After the failures of the Bush administration, US policy in the Middle East must be rethought, writes Amr Hamzawi* I recently participated in a new study whose purpose was to formulate a set of preliminary recommendations for changing the tack of US foreign policy following the departure of the Bush administration and in light of the consequences of that administration's Middle East policies. The study ("The New Middle East" which appears in the 2008 Carnegie Report) proceeds from the primary conviction that Washington must acknowledge its failure to alter the map of the Middle East in a manner that would reduce threats to American interests and must come to terms with the formidable restrictions that now encumber its ability to act. Accordingly, the next administration's foreign policy will need to set clear and modest goals for the US. These, we believe, are essentially four, all connected to the need to contain violence and secure the flow of oil: first, reaching a negotiated solution with Iran and limiting nuclear proliferation; second, a gradual disengagement from Iraq in a manner that forestalls a slide into anarchy; third, focussing serious attention on the promotion of Arab-Israeli peace; and fourth, re-establishing a regional power balance that can be sustained by regional powers without the need for intensive US military presence. One effect of the Bush administration's policies has been to turn Iran into a major player in many areas vital to American interests, notably Iraq and Afghanistan, nuclear non-proliferation, energy security, terrorism and Arab-Israeli peace. As unpalatable as the behaviour of the Iranian regime may seem to the US, refusing to talk with Tehran will not ameliorate any of these issues, while confronting it militarily will only exacerbate all of them. A hardline approach that seeks to foment regime change will be similarly counterproductive and dangerous. The Iranian government is not on the verge of collapse, and in the event of an abrupt political change the only groups that are currently armed and organised are not liberal democrats but the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Bassij militia. Also, a policy that keeps the threat of regime change implicitly on the table also gives Iranian leaders -- who would continue to sense an existential threat from the US -- more, not less, reason to pursue a nuclear deterrent. Thus, instead of attempting to confront Iran militarily, the US would be wiser to formulate a precise diplomatic action plan containing conciliatory proposals over all issues under dispute. The US should focus initially on Iraq, because the US and Iran share an interest in sustaining Iraq's territorial integrity and containing violence. On the basis of this common concern, a US-Iranian dialogue should be able to deal pragmatically with the nature and limitations to an ongoing US military presence in Iraq and the issue of Iran's policies and activities in support of various Iraqi factions. Eventually, once the two sides develop a sufficient level of mutual confidence they will be able to extend their dialogue to the nuclear issue. Nevertheless, talks on this subject will not be easy. Iran's leadership has succeeded in forging a national consensus over the need to resist outside pressure to relinquish what it regards as its absolute right to enrich uranium. Iranian leaders believe that the US is incapable of inflicting sufficient penalties upon Iran to compel it to entirely suspend its enrichment activities or to abandon its nuclear ambitions. Since Tehran is unlikely to accede to US demands as they currently stand, the US should instead focus on an interim formula in accordance with which Iran could continue some level of enrichment activity under intensive international monitoring. Shifting from the confrontationist approach to dialogue with Iran does not imply appeasement. Nor does it preclude efforts to contain the belligerent ramifications of Iran's regional influence. Therefore, economic, commercial and financial sanctions will remain a central weapon against Iran whose economy, in spite of the rise in oil prices, is in the grips of an acute crisis and in search of avenues towards re-assimilating into the global economy. These tools must remain at the ready to show Iran that its hardline approach will not reap rewards. In Iraq, the next administration's policy must start from an admission of failure of the process of reconstructing the Iraqi state atop the ruins of the Saddam Hussein dictatorship. Since military efforts alone cannot contain violence and sustain stability for long, the US must urge political players in Iraq to deal constructively with flaws in the political process. Moreover, the time is now to internationalise the Iraqi question again. The UN has reopened its offices there and some Arab countries have made it clear that they are eager to reopen embassies in Baghdad. All this is transpiring in the climate of heightened diplomatic activity in the region. As long as the US does not interpret "internationalising" to mean pressuring other countries and the UN into paying for and carrying out policies already formulated in Washington, an international presence could generate the needed impetus for a successful political process. US core interests in the region include engineering a peace between Israelis and Palestinians and promoting negotiations on other tracks of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The only solution at present that can lead to a peace that realises part of Palestinian national aims and safeguards the security of Israel is the two-state solution. But it will be far from easy to put that solution into effect. Because of the rift between Fatah and Hamas, President Mahmoud Abbas possesses neither the legitimacy nor sufficient strength to negotiate on behalf of all Palestinians. Even if he had, he would have a tough time convincing Palestinians of the benefits of the two-state solution while Israel persists in behaviour that undermines it, notably continued settlement construction and failure to come through on its frequently reiterated commitments to improve the living circumstances of the Palestinian people. The way out of the vicious cycle requires all parties to make tough choices. Diplomatic efforts must be pursued seriously with the aim of reincorporating Hamas into the Palestinian political structure while striking an appropriate blend of incentives and pressure to encourage Hamas to maintain calm with Israel and take a pragmatic approach to peace negotiations. Pressure must also be brought to bear on Israel to end the isolation of Gaza, to accept a truce and a halt to military activities in Gaza and to freeze settlement construction in the West Bank and Jerusalem. Thus, the US must cease pretending that Abbas has sufficient domestic legitimacy in the absence of reconciliation with Hamas to conclude a peace agreement and that the embargo of Gaza will drive the people there into abandoning Hamas. Clearly such wagers have failed. Washington should therefore support Palestinian reconciliation and the revival of a national unity government and should work with regional and international efforts to draw the preliminary lines of a final peace agreement while avoiding setting unrealistic timeframes or otherwise raising unattainable expectations, especially in view of the domestic political crisis in Israel. Lastly, the next administration in Washington must work to restore a regional power balance in the Middle East that includes Iran and is not contingent upon a long- term US military presence. During the past two years, the US tried to overcome the collapse in the regional balance brought on by the invasion of Iraq and the growing influence of Iran by attempting to form an anti-Iranian regional alliance and driving the Gulf countries into an arms race in order to offset Iran's military power. However, geopolitical realities and the refusal of Gulf countries to rely solely on confrontational options in their dealings with Iran have suggested a totally different approach, one that will be much more effective in restoring balance and stability. This approach entails a conditional re-engagement with the Islamic Republic in a manner that offers it a role in security arrangements in the Gulf in exchange for a more cooperative and non-aggressive regional policy on its part. * The writer is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
