Things aren't what they appear: the US, Iran and Saudi Arabia are playing their cards carefully in Iraq, writes Mustafa El-Labbad Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki's visit to Tehran last week was more than your run-of- the-mill state visit. Its significance went beyond the usual matters of protocol, shaking hands and smiling, and signing agreements before the TV cameras. It told us, contrary to the general impression conveyed by the media, that US-Iranian relations have made a breakthrough. The security agreements that the Iraqi and Iranian leaders signed were pure form. Iran already possesses more than enough keys to restore security to Iraq without having to formalise them in protocols and the like. Al-Maliki was in Tehran for another purpose. He needed the blessing of the regional godfather in order to secure his tenure as the kindly representative of the Iraqi Shia. In giving this blessing, Iran effectively inaugurated the race of regional powers to select their local proxies in the forthcoming contest over shares in the ruling structures in Iraq that will arise in the wake of the US-Iranian understanding. The US and Iran have long been engaged in a protracted game of chess over Iraq, using political, military and negotiating tactics. They have different strengths and weaknesses. Washington occupies Iraq militarily, but Tehran holds many of the political strings, which it can easily tweak to exacerbate the dilemma of the occupation forces. But both sides have come to realise that they cannot keep the situation under control without the help of the other. Al-Maliki knows that he owes his success at staying in power in Baghdad to his deftness at playing upon common American and Iranian interests. He also knows that if US-Iranian negotiations succeed they will create a new reality in his country and that he needs to remain in Tehran's good graces in order to keep the edge over his potential Shia rivals (notably Adel Abdul-Mahdi, Amar Al-Hakim and Ibrahim Al-Jaafari) and retain his hold on the premiership the government that will emerge under that new reality. The US may have succeeded in toppling the Iraqi regime, but Iran succeeded in placing its allies in positions of power in Baghdad in the post-invasion phase. Iran won its influence in Baghdad not only through its political, sectarian, economic, military and intelligence presence in Iraq, but also through its skill at capitalising on the momentous bungling of the neo-conservative administration in Washington. In 15 years it reversed the outcome of the Iraq-Iran war (1980-1988). From near military defeat it has now scored almost total political victory. It is perhaps no coincidence, therefore, that Al-Maliki's visit was timed to coincide with the anniversary of the Iraq-Iran war. This anniversary also adds a poignant significance to the third round of US-Iranian negotiations over the future government in Iraq and which powers should have a say in how this government is shaped. As the situation stands, there are three primary players in the field: Washington, Tehran and Riyadh. These are expected to reach a pragmatic compromise that will consist of a greater stake for the Sunnis in government, a continued Shia majority say, and the redeployment of occupation forces outside the major cities. To bring this about, Saudi Arabia will attempt to persuade the Sunni parties to participate in the forthcoming government and to rally them to confront the Sunni militias and Al-Qaeda operatives in the Sunni triangle. Iran will pledge to neutralise the Shia anti-occupation forces, such as Muqtada Al-Sadr's militias, on the condition that other parties fulfil their obligations. All three parties appear to be operating on a tacitly agreed-upon premise: a compromise solution will only work if each party does what it takes to ensure that the other parties' worst nightmares do not come true. Riyadh's nightmare is that Iran will succeed in securing a large base of operations in the area of southern Iraq adjacent to the Saudi Arabian borders, within a stone's throw of Saudi oil fields. Tehran fears the emergence of a central government in Baghdad which owes its primary allegiance to Washington and which could eventually build up a strong enough army to threaten Iran again in the future. Washington is cringing at the spectre of a forced withdrawal without face-saving agreements and, therefore, having to sustain the internal and external fallout from an unequivocal defeat while Tehran is left to crow over its political victory in Iraq. One fairly sure sign that the "nightmare prevention" strategy is on the verge of completion is that securing American oil interests is also an integral part of the negotiations. Not that this is stated in so many words. Rather, the phraseology is more in the nature of "introducing mechanisms for the distribution of Iraqi oil wealth over the three parts of Iraq: the Kurdish north, the Sunni centre and the Shia south." Naturally, the agreement will also provide for joint control over the armed forces and intelligence agencies, both of which will expand in accordance with the provisions of the formula. In anticipation of the agreement, players inside Iraq are busily manoeuvring behind the scenes, flexing their muscles or swearing allegiance to the regional godfather. After all, such are the dynamics of political section in the absence of a cohesive national project. Meanwhile, Washington and Tehran are upstairs, sitting face to face across the negotiating table behind closed doors. Harangues against the "Great Satan" and the "Axis of Evil" have been locked outside the room so they can knuckle down to work. Inside that room, a different logic is at play. In negotiations of this sort, evil is not taking advantage of available opportunities and the devil exists only in the small print.
