The failure of the Geneva 2 conference on Syria's civil war could revive a limited US-led military intervention, which would eventually boost extremist Islamist groups and lead to grave consequences. The latest round of peace talks aimed at finding a peaceful resolution to the Syrian conflict was crowned earlier in February with a dramatic "sorry" by the UN special envoy and mediator Lakhdar Brahimi. The two sides failed to reach a consensus on the way forward, or to find any common ground to build upon, with the regime insisting the focus should be on fighting terrorism, while the opposition put forward a plan for an interim government, which crucially did not mention the fate of Assad, but which nonetheless went nowhere. As the gears of diplomacy grind to a halt, at least for now, it seems the main backers of the rebels, the US and its European and Gulf allies are weighing military options once again. This includes limited strikes against high value assets as well as providing "game changing" sophisticated weapons to select rebel groups with the aim of stemming the tide of recent regime gains on the ground (especially in the strategic Qalamoun border area with Lebanon, as well as Aleppo) and forcing it to rethink its calculus and position at any future talks. The recent high level meeting between Jordan's King Abdullah and U.S president Barack Obama primarily focused on the Syrian issue, including ways of stepping up military pressure on the regime in Damascus. Jordan borders Syria to the south, and is a vital route for weapons and fighters opposing the Syrian regime. The recent visit by Saudi prince and Interior Minister Mohamed Bin Nayef to Washington, and the Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim to Ankara also fall into the same category, while the scheduled visit by U.S president Barack Obama to Saudi Arabia next month may herald important changes in the region, as well as mend recently frayed ties. In reality, it has become quite clear that an outright military victory by either side is a very remote possibility, and the only way to resolve the Syrian conflict is by forcing a compromise solution on the warring sides. The opposition seems to be on board and willing to make the necessary painful sacrifices for one to work, whereas the regime is not. Bolstered by its recent string of successes it clearly feels it has the upper hand and is in no mood to make any concessions. A complete collapse of the Syrian state and a possible repeat of the Iraq scenario is in no one's interest, least of all Syria' neighbors, but balancing military pressure while aiming to achieve political goals seems to be the current working strategy. But here lies the difficulty of this delicate balancing act, for it seems that the formula in Syria has the fortunes of the regime diametrically opposite those of the most extreme Islamist groups. A decline in the regime's power is met with increased influence and control by the Jihadist groups and Al Qaeda spin offs, most notably the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham or the Levant (ISIS) which purses its own agendas irrespective of what everyone else is doing. The real risk is that those who back the rebels and opposition may over play their hand and make an already awful and complicated situation even worse. Their track record in that respect has been less than impressive. The hesitant and confused policies of the US and its European allies as well as Saudi and Qatar have contributed to and exacerbated the conflict. The real fear is that any military action, direct or indirect will pour fire onto an already raging inferno, resulting in even more death and devastation. Other than the obvious dilemma of any void being by filled by radical groups, there is real concern that the refugee crisis, already at cataclysmic proportions will get much worse. More and more, fragile and painstakingly reached ceasefires in effect around areas of Damascus, including Yarmouk, Babeela, Qaboun and Barzeh may unravel or collapse entirely, unleashing a fresh wave of violence in places which have seen relative peace and have started to slowly recover. Escalation of the conflict is also likely in the south in Deraa and in the north in Aleppo as emboldened and resupplied rebels launch new offensives. Also problematic is the penchant of certain rebel groups to use heavy weaponry to target densely populated areas controlled by the regime, especially in Damascus and Aleppo, already overcrowded with displaced families fleeing the worst of the fighting elsewhere. Any new supplies of heavy weapons will invariably end up falling on people's houses. But by far the biggest concern is that any sophisticated weapons sent to moderate rebels may end up in the hands of extremist Jihadist groups, either forcefully or by way of them being sold by unscrupulous commanders looking to make a quick fortune. Unfortunately there are precedents for this, such as the Salafist group Ahrar el Sham taking over the positions and warehouses of the Supreme Military Council of the Free Syrian Army near the Bab el Hawa crossing late last year, and acquiring the bulk of the Western supplied hardware for themselves. These weapons in the wrong hands will pose very real and direct dangers to Syria's neighbors, and may continue to do so for years to come. The use of military options to force diplomatic settlements is a very risky strategy, especially in such a volatile and unpredictable conflict as Syria. The risks of it backfiring are very real, and the probability of aggravating an already terrible situation is quite high.
