Prioritising affiliations of ethnicity and sect destroys the people. Yet only the state can protect the interests of its citizens, argues Galal Nassar It is important to draw a distinction between following a particular school of Islamic theology and adhering to its rites and the tendency to turn that creed into a distinct and exclusivist culture and identity with prohibitions, attitudes and barriers that keep its adherents from assimilating into wider society and embracing a more overarching culture and identity. This distinction between religious commitment and sectarianism is not arbitrary. It is fundamental to our ability to understand and appreciate the threat of sectarianism to national unity. One adds to the nation's moral and cultural assets, the other diminishes them. The different schools of Islamic jurisprudence and their philosophical production greatly stimulated and enriched Islamic thought. Conversely, the exploitation of these theological outlooks and disciplines for political ends was disastrous. The internecine conflict it precipitated led to the downfall of the caliphate, the decline of the Arabs' civilisational role and the fragmentation of the Islamic empire. In their transformation from a means for understanding the fundamentals of faith and morals to a politicised cultural identity, the different schools of Islamic thought became wedges that drove Muslims apart. When affiliates of the sects closed ranks against one another and claimed superior rights the collective spirit and force of the Islamic nation crumbled. In the modern era the Arab peoples fought for national liberation and independence. Their motto was national unity, a banner beneath which most liberation movements succeeded. After World War I the British and French realised that they would not be able to suppress national liberation movements by force of arms alone. They knew that the key to domination was to divide and conquer. Our modern history is replete with examples of victories when this tactic failed. In Lebanon the French established a system of government based on denominational quotas. In the absence of a project to forge an overriding national affiliation sectarian leaders squabbled over what they held was their rightful quota. This conflict overshadowed all other issues, including the need to develop the nation's resources, to disseminate a spirit of common purpose and to deepen the concept of citizenship. Since independence, Lebanon has never enjoyed an extended period of peace and stability. The country's long civil wars and intermittent violence furnish incontrovertible proof of the dangers of sectarianism. Iraq offers additional, and tragic, proof. When Paul Bremer, the US governor-general of Iraq, imposed a Lebanese-style system with some additions of his own, he turned Iraq into a fragile federation of ethnic-sectarian entities. With any connection to national institutions severed, the leaders of these entities derived their strength by lending themselves to and identifying with outside forces. Since the ability to advance their interests is contingent upon these leaders' collusion and coordination with outside powers any notion of national unity or cohesion is, at best, a fiction. The only logical outcome of a sectarian/ethnic quota system is disunity and the disintegration of the unified state. The controversy currently raging in the Iraqi parliament over Kirkuk, an oil rich region that the Kurds maintain should be annexed to their province even though the majority of its population is Arab and Turkomen, is a tangible manifestation of the breakdown in an authentic national affiliation due to the imposition of a system of government that emphasises ethnic and sectarian affiliations. Under such conditions comprehensive development and economic integration become impossible as the country fractures into separate cantons, each with its separate identity and culture. Even such supposedly neutral national establishments as the army, the police and government ministries have been portioned out on a quota basis. The more this system takes root and sectarian and ethnic identities rule, the weaker central government, indeed any form of government, becomes. While this form of rule may have had a raison d'être before the emergence of the modern state there is no justification for it now. It flies in the face of the evolution of institutions and mechanisms of modern government. It is impossible to conceive of a modern educational system, national healthcare, a modern social welfare system -- a modern anything -- in the absence of institutionalised government. It requires no great intelligence to realise that ethnic/sectarian cantons of the type taking shape in Iraq will be unable to fend off a foreign invasion or even agree to join forces towards that end. One recent case in point occurred when the Turkish army pursued members of the Kurdistan Labour Party across the border and bombarded villages in northern Iraq. Iraqi canton chiefs were so sharply divided over what action to take that they could not contain their mutual acrimony and their meetings deteriorated into verbal abuse. Iraq's "ruling" political forces staged a repeat performance of this spectacle in response to the Iranian bombardment of several villages in northeast Iraq. In both cases sectarian and ethnic divides hampered serious deliberations over an appropriate response. Sectarianism is inimical to the culture of tolerance. It breeds hatred and is a pernicious threat to national unity. Fighting sectarianism is both a moral and a patriotic duty. At the level of the Arab nation it seems obvious that when one piece crumbles this will cause rifts throughout the whole. When one bead of necklace falls the rest are soon to follow. But the perils of sectarianism extend beyond the immediate human and material costs of the internecine hatred it breeds. It threatens the very core of the Arab consciousness and the future of the Arab nation. Sectarian culture has its own way of looking at history. It interprets and rewrites history in a way that strengthens the distinctiveness and superiority of specific identities. This is a conscious political act and its aims are political. Some objectives may spring from deeply rooted feelings of rancour among peoples that embraced Islam when conquered by the early Arab armies. Although they bowed their heads to the powerful tide they continued to harbour a sense of superiority over the Arabs which, in turn, lent itself to biased and distorted readings of Arab history that even mars the illustrious figures who played a major part in the dissemination of the message of Islam. Now, if we consider that each sect has its idiosyncratic reading of history that places its own identity, culture, customs, victories and trials and tribulations centre stage, then we are left with a multiplicity of divergent interpretations, each gnawing away at the fabric of collective Arab history and consciousness. Since history is the spirit of the nation and geography its vessel, to distort Arab history is to distort the spirit of the nation. Clearly then, the fight against sectarianism is part of the battle to defend our nation and its cultural and moral legacy.
