Pitfalls in international relations often come from misperceptions and a reluctance to admit to mistakes, writes Abdel-Moneim Said* Egypt's most celebrated political writer, Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, came up with the theory that President Gamal Abdel-Nasser was dragged against his will into the 1967 defeat. When Saddam Hussein was driven out of Kuwait, Heikal once again speculated that Saddam was lured against his better judgement into that abortive misadventure. The notion of leaders walking into traps has become popular ever since. Some analysts have even concluded that Arab countries were duped into fighting the 1948 War. Conceivably, analysts can use the same theory to explain how Muammar Qaddafi became embroiled in the Lockerbie affair, how the Sudanese government got bogged down in a long-running civil war in the south and west of the country, and even how Syria earned the wrath of Europe and the United States. According to the theory of entrapment, countries with a revolutionary ideology are more likely to get duped than countries with a moderate or conservative policy. Syria is therefore an obvious victim. Its regime still embraces a pan- Arab Baathist ideology and claims to speak for all the Arabs and defend their interests. Things are changing in this region. The Baathist regime has disappeared from Iraq. Libya is getting more interested in the African cause than the Arab one. Algeria is turning introspective. The Islamic revolution in Sudan is losing its edge. Moderate Mahmoud Abbas replaced revolutionary Yasser Arafat on the Palestinian scene. As things stand, Syria appears to be the last mainstay of pan-Arab revolutionary ideology in the region. It is true that Damascus is always careful with its rhetoric and has kept things mostly quiet on the front with Israel. But radicalism still lingers in the Syrian press. And however justified, radicalism is becoming less fashionable in today's world. According to the theory of entrapment, the entrapped often misunderstands the signals and misinterprets the lay of the land. The entrapped exaggerates its own power while underestimating the power and resolve of opponents. Nasser misjudged Israel's political and military power in 1967. Saddam failed to grasp the changes that happened on the international scene. Qaddafi mistakenly assumed that the world would tolerate his attempts to interfere in countries around the world, from the Philippines to the Indian preservations, from Northern Ireland to the heart of Africa. Sudan's Al-Bashir and Al-Turabi have been too optimistic when they assumed that major international powers would sit back and watch them holding international revolutionary conferences and befriend international terrorists. The Syrian regime seems similarly oblivious to the changed world, that the Soviet Union has collapsed, and that what was fine in the 1980s when US troops pulled out of Lebanon in disgrace is no longer so. Playing hardball in Lebanon and Iraq was no longer an option for the Syrians, and yet Damascus did it anyway. Miscalculation can be deadly. The Nasserist regime could have survived as long as the Cuban or Vietnamese, had it not sent troops to Yemen and closed the Straits of Tiran in the Gulf of Aqaba. Saddam's regime could have still been in power, had it not invaded Kuwait. The regime of Bashir and Turabi in Sudan could have had a peaceful time, had it not befriended Carlos and Bin Laden. Sudan and Libya have, however belatedly, reversed their ways in order to escape the entrapment. In Syria, entrapment could have been avoided, had the Syrians walked out of Lebanon earlier than they did. The Syrians did not just stay in Lebanon; they exercised power and dictated policy. Damascus pulled strings and twisted arms to get Lahoud another term in the presidency. Syrian security officials were so much a part of the scene in Lebanon that they could not but otherwise be suspected of involvement in the killing of former prime minister Rafik Al-Hariri. Mehlis Detlev, the international judge investigating Al-Hariri's murder, had little trouble uncovering embarrassing facts. Entrapment is not an inescapable destiny. Egypt walked clean away in Anwar El-Sadat's time. Libya did likewise more recently. Sudan avoided entrapment when it admitted that the country is multi-religious and multi-ethnic. Saudi Arabia never walked into its trap to start with. The first step to escaping entrapment is to admit mistakes. The second step in escaping entrapment is to act calmly and reasonably. Sending millions to the streets to chant angry slogans is not a solution, and could make things worse. The third step for escaping entrapment is to put one's house in order. The fourth step is for the political leader to take an initiative that is creative and not just defensive. This may not be easy, but it is possible. * The writer is director of Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies.
