Why would Egypt's legendary political savant revert to an interpretation of Egypt's history that has been proven misjudged, asks Abdel-Moneim Said* Exactly what Mohammed Hassanein Heikal has against President Anwar El-Sadat to make him so tenacious in avoiding the truth regarding the president's strategy for the October 1973 war eludes my grasp. It is certainly not a personal grudge dating from Sadat's detention of Heikal, because from my personal acquaintance with him I know he is not the type to indulge in feelings of rancour and vengefulness, however unpardonable the folly that drove Sadat, shortly before his assassination, to order his arrest. At the same time, Heikal remains one of the few who appreciate the value of history, the value of the nation, and the value of knowledge, and I am sure he would not turn his keen argumentative capacities towards deceiving that considerable segment of the Egyptian public to whom his writings are almost holy writ. But nor can his attitude be attributed to any deficiency in his strategic analytical capacities, for in this discipline he excels not only over most Egyptians but also over most Arab scholars. Nevertheless, in his introduction to the six previously unpublished letters that he had sent to Hosni Mubarak in 1982 and that have just appeared in Al-Masri Al-Youm, Heikal returns once again to the October war and reiterates the same take on Sadat's decisions during that war that we have seen in so many articles before this. That the information and arguments in this version have undergone no process of revision in spite of the facts that have come to light since 1982, and the available studies on the subject, leads one to suspect -- hopefully mistakenly -- that Heikal was deliberately set on tarnishing the memory of that president who gave Egypt its greatest victory in contemporary history. Were it not for Sadat's wisdom and foresight during the October war, Egypt would probably have suffered the same fate as Arab countries that opted for a different strategy, one that was perhaps closer to Heikal's ideals, but one that would have nevertheless meant continuing foreign occupation and national humiliation. But perhaps it is best to start at the beginning, because of Heikal's determination to open his narrative with Sadat's first contact with Kissinger on 7 October 1973. During this communication, the Egyptian president assured the US secretary of state that Egypt did not intend to deepen or expand the battlefront, which to Heikal was, at best, a gross strategic blunder. In his article in Al-Masri Al-Youm, Heikal writes that he learned of these secret communications during his trip to Washington in 1975 and that he discussed them in interview with Al-Ahali in 1983. In fact, however, secret Egyptian-US communications began long before Sadat came to power. According to Amin Howeidi, contacts between Egyptian and US intelligence agencies began under Abdel Nasser in 1968 -- not that this was particularly out of the ordinary for a country that was exploring all possible avenues to further its national interests and, above all at the time, ways to liberate its occupied territory. More significantly, Kissinger revealed in textually corroborated detail what transpired between him and Egyptian National Security Advisor Hafez Ismail, through whom Sadat communicated with the White House, in Years of Upheaval, which appeared in 1982, which is to say a year before Heikal's Al-Ahali interview. Heikal could have spared himself considerable trouble and his readers no small degree of dismay had he, too, read Kissinger's account of these communications and his appreciative remarks regarding Sadat's strategic vision. Unfortunately, for some reason he did not and, therefore, failed to present his readers, if only to offer them the opportunity to see all sides of the issue before passing judgment, with Kissinger's perspective. In all events, according to Heikal, Sadat's secret disclosure to the US stemmed from confusing his "bet on peace" with his "bet on war." The consequence of this strategic blunder, Heikal said, was to give the US -- and by extension Israel -- opportunity to capitalise on Egypt's behind- the-scenes breaking of ranks to regain the initiative and to divide the Egyptian and Syrian fronts. However, if we put those events in a different context we come up with an entirely different reading. Let us assume that Sadat did not have two wagers but one' that from the outset he felt that the peace option offered the best chances of recovering occupied Sinai, creating a framework for the liberation of the rest of Israeli occupied territory, and setting Egypt, straining from years of war and revolutionary turmoil, on the path to peace and economic recovery and development. In this context, Sadat knew he had to wage a war with the purpose of achieving limited military objectives that he could then turn to the service of major political objectives. However, as everyone also knew at the time, the balance of powers was stacked in favour of Israel, not only because of its possession of nuclear weapons but also because of its military superiority in the air and its ability to penetrate deep into the Egyptian interior. Against this backdrop, one can better understand Sadat's intent from the message he sent to Kissinger. He wanted, first, to gain time to stage the crossing of the Suez Canal before the Americans responded. And, indeed, he gained a full week before the US began to extend its air bridge to Israel. Second, he wanted to keep the battle on the other side of the Israeli front and away from the Egyptian interior and, third, he wanted to avert civilian casualties and damage on both sides in order to preclude the rise of extremist tendencies -- there or here -- that would impede efforts to reach a peace agreement. In short, Sadat had set the rules of the game. Kissinger understood this perfectly well, respected it and played accordingly. The result was the well-known series of Israeli withdrawals from Sinai. Nor was that communication to Kissinger on 7 October Sadat's final word. Contrary to the advice of General Saad El-Din El-Shazli, on 14 October he ordered Egyptian forces to advance towards the Strait of Aqaba, a development that Kissinger described as the second time Sadat had duped him (the first being the surprise crossing of the Suez Canal on 6 October). In effect, then, Sadat's message to Kissinger met the needs of the moment, since the original plan was to keep Egyptian assault forces beneath the Egyptian missile umbrella and to create a vice to intercept the Israeli counterassault. This tactic was, in fact, put into effect with the result that over three days of fighting Israeli forces suffered major losses in aircraft, tanks and artillery. Nothing, it seems, could more tangibly put paid to the contention that Egypt abandoned Syria in the field of battle. In fact, Syria had asked for a ceasefire within hours of the commencement of the war. Before the day was out on 7 October, the Syrian offensive had ground to a halt and by the evening of the 8 October, Israeli forces had driven Syrian forces behind the lines from which they had originally started. It was not Sadat, therefore, who began the search for a separate solution. Indeed, quite to the contrary, his order to advance toward the Strait of Aqaba, contrary to El-Shazli's advice, could only have served one purpose, which was to come to Syria's aid by mounting pressure against Israel on the Egyptian front, since the regrettable result of this order was to thin out forces on the ground making it possible for Israeli forces to drive a breach in the Egyptian front. On the whole, Sadat's actions were a bid to create a regional and international environment conducive to compelling Israel to withdraw completely from occupied Egyptian territory. It is curious that Heikal did not find it necessary to point this out. If the October war had a single political purpose it was to force Israel to the realisation that it would have to pay a heavy price for continuing to hold on to the territory it occupied. At the same time, however, it was made explicit that this war was part of a larger project, one that offered Israel an alternative -- peace -- if Israel withdrew from occupied Arab territory. Thus it was clear to Israel and to the US that Egypt did not go to war for the sake of war, but rather in order to free its land and then bring long- awaited peace to its people. It is important to keep this context in mind when recalling Sadat's statement that the US holds 99 per cent of the cards in the quest for a solution to the Arab- Israeli conflict. It is unjust to read into this anything more than a rhetorical appeal to the US to shoulder its responsibilities, as opposed, for example, to a signal that Egypt was willing to abandon its allegiances and throw in its lot with the Americans. If Heikal were fair, he would accord Abdel Nasser's famous threat to force the US to drink the waters of the Red Sea and Mediterranean similar weight. Of course, Heikal would not take such a statement by Nasser with literal seriousness, because he knows very well that rhetorical hyperbole can serve various functions, from mobilising the masses to delivering diplomatic messages. But the question remains, why he did not apply this standard to Sadat? * The writer is director of Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies.
