People who have followed events in Egypt closely can only conclude that the Egyptian army acted to remove Mohamed Morsi from the presidency several days after millions of Egyptians gathered in central squares around the country in what was universally described as “the largest mass assembly in the history of mankind”. Therefore, they can confidently state that the army acted in response to the will of the people, who are the source of political “legitimacy”, and that this was by no means a military coup, whether soft or hard. Certainly, the overwhelming majority of Egyptians feel this way, and they remain adamant in this opinion, especially in view of how quickly the army took practical measures towards the transfer of power to civilians in accordance with a “roadmap” that was drafted with the participation of diverse political forces and that was inspired by the renewed “revolutionary legitimacy” that made 30 June 2013 a second of wave of the 25 January Revolution that had been hijacked and derailed by the Muslim Brotherhood. Over the past year under Morsi it became obvious that the Muslim Brotherhood's understanding of democracy does not extend beyond the ballot box. They made this clear in their statements and commentaries, in their behaviour and in their attitude towards their own pledges. Even the “ballot box” they understood in the narrowest possible sense, for they refused to offer any guarantees to ensure the integrity of the electoral process and the equality of opportunity among political contenders. Beyond this they ignored or flouted fundamental democratic values. The extent of their respect for freedom of opinion and expression was reflected in the unwarranted closure of satellite television stations, the hundreds of journalists they dragged before the prosecution and the court, and the legislation they drafted to restrict the freedom of the press. Minority rights, including the right to life, were jeopardised by a political and religious rhetoric that viciously targeted and incited hatred against Christians. People who held opposing views to the Muslim Brotherhood were systematically vilified with choruses of curses raining down on liberal and leftist “heretics” by leaders from Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiya, the Salafist Front and other Morsi/Muslim Brotherhood allies, who included Al-Qaeda members. For the large swathe of Egypt's popular and working classes, standards of living deteriorated as investment ground to a halt, domestic debt climbed, the country's international credit rating was downgraded, inflation mounted and prices and unemployment figures soared. Morsi behaved as though he came to power with massive popular support. The fact is he only scraped into power by a narrow margin over Ahmed Shafik, his rival in the second round of the presidential elections. Moreover, some have questioned the results of that poll due to allegations regarding attempts to prevent Christians from reaching polling stations in Upper Egypt and the production of fake and pre-completed ballots by some workers in government printing houses whom the Muslim Brotherhood had allegedly bribed. Such considerations aside, Morsi interpreted his electoral “victory” as a blank cheque granted to him by the Egyptian people, entitling him to do whatever he pleased. Accordingly, he seized upon this “mandate” to issue a spate of decrees and measures, some of which were in breach of the constitution and the law, or detrimental to the national and social welfare, and virtually all of which demonstrated his unwavering loyalty to a single constituency — the Muslim Brotherhood. Morsi admitted this allegiance in a televised interview in which he said that his character, beliefs and upbringing were connected with this group. Morsi was eighth in line in the hierarchy of the Muslim Brotherhood Guidance Bureau. Egyptians, who previously had little opportunity to glimpse inside this organisation, soon realised that he had no choice but to obey the commands of the seven above him due to the Muslim Brotherhood's strict and inviolable code of obedience. Although the Supreme Guide had officially dismissed Morsi from Muslim Brotherhood decision-making circles just before the presidential election process began, it quickly became apparent that this was purely cosmetic and only the beginning of the Muslim Brotherhood's systematic campaign to deceive the Egyptian people. This deception, moreover, was being carried out by a group whose ideological make-up, organisational structure and shrouded subterranean portion give it more in common with a fascist cult than with a modern organisation that runs itself democratically and believes that democracy is not something to be used once and then thrown away. Another facet of the deception was that, before the second round of the presidential elections, Morsi cast himself as the “candidate of the revolution” in a contest against “the candidate of the Mubarak regime” — Shafik. His campaign rhetoric was pitched towards large segments of the “youth of the revolution” many of whom, at the time, supported him because they felt this would seal the end of the regime they had rebelled against. Although these may have been the votes that give him the edge over Shafik, this did not prevent him not only from ignoring them after he became president but also from remaining silent about, or even colluding in, the actions that led to the death of dozens of young revolutionaries. To Morsi, the 25 January Revolution had never been about principles. The revolution's calls for “bread, freedom, social justice and human dignity” were, if anything, little more than words to pepper his speeches. Rather, the revolution was a historic window of opportunity to promote the “empowerment” of his group over Egypt as a key to strengthening the capacities of the Muslim Brotherhood, which has chapters in more than 80 countries, so as to position it for “world mastership”. This latter concept, in Muslim Brotherhood doctrine, extends beyond the revival of the Islamic Caliphate that had been abolished by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in 1924, because one of its corollaries is the “empire of the idea” which holds that “wherever our idea exists, this is our state”. As a soldier committed to the advancement of the Muslim Brotherhood mission, Morsi saw power as a “divine gift” that he had to cling to at all costs, even if that entailed bloodshed, the destruction of the institutions of the state, and the spread of chaos. Over the months, Morsi began to stray more and more not only from “revolutionary” but also from democratic legitimacy, a trend that culminated in his constitutional declaration of 22 November 2012, which granted him virtually absolute powers. The purpose was to facilitate the completion and ratification of a highly controversial constitution that laid the foundations for the establishment of a theocratically oriented state. The trend continued in collusion with the Muslim Brotherhood in the form of a battery of laws intended to prevent the rotation of authority and to undermine the principle of equal opportunity between competing political forces, the appointment of cronies to government posts regardless of their lack of qualifications, and even the formation of militias consisting of Islamist extremists many of whom Morsi had released from prison by wielding his power of “general amnesty”. Simultaneously, Morsi and his group waged battle against all institutions of the state, most notably the judiciary, the police and the press. On top of this there was an ongoing muted battle between them and the armed forces. In a full year of Morsi rule, major world leaders refrained from visiting Egypt. Morsi did undertake many trips abroad, but they brought little benefit to the country and its people. For all the reasons above, the anger and frustration of the Egyptian people accumulated over the course of a single year to the point that they had no alternative but to pour out to the streets in massive numbers on 30 June in order to reclaim their revolution. The army, in turn, had no alternative but to side with the will of the people and to forestall the outbreak of civil war. Morsi was in denial; in his blind intransigence he could not see how drastically his popularity had plummeted. He would never have responded to the will of the people even if they had remained in the streets for months and the streets filled with their blood. He had made this perfectly clear on numerous occasions during recent weeks. During his election campaign he had vowed that if millions marched to demand him to step down, he would leave the presidential palace immediately. As it turned out, this proved yet another of the Muslim Brotherhood's endless string of lies. In Morsi's last appearance, he swore that he would “sacrifice his blood for legitimacy” even though his so-called “legitimacy” had long since lapsed due to his actions and the consequent wrath of millions. It was reported, citing a leak from his last meeting with the minister of defence, that when he was offered the opportunity to leave with his dignity intact he responded, “over my dead body”. Now that Morsi is out, the Egyptians have an opportunity to bring their revolution back on course. Hopefully, our political forces will learn from their past mistakes and avail themselves of this chance wisely. One positive sign that this may happen is the constitutional declaration issued Monday evening stipulating that the new constitution is to be finalised first, after which parliamentary and then presidential elections will be held. According to this roadmap, which proceeds in a logical order this time, power will be vested in civilian hands within the space of six months. If this process can be concluded in a true spirit of consensus and inclusion, and with the empowerment of youth in the process, the selection of government administrators on the basis of merit, immediate measures to promote social justice and the elimination of corrupt elements from the police, and prosecutions of those from the Mubarak and Morsi eras who stole from the people and caused blood to be shed, then the revolution will be back on track.
