Back from the brink, Lebanon has much hard work ahead, writes Amin Howeidi* The Lebanese system is unique in that it is based on sectarian quotas giving every community a certain share in power. The political formula that exists in Lebanon today was originally designed to reassure the country's various factions. What makes this formula vulnerable is the tendency of domestic groups to attach themselves to foreign powers, a fact that hinders their ability to sort out their problems quietly. There is no victor and vanquished in Lebanon's quarrels. This is why the Lebanese devise ways to avert confrontation. One example was their willingness to leave their country without a president for many weeks -- even after everyone agreed on whom the next president should be. According to sectarian quotas, the president, the prime minister and the parliamentary speaker should each be selected from one of the country's top three factions. And yet there is always a crisis brewing in Lebanon. The recent crisis erupted when the government of Fouad Al-Siniora decided to de-legalise Hizbullah's communication system, dismiss the Hizbullah-backed airport security chief, and ignore Hizbullah's demands for a new electoral law. The government couldn't take on Hizbullah, so it referred the communication system issue to the courts. Other intricate matters were referred to the army chief to sort out. Hizbullah was enraged. Confident of its military prowess, the movement sent its militia to occupy West Beirut, bullying some of its adversaries in the process. As a friend told me from Beirut, "Hizbullah had them for breakfast." At which point, civil war reared its head in that small but turbulent country. To defuse the situation, the army stepped in, demanding that gunmen withdraw from the streets. A Lebanese-style arrangement was soon reached with the government reversing its earlier decisions and roads, the harbour and airport reopened. Consequently, Hizbullah ordered its gunmen and allies to withdraw from the streets and the spectre of civil war lifted, at least temporarily. Suddenly, everyone was on Hizbullah's case, sometimes unfairly. I don't wish to defend Hassan Nasrallah here. His actions speak louder than words. But let's keep things in perspective. The crisis began with the cabinet's controversial measures. Nasrallah saw the measures as a declaration of war for a simple reason: the resistance cannot function with its own communication network. Hizbullah had a point, and the army chief recognised it. This is why, when everyone asked him for a solution, he advised the cabinet to rescind its decisions. We must not forget how brilliant, by the admission of the Winograd Commission, Hizbullah's performance was in its recent war against Israel. We all know that the US and Israel are eager to disarm Hizbullah in order to deprive the Arabs of their last military option. This is why I believe that the decisions Al-Siniora's government made, if not ill intentioned, were at least misguided. Hizbullah deserves to be approached through calm dialogue, not confrontation. Meanwhile, it should promise to not use military force in internal disputes. The Lebanese government should recognise Hizbullah as a political partner. And it should work hand in hand with the government to safeguard Lebanon's national interests. Unity is the only hope for the Lebanese. And they have to do what it takes to keep their country united and safe. During the Doha meetings, Lebanese civilians marched in the streets with signs telling their leaders to stop squabbling. "If you don't agree, don't come back," said one sign. As it turned out, the deal reached in Doha was less than decisive and much remains to be done. * The writer is former defence minister and chief of General Intelligence.
