Regardless of differences in doctrine and political tenor, what unites Sunni and Shia is more important than what divides them, writes Ammar Ali Hassan* When just a young man, long before his verses made him a household name, the great Iraqi poet, Mohamed Mahdi Al-Jawahiri, tried to become a primary school teacher he was turned away by the famous Arab nationalist thinker, Satie Al-Husari, who at the time was responsible for educational policy in Iraq. Like most Shia families and clans, Al-Jawahiri had refused to apply for Iraqi nationality, preferring instead to retain his Iranian nationality, which protected him from the tyranny of "Sunni" Ottoman officials, their exorbitant taxes and compulsory military recruitment. Although this incident is an anomaly, a huge fish-eye lens homed in on it and blew it out of all proportion to its place and time. As a result, to those who have not even bothered to question the story as it was handed down to them, it has come to epitomise the attitude of Arab Shia not only to Arab nationalism but also towards their allegiance to the countries in which they live. Yet, historical developments both before and after the Al-Jawahiri incident put paid to the general impression gleaned, and betray the underlying injustice inferred. In fact, the Shia schism began in the Arabian Peninsula, long before Persia was converted to Islam. At the time when some Arabs declared their support for Ali Bin Abu Taleb as successor to the caliphate (the Shia creed has its origins in Ali's disputed claim to the caliphate in which context the "shia of Ali" meant the followers of Ali), the state religion of Iran was Zoroastrianism. But even after the Islamic conquest of Iraq and Iran, the majority of the Arab tribes in those countries converted to Shia whereas the vast majority of Iranians subscribed to the Sunni tradition. It was not until 1500, when the Safavid dynasty declared Shia the official religious doctrine of the state, that Iranians were forcefully converted to Shia Islam. Meanwhile, Iraq only came to have a majority Shia populace in the 19th century, which is when most Bedouin tribes settled in the Euphrates valley. Although the Shia of Iraq and Iran share the same doctrinal beliefs there are certain differences between them. These stem primarily from their differing spiritual authorities. The majority of Shia in Iraq seeks guidance from the Imamate in Najaf, whereas only a minority follow the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq that takes its ideological and political cues from Iran. Also, even though such key Iraqi spiritual leaders as Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, Mohamed Ishaq Fayad, Hussein Bashir Al-Afghani and Mohamed Said Al-Hakim, are of Iranian origin, unlike their Iranian counterparts they are reluctant to involve themselves in politics, preferring instead to concentrate on purely religious concerns. The notable exception here is Imam Mohamed Sadeq Al-Sadr. However, if he subscribes to the principle of "rule of the clerics" he has nevertheless grounded his understanding of this principle on different territory. Imam Al-Sadr has been highly instrumental in crystallising the Arab identity of Iraqi Shia through his espousal of al-hawza al-natiqa, a concept of political activism intended to encourage Shia clergymen out of their ivory towers and into direct involvement in the affairs of the people, and through his attempts to compel both the spiritual and administrative Shia authorities to reach out to Arab clans and tribes. However, if anything testifies to the patriotism of Iraqi Shia it is the Iraq-Iran War (1980-89), in which they made up the majority of the infantry and fought tenaciously in the defence of their country, side-by- side with their fellow Sunni citizens. Sadeq Al-Sadr, who felt that the political and economic conditions that contributed to the success of the Islamic revolution in Iran did not yet exist in Iraq, urged his adherents to remain loyal and dedicate themselves to their allegiance to their country. In Lebanon, the Imam Moussa Al-Sadr similarly sought to shape a distinct identity for the Lebanese Shia, in spite of the influence the Iranian revolutionary experience had on him and the degree to which the experiences of the Iraqi Shia coincided with his interest in Arab causes, notably that of the Palestinians. Moussa Al-Sadr was keen to reconcile the various doctrinal schools of Islam and he passionately advocated Lebanon's Arab identity and a more active Lebanese role in the struggle against Zionism, bringing to bear towards this end an array of Shia values, such as material and personal sacrifice and support for the underprivileged. He also argued that there was no inherent contradiction between the special character of Lebanon and Arab nationalism, nor between the Shia creed and Arab identity. These ideas and others found their way into practical application, the clearest and most memorable example of which is Hizbullah's and Amal's resistance movement that ultimately forced Israel's humiliating withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000. There are four issues to be taken into consideration in any discussion of the identity of Arab Shia. First, that certain sectors of Shia opinion are opposed to Arab nationalism should not be taken to mean that they do not see themselves as part of the Arab world but rather that they reject what they perceive as pan-Arabism's underlying "secularism". To Shia theologians the very concept of Arab nationalism is inimical to Islam. They argue that the first advocates of pan-Arabism were not Muslim and that the concept perpetuates a certain Arab ethnocentricity from which non-Arab Muslims had suffered for many centuries. Regardless of the validity of these arguments, they are not alone in their attitude. Many Sunnis, particularly those belonging to Islamist groups and organisations, also regard Arab nationalism as a conspiracy against Islam, fight it tenaciously and rejoice in its failures. On the other hand, many Shia intellectuals have responded favourably to Arab nationalism and defended it from within the ranks of the Baathist and Socialist parties in the Levant and the pan-Arab national movements in the Gulf, just as their Sunni intellectual counterparts did. Second, it is not in the interest of Arab nations to question the Shia's Arab identity. Iraq's Arab affiliation, for example, would become very fragile if the Shia were removed from the equation; indeed, it would ultimately become a non-Arab nation without them. Simultaneously, it is not in the interests of the political development of the region to strengthen the bonds of the relationship between religion and politics, whether from the standpoint of the Shia or that of Sunni Islamist movements, all the more so in view of the fact that both the Shia and the Sunni have a common agenda, which is to confront Israeli aggression and American arrogance. Third, patriotism is not an emotional bond that operates in a void. Rather, it emerges from ideas and practices that are applied in day-to-day life and that are founded upon an overriding affiliation of citizenship, the principles of equality and justice among the various sectors of a national population as pertains to the distribution of wealth and access to office, and the concepts of social and national security. The plague of Arab regimes is that from national independence to the present they have failed to take the necessary measures to promote and/or sustain national integration, often to the tragic detriment of national minorities, such as the Shia. It is high time that these regimes adopt policies to mend the fissures wrought by ethnically or religiously biased policies, rather than accusing minorities of being unpatriotic. Fourth, there is a vast difference between "sympathy" and "loyalty". While Arab Shia may sympathise with Iran, so too have Arab Sunni at certain points in that country's history. Sunni Islamist groups, for example, found great inspiration in the Khomeini Revolution, and at times of intensifying confrontation between Iran and the US the Sunni Arab public tends to side emotionally with the former, in view of the sense of a common cause of resisting Zionist expansionism and American bids for hegemony in the region. We must not let sectarian differences blind us to what is most important. It seems obvious that in discussing religious matters, we should work together on those areas we agree upon and "agree to differ" on the rest, and in political matters we should give precedence to the higher interest. In short, we must concentrate on strengthening the Arab immune system, so that we can better resist the designs of foreign powers, a significant component of which depends on the strategy of divide and conquer on the basis of ideological, religious and ethnic affiliations. This is precisely the strategy into the hands of which some Arab countries are playing now by leaving Hizbullah stranded in its confrontation against the foremost enemy of all Arabs on the grounds that helping Hizbullah would strengthen the spectre of a so-called "Shia crescent". * The writer is the director of the Centre for Middle Eastern Studies and Research.
