogans and propaganda, no longer believed by many of its own supporters. What does rally them around it however is fear of extremist Jihadists, a fear which the regime seeks to exploit at every opportunity. By collectively putting all its opponents in the same basket as radical Islamists, it aims to discredit and undermine them.
