Calls increase for Egypt and Israel to act promptly to end the Gaza crisis, Dina Ezzat reports The worst for Gaza is imaginable but not inevitable if key parties act promptly to address a crisis that is harming the interests of all. This is the basic message of a report issued by the International Crisis Group (ICG) this week on the situation in Gaza. Entitled Ruling Palestine -- Gaza under Hamas, the 30-page report offers a detailed account of the dynamics of the Gaza crisis with an eye to finding a way out of the current dilemma which, according to the ICG, is predominantly harming the Palestinian people but is also harming the interests of Gaza's neighbours, Egypt, the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank and even Israel. "The policy of isolating Hamas and sanctioning Gaza is bankrupt and, by all conceivable measures, has backfired ," said Ezzedine Choukri-Fishere, Director of the ICG Arab-Israeli Project. The costs of the failed attempt to drive Hamas both from Gaza and from the entire Palestinian political scene include, as the ICG report indicates, the collapse of the political legitimacy of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas on the basis that "Hamas's losses are not Fatah's gains"; damage done to the image of the Arab world given its failure to stand up for and rescue Gaza; and damage done to the international community which is seen as unmoved by the plight of the Palestinian people. Meanwhile, argued Choukri-Fishere "the population's suffering [in Gaza] has only increased its dependence on its rulers". For Egypt and Israel, the ICG report sends a clear and unmistakable signal: attempts to ignore or marginalise Hamas are doomed. Such policies, the report suggests, keep Israel on edge as Qassam rocket fire continues and led to the recent events at Rafah where close to 700,000 Palestinians broke their way into Egypt to stock up on basic necessities. Blockading Gaza, the report suggests, can only lead to illicit attempts -- tunnels -- for people to meet their basic needs, in turn posing a security threat to the powers imposing the blockade. "Observers routinely wonder when Israel will re- enter Gaza, but to a large extent it already is there," the report suggests, adding that the full reoccupation of Gaza by the Israeli army is not the correct approach to ending the Gaza crisis. The report promptly adds that, "the status quo is not tenable," not only because of the devastating impact it is having on the lives of Palestinians and the challenges it is posing to the political and security concerns of Gaza's neighbours, but also because it defeats already feeble post-Annapolis peace talks. As such, the ICG is demanding action from all parties. Of the governments of Israel and Egypt, the PA and Hamas it demands the prompt evacuation of civilians "in need of medical care as well as students and individuals who live in third countries". It also demands an increase in the opening hours of Israeli crossings handling commercial traffic and a broadening of the list of permitted items -- especially in fuel that is essential to the operation of hospitals and containing Gaza's huge sewage- processing problem. Within the category of immediate measures, the ICG also demands that Israel, Egypt, the PA and Hamas accept the presence of a third party, "such as UN personnel or private contractors to help manage crossings and interface between Israel and Hamas". In the medium term, the ICG report proposes a return to "existing regulations" with regard to Gaza's crossings -- a reference to the 2005 US-brokered Access and Movement Agreement that Egypt, Israel and the PA insist upon but which Hamas refuses, principally due to the control it affords Israel over the Gaza-Egyptian border. One proposal by ICG to overcome disagreement over the 2005 agreement -- that also entails Hamas's reluctance to hand over border crossing control to the PA -- is the possibility of an agreement on the "return of Palestinian Authority forces inside and in the immediate perimeter of the crossings and redeployment of Hamas forces at a distance from the crossings, with coordination between the two". At Rafah, the report recommends the return of the EU Border Assistance Mission and the resumption of its operations "without interference". Moreover, the report proposes the use of revenues collected at the crossings to finance Gaza's public expenditure, such as utilities and the running costs of key institutions such as hospitals and schools, "possibly with third party supervision". None of these measures, the report affirms, are conceivable absent a truce between Hamas and Israel with the support of the Quartet, Egypt, the wider international community and the Arab world. As proposed by the ICG, the truce should be based on the simultaneous end of Qassam rocket fire and Israeli "operations" in Gaza backed by enhanced Egyptian efforts, "in coordination with regional and international actors, to prevent smuggling" and "third party monitors inside Gaza, along its borders with Israel and Egypt, with a mandate to supervise the parties' compliance with their commitments". Throughout the ICG report, the need for Palestinian reconciliation is underlined as a prerequisite to containing the current crisis and for any potential political breakthrough. The ICG report insists that "the most catastrophic scenarios may not yet be likely, but they are becoming increasingly imaginable". It adds that avoiding them ultimately will depend on whether Fatah and Hamas can find a pathway to reconciliation and that Hamas and Israel can agree on a ceasefire that lifts the siege on Gaza and allows Gazans and Israelis near the border to pursue normal lives. Achieving the objectives indicated by the ICG is not impossible, Egyptian, Arab and American officials argue. The relative calm that has been achieved in Gaza, despite continued Israeli operations, helps. "It is true that we are still at the phase of crisis management rather than that of striking a deal, but the relative calm we have witnessed is likely to persist," commented one Egyptian official close to mediation efforts between Israel and Hamas. On the Hamas side, sources speak of lowered anti-PA incitement and of a substantially reduced rate of Qassam fire, despite ongoing Israeli military operations. They also talk of Hamas's flexibility regarding the terms of border management. On the Israeli side, the same sources report that Israel is being less intransigent, especially regarding commercial supplies to Gaza. "Before, Israel used to allow no more than a 48-hour supply to enter. But now we have sufficient supplies in Gaza to last for close to three weeks, aside from a shortage of most fuel types and spare parts necessary for the operation of the sewage system and hospitals," commented an informed Egyptian official on condition of anonymity. Israel, the same sources add, has recently responded positively to US encouragement to give Egypt and the EU wider prerogatives in the management of Gaza's crossings, especially the Rafah crossing. Egyptian officials acknowledge the fact that this "positive" Israeli response came in return for clear and detailed guarantees from Cairo that it would beef-up security along the border with Gaza. As for the PA, the consensus is that despite his repeated reluctance to rebuild bridges with Hamas, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas is coming to accept that he cannot defeat Hamas but rather must accept and work with Hamas. According to one informed source, "he is now aware that there will be no public apology from Hamas [for the takeover of Gaza], or a full withdrawal of its forces, but rather an agreement whereby the PA would return to Gaza to work side-by-side with Hamas under the ultimate honorary leadership of Abbas."
