The Egyptian revolution was "like most things which appear too good to be true," author Hany Ghoraba, wrote in his recently published book. "As recently as a decade ago it was a common saying that achieving true democracy in Egypt would be akin to a human landing on Mars." If you want to fully understand the Egyptian political, religious and media mosaic in the wake of the January 25 Revolution, then this book is a must-read: Egypt's Arab Spring: The Long and Winding Road to Democracy by Hany Ghoraba. The most outstanding privilege Mr Ghoraba has over other American and British writers who spoke and wrote at length on Egypt's revolution is simply he is Egyptian and truly knows the width and breadth of the issue. The 15-chapter (256 pages) book is a page-turner really. One of the most interesting characteristics of the writer's style is his ability to set the right examples, cite the relevant proverbs in western culture and above all a bitter sense of irony. Mr Ghoraba draws a bleak picture for the Egyptian revolution. He says optimism of the young rebels of the leaderless uprising and who ended 30 years of an autocratic rule only lasted for the 18 days of massive protests that led to the downfall of former strongman Hosni Mubarak. To him, the revolution was like a Shakespearean tragedy. The Egyptian revolution was "like most things which appear too good to be true," he says. "As recently as a decade ago it was a common saying that achieving true democracy in Egypt would be akin to a human landing on Mars." "As a matter of fact, an implementation of something similar to Russia's Vladimir Putin's brand of democracy was the highest extent of the common Egyptian's democratic aspirations." Mr Ghoraba likens the chaotic scene that unfolded after the uprising to a part of the 1970s Clint Eastwood "Dirty Harry" movie series or Charles Bronson's "Death Wish". He writes: "Armed robberies, organised crime, assaults on banks and money transport vehicles, grand theft auto, murders, massive riots, kidnappings, ransoms, arson, biker-gangs and vandalism. To add insult to injury, on 1st February 2012 a massive massacre was committed by some fanatical support- ers of a football team against their guest rivals. Around 79 people were killed and 1300 injured, most of whom were from the visiting team. This just happened in Egypt, a country well- known for her peaceful nature and the safety of her streets throughout most of its modern history." Mr author tackles in great detail the two different eras that emerged after toppling Mr Mubarak ; namely, the military rule of the country and the Islamists' rule after the election of Mohamed Morsi in June 2012. In the early days of the revolution, he notes, the military represented in the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) was praised for their restraining role and for siding with the rebels against the ousted president. "It was they who put pressure on Mubarak to relinquish power to save the country from further turmoil," he says. However, in the days that followed this initial involvement in politics, SCAF leaders were not entirely above board in their dealings. Mr Ghoraba believes that SCAF has forged an alliance with the Islamists, and "eventually handing them power on a golden platter." He writes: "SCAF has continued to alienate itself from the Liberal community and mainstream Egyptian society. Furthermore, their decision to side with the Islamists during the presidential elections led many to believe that this group had been infiltrated by Muslim Brotherhood elements." Not only this, but Mr Ghoraba further is convinced that this "unholy alliance" has resulted in "fraudulent and rigged" elections that installed Mr Morsi as the first Islamist president of Egypt by a controversial 51% vote. SCAF has given Mr Morsi a free reign to "expand his dictatorial powers," adds Mr Ghoraba. He continues: "The old proverb ‘The road to hell is paved with good intentions' manifests in the way SCAF handled the transitional period after the ousting of the former president. The fact that the army officers are a group of patriots who fought for the country through several wars and were victorious during the glorious war of 1973 is unquestionable. Therefore, the question of their integrity and patriotism should be off the table. The author says that SCAF has committed during the transitional period the political equivalent of Christianity's seven deadly sins that a human should avoid, i.e. wrath, greed, laziness, pride, lust, envy and gluttony. "The political sins committed by SCAF can be described according to the writer as follows: diversion, deception, abuse of power, tyranny, fear mongering, indecision and complacency." And under the Muslim Brotherhood, Mr Ghoraba says, the Islamist president Morsi had been systematically trying to control all the key positions of the country in what the opposition called the "Ikhwanisation" of Egypt. "This process is being met by a very defiant opposition since the Brotherhood has failed to accomplish any of their election promises, either for the parliamentary or presidential elections," he says. The writer is mostly critical of what he believes the Islamists' political exploitation of the sense of religiousness and piety, which is deeply rooted in the Egyptian mentality and society. In chapter 8, which he named ‘There is no Business like God Business', Mr Ghoraba writes: "Modern Egyptians have become entangled in a web of Islamisation intrigues by two main forces; the Salafi groups (Islamic radical fundamentalists) and the Muslim Brotherhood. The involvement of these two main groups in Egyptian political and social life has stunted the momentum of the Egyptian age of modern enlightenment." But on the other side of the equation remains a significant number of Egyptians who are neither for nor against the revolution. Some of them actually believe in the old regime and are called the ‘felool', who include a significant section of the Egyptian society, including business owners and celebrities. "This group, who like to call themselves the silent majority, cannot be categorised as Liberal or Conservative as they are a mix of both. They are a significant voting power. These are mainstream Egyptians who are not likely to have any political affiliations and were never actively interested in politics in the past few decades. "This group, who can get equally fed up with both the Islamists and revolutionaries, will likely be the decisive factor in the near future of Egypt during and after Mohamed Morsi's reign," Mr Ghoraba notes. And between the military, the Islamists and the ‘silent majority,' the Tahrir revolutionaries found themselves demonised and marginalised. "The puritan rebels sacrificed everything for the revolution, including their body parts and even their own lives. Yet a lack of coordination and common goal made them quite impetuous and occasionally perceived by the public as rebels without a cause," Mr Ghoraba concludes.
