Lebanon remains gripped by internecine struggles that can only serve external competing powers, writes Talal Salman* The Israeli July 2006 war on Lebanon formed a turning point in Lebanese politics, its aftermath throwing into relief the fragility of the coalition that had been patched together at the last minute between Hizbullah, the Amal Movement, independents and Walid Jumblatt's Progressive Socialist Party. It was an alliance built on thin ice and produced a cabinet without a consistent agenda to bind it together. Perhaps the only item in common between Jumblatt, Saad Al-Hariri, who heads the independent bloc, and Chief of the Executive Committee of Lebanese Forces Samir Geagea was to keep out Michel Aoun, leader of the Free Patriotic Movement and widely supported by the Maronite community. Hizbullah, meanwhile, catapulted itself into the executive branch after having, for the first time in its history, taken part in the Lebanese electoral process. But if this party acted as though it was going to be just another ordinary member of an ordinary Lebanese government, these were not ordinary times for Lebanon. Hizbullah had certain aims to accomplish and it felt that having ministers in the cabinet would help it achieve them. For one, it wanted to bury the suspicion of having catered to Syria at the expense of the life of Rafiq Al-Hariri. It also wanted to improve relations with other Lebanese parties and, in the long term, perhaps, work to improve Lebanese-Syrian relations. Before the Israeli invasion, there were, of course, differences among the coalition members. The first major altercation erupted over UN backing of an international tribunal on the assassination of Al-Hariri. Hizbullah's adversaries rubbed their hands at the prospect of the rest of the coalition turning against Hizbullah, and Al-Hariri, Jumblatt and Geagea were quick to seize any chance to embarrass it. When the government attempted to adopt the UN's recommendations before Hizbullah and Amal ministers had sufficient time to study them, these ministers withdrew from the government and each camp retreated to its entrenched positions. Even when Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri called for a dialogue between the disputants it was obvious that talks would run up against the wall of Lebanese-Syrian relations, beneath which heading came an array of sensitive issues such as the question of borders, Shebaa Farms and disarming Hizbullah militias. The 14 March Alliance was not prepared or willing to delve into such matters, keen as it was to keep the Syrian card as a sword over the heads of its adversaries. Last year's war caused the fissures to gape. It also exposed the true attitude of the Lebanese premiere towards Hizbullah. Prime Minister Fouad Siniora could barely mention the word "resistance." In some quarters he was baptised Lebanon's hero, the tears he shed as he delivered his appeal with a quivering voice at the Arab foreign ministers' summit were deemed more precious than the Lebanese blood that was being sacrificed on the battlefield. Arab officialdom had come out on the side of Siniora and it made its sympathies clear through its condemnation of Hizbullah for starting the war and effective exoneration of Israel. But then the Arab order discovered it had backed the wrong horse. Hizbullah and the resistance forces succeeded in holding their ground, scoring an unprecedented victory. As though by some unwritten agreement, a massive media campaign was set into motion to blacken this achievement, tarnish Hizbullah's patriotic credentials and raise the ogre of a sectarian conspiracy. Suddenly, Hizbullah was branded as "a Shia party linked to Iran and the Alawi regime in Syria" and, hence, "opposed to Sunni Islam". And the Arab public began to hear of that looming "Shia crescent" -- a term coined by Jordan's monarch -- and the "irresponsible actions" it perpetrated from Lebanon all the way to Iraq. It was a nasty game. But here was an Arab-Islamic resistance movement that stood against Israel and America, so it had to be discredited as a Persian pawn and simultaneously used to drive the Syrian regime into a corner. And the way to do that was to inflame sectarian passions. The Lebanese government's handling of the war was one of the major causes of the political crisis that rocked the country in the months following the war. It was impossible to form a national unity government. The US and the West backed Siniora and drew a sharp red line at the notion of toppling his government. Siniora had to stay as the man of the moment and the symbol of Arab "moderates". So the US and France vetoed the national unity government, especially because such a government would have included Hizbullah. Hizbullah had to be punished, and it had to be humiliated. But the Lebanese opposition was also, to a certain extent, to blame for the deterioration in the post-war situation. It had not predicted that Siniora and his supporters could have remained so stubborn in the wake of the largest anti- government demonstration in the history of Lebanon. Perhaps, too, it should have foreseen that the demonstration would be turned into a gambit for rallying support behind the government on the basis of sectarian affiliations. The opposition made some other miscalculations. It failed to appreciate the sheer scale of foreign meddling in Lebanon. It should have kept to peaceful marches, thereby establishing its legitimacy. Instead, it staged a strike that grew violent. The tragic events of January tarnished the image of the resistance and gave the government and its local and foreign supporters the pretext to redraw the conflict along sectarian lines. Various Lebanese leaders were instrumental in fuelling Sunni-Shia tensions -- Druze leader Jumblatt stands out. Also, some Sunni fundamentalist groups surfaced to pitch in against a common enemy: the Shia, regard by them as heretics and which form the primary constituents of Hizbullah that the 14 March Alliance hoped to crush. Hizbullah did not mount a counteroffensive. Contrary to the claims of its domestic adversaries, throughout its history it regarded Israel as its sole enemy and this is the direction in which it had always focussed its energies. The only reason it began to take part in the Lebanese political process was to protect its back politically. Lebanon has been swept into a conflict without a cause beyond securing a grip on power. It has lost the ability to act at a time when international rivalries are seething around it. Competing powers are using Lebanon as a base to promote their interests in the region, their allies likely to be abandoned once particular external agendas are realised. The longer this futile power game persists, the more the value system of Lebanese society will teeter, and the greater the risk that the Lebanese right to self-determination will be surrendered to an international mandate of indeterminate duration, impinging upon every facet of life, overthrowing the constitution and Lebanon's democratic institutions, and opening the country's flank to unrestrained Israeli encroachments. This leaves us with the question as to whether it is still possible to halt this internecine fighting and spare the nation from the disasters that await it after serving as a pawn in international conflicts. * The writer is editor-in-chief of the Lebanese daily Assafir.
