The painful analysis of the failures of the Lebanon war has resulted in a more militaristic Israeli society, writes Saleh Al-Naami Amidst public approval, the hall roared with applause as the stars of the entertainment show "A great nation", broadcast by Israeli television channel 10 last on 8 July, continued their sarcastic commentary on the performance of the state's leaders during the recent Lebanon war, which Israel calls the "sixth war". As the first anniversary of the war on approached on 12 July, debate in Israel over the war and its ramifications escalated significantly (it had never stopped since the war ended). By following the debate on television screens and in the pages of newspapers, as well as the research halls of universities, it becomes clear that the majority of politicians, military officials, commentators, and researchers in Israel view the war's outcome as a sweeping failure for Tel Aviv and a turning point in the downfall of Israeli defensive power in confronting Arabs. The Israeli minister of infrastructure, General Binyamin Ben Eliezer, told Israeli television channel one last Friday that "the truth must be told. The outcome of the war was a fierce blow to Israeli deterrence power. It was the first war in the history of our state in which we did not determine its end according to our own will." According to an opinion poll among the ministers of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's government conducted by Israeli military radio on the occasion of the war's first anniversary, with the exception of Olmert himself, all of the ministers hold that Tel Aviv failed to meet the goals it set for itself. Yet the harshest evaluation of the war's outcomes was made by Meir Dagan, the head of Mossad, and Yuval Diskin, the head of domestic intelligence, Shin Bet, who described the war's outcomes as a "national catastrophe". According to General Roevin Bedhetetsor, a strategic affairs expert, the Israeli government failed to accomplish the basic goals it set for the war, such as the unconditional release of the two kidnapped soldiers and halting the smuggling of weapons and ammunition to Hizbullah. Additionally, the presence of international forces in the south failed to prevent "hostile forces" from continuing their activities unabated, as in the case of a Palestinian organisation which recently fired missiles into Israel from a village near the border. Nor did they stop these forces from becoming a target for "terrorist" operations, as in the case of the bombing which targeted a Spanish patrol. In contrast to these critics is Olmert, who grasps every opportunity to point to the statement Hizbullah General-Secretary Hassan Nasrallah made to a Lebanese television station, saying that if he had known that the kidnapping of the two Israeli soldiers would have lead to such catastrophic results, he would not have ordered their abduction. Olmert's attempts to persuade the media incited the wrath of Ofer Shelah, the presenter of a popular news program on Israeli television channel 10. He responded bitingly to Olmert, asking, "Is what Nasrallah said sufficient to cover up the disasters the state faced during this war, in which tens of thousands of Israelis were forced to leave their homes after having lost security? How is it possible to bring back the Israeli population's trust in the authority's institutions, and specifically in the army, which did not deliver the goods it was expected to. It failed to defeat a few hundred members of a terrorist militia." The political, military and intellectual elite in Israel differed over whether it was possible to avoid the war. The minister of internal security, Avi Dichter, recently repeated his statement before the Winograd Commission which investigated the war, saying that it was unwise to wage war before mobilising international opinion to pressure the Lebanese government and backing diplomatic pressure with the threat of military force before having to actually resort to this. He believes that such a strategy would have led to more constructive results. Uri Saghi, former head of military intelligence, and Uri Savir, head of the Peres Centre for Peace, agree with Dichter, stressing that Israel had hastily engaged in a war that had not been studied well, and went as far as to suggest that Israel was not even prepared for it. Most politicians and military officials, however, hold that the war as a "just" one that could not have been avoided, as the minister of transportation, General Shaul Mofaz, said. With regard to Israel's preparation, all of the military correspondents and commentators in the Israeli media stressed that the Israeli army entered the war without undertaking the necessary preparations. General Moshe Yaalon, former chief of staff, made a sweeping attack on General Dan Halutz, who was the chief of staff during the war, accusing him of "destroying the army and killing and corrupting its morals." In statements made to television channel 10 on 6 July, he asked, "how can a person like Halutz lead the army when on the day war was waged, he was busy making sure that it would not affect his personal stock investments?" Ephraim Anbar, a political science professor at Tel Aviv University, holds that the Israeli leadership failed "intellectually" in the war when it reassured Syria that it would not attack it, despite knowing that Hizbullah is a "Syrian creation," according to his reasoning. He said, "We should have learned from the Turks how to deal with the Syrian regime, for if we threatened Bashar into pressuring Hizbullah to hand over the two soldiers, he would have done it, and if he had refused, we could have used the war as a pretext to attack Syria's long-distance missile network which threatens Israel. This missile network covers most of the area of Israel, and the war provided an opportunity to address this threat once and for all." Yet there are observers in Israel who don't believe the war's failures were due to a lack of military preparation, but rather due to Israel's continued occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Amnon Amnon Abramovetz, the leading commentator on Israeli television channel two, said that rather than preparing for a war in which regular armies engage, the soldiers were required to undertake policing duties in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, pursuing women and children throwing stones. He believed this "corrupted the spirit of the army and diminished the professional level of its leaders and soldiers." Among the most important conclusions the Israeli army reached was the conviction of the importance of missiles in determining future wars between Israel and the Arab states. General Daniel Milo, commander of air defence in the Israeli air force, stated that the army leadership has assumed that Arab parties, whether regular armies or resistance movements, will focus on firing missiles into Israel to settle confrontations. Milo added that the massive damage Israel incurred through the firing of long-and short-range missiles during the war would further tempt Arab parties to continue employing this strategy. Milo expects that in the next war with Israel, Syria will fire mid-and long-range missiles and warned that Syrian missiles could strike any location in the Jewish state. He pointed out that the leadership of the occupation army is currently preparing appropriate military responses to missile attacks in future wars, and noted that it was decided to form a committee of missile experts to determine the steps that must be taken to counter Arab missiles. To act on these conclusions, the chief of staff, Gabi Ashkenazi, is busy with a plan to upgrade the military, and has won the approval of the members of the foreign affairs and security committee in the Knesset who have reviewed his plan and praised him for it. The wide debate over the results of the war makes it clear that Israel is confused regarding its relations with the Arab world. For example, many of those in military circles, and particularly military intelligence, argue that the war's outcome forced Israel to exert the greatest effort possible to resume negotiations with Syria. The Israeli minister of education, Yuli Tamir, asked Olmert to ignore American opposition to negotiations between Tel Aviv and Damascus on the basis that these serve Israeli interests. Tamir is not alone in her view, for according to the Haaretz newspaper, most of the ministers in Olmert's government support attempts to resume negotiations with Syria. This led Olmert, on 9 July, to invite President Assad to begin holding talks in the location he chooses. And yet there are numerous obstacles to pursuing this. In addition to the American position opposing negotiations between Syria and Israel, Mossad has doubts over the real intentions of Assad. Yet more important is that the binding recommendations in the report of the Winograd Commission, which the Israel government formed to investigate the war, only prepare Israel for future wars and not for political settlements, as noted by Raviv Droker, the political commentator on Israel television channel 10. Observers in Israel state that the report stressed that the Israeli government and army must take preemptive military measures to halt the advancement of "hostile" parties seeking to take Israel by surprise. They say that this means that the current Israel government, and that which will succeed it, will invest all of their efforts in preparing for the next war and not in political settlements. Former Israeli deputy minister of defense, Ephraim Sneh says that one of the outcomes of the war is the failure to seriously move against the Iranian nuclear programme and that this is a major shortcoming that is unacceptable. According to observers in Israel, the war led to an increased militarisation of the agenda of the state and of society. Strengthening the army's power means using force has become the top priority of the government. The military's budget is being increased to enable it to carry out wide-scale training, and to upgrade the reserve forces, which constitute 70 per cent of the manpower in the Israeli army. At the same time, the war has increased the militarisation of Israeli politics, because the Winograd report made a clear connection between Olmert's and the former defense minister Amir Peretz's lack of military background and their failure in the performance of their duties Among the priorities the Israel army is seeking to address is regaining the confidence of the Israeli public in its institutions. According to a study conducted by Audi Lepel, a professor in political psychology at Ben Gurion University, the majority of the public has lost its confidence in the army and its spokespersons. This lack of confidence peaked when the Israeli public relied on Hizbullah broadcasts for information during the war.
