As more Arab dignitaries flock to Baghdad, Arab-Iraqi relations seem back on track, writes Salah Hemeid Early this month, Egypt's Foreign Minister Ahmed Abul-Gheit travelled to Baghdad, in the first visit by an Egyptian chief diplomat since 1990 when the two Arab countries severed ties after Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. A few days later Sheikh Mohamed Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, Abu Dhabi's Crown Prince and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces followed suit and flew in with a delegation of several high ranking officials. The visits by the Egyptian and UAE officials capped several ventures by other top Arab officials, including King Abdullah II of Jordan and Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Al-Siniora, signaling a change of heart by the Arabs after years of coolness. While in Baghdad Abul-Gheit, who was accompanied by the Minister of Petroleum Sameh Fahmi, promised that Cairo will restore full diplomatic relations with Baghdad and send an ambassador in due time and also announced that Egypt will embark on closer economic cooperation with Iraq including rebuilding its devastated oil and electricity sectors. Following Sheikh Mohamed's visit, the UAE also announced that it will inject hundreds of millions of dollars into Iraq's telecoms and property projects. The Emirates had earlier cancelled all Iraq's debts, estimated at $7 billion. Jordan, Bahrain, Syria and the Arab League have already named ambassadors and Saudi Arabia has hinted of a similar warming soon. Other Arab countries had said that they were planning to improve their political, economic and trade ties with Iraq in line with a resolution by the 2006 Arab summit in Riyadh. The Arabs' sudden rush to Baghdad raised questions about its timing and motives. It signalled success for Washington's efforts to get Iraq's Sunni Arab neighbours to overcome security fears and mistrust of the government in Baghdad which they have shunned since the 2003 American invasion. It also marked a departure from the policy of isolating they had implemented against the Shia-led government. After the war, the Sunni-led governments of the Arab world remained suspicious of Iraq's new leaders, blaming them of discriminating against Iraqi Sunni Arabs and helping Iran extend its influence in Iraq and the region. They linked their support of the new regime to a package of demands before they give substantial help to its fledging government. They repeatedly demanded changes in the political process and the military to include more Sunnis and stop Iran's meddling in Iraqi affairs. Arab governments also were fearful that their diplomats might be at risk if they reopened their missions, as stability and security remained illusive and the political process was fragile. Egypt recalled its diplomatic representatives from Baghdad, after its ambassador, Ihab El-Sharif, was killed in 2005. Algerian diplomats were also kidnapped and killed. The UAE and Jordan's embassies were bombed. So, why did the Arabs, who have long dismissed the Baghdad Shia-led government as sectarian and beholden to Iran, have a sudden change of heart and decided to reach out to it after years of disdain and boycott? For years the Bush administration has struggled to rally its Arab allies behind the government, hoping that normal relations between Iraq and its Sunni Arab neighbours will give it more credibility and legitimacy. The Iraqi government also appealed to Arabs to return, promising to escalate the national reconciliation efforts to include more Sunnis and pledging to serve as a bridge between Iran and Arab governments that are worried about Tehran's growing influence in Iraq and elsewhere in the Arab world. Critics, such as former Iraqi Baathists, have accused the Arab states of bowing to American pressure, but that could hardly be the reason, as the lame duck Bush administration, which has only three months left in office, is much weaker these days and preoccupied with other problems. One reason seems to be that Sunni Arab governments have realised, though late in the day, that their diplomatic and political absence from Iraq was counter- productive and it had deprived them of any clout to ensure Iraqi national reconciliation in order to guarantee a larger role for fellow Sunnis in government and the armed forces, a key demand. The other reason could be the rising fear among Arab Gulf countries Saudi Arabia and Egypt, as well as Jordan, about Iran's increasing influence in Iraq. According to this analysis, Arabs seems to have realised that rousing rhetoric and decrying Iran's interference in Iraq could not stop the rout and it is much better for them to return to Baghdad in order to balance Iran's influence with that of their own. The bigger question now is whether Arabs have a coherent and serious strategy to deal with Iraq or whether it is the usual random and late response to crises and calamities. Indeed, Arabs were in a total state of denial long time before the US invasion of Iraq. There is more than enough blame about the Arab role in Iraq to go around. They first failed to stop the war and then had an uneven record of success in brokering a power-sharing deal between the bickering Iraqi factions. In the end they left Iraq to fall to Iranian influence which came largely by way of the strategic vacuum Arabs were unwilling or unable to fill. Arabs may be well placed to help Iraqis end their national catastrophes but only if they work out a joint strategy instead of the bilateral approach they have been using to reach out to the Baghdad government that still lacks a legitimate and broad-based support. Such an approach is unhelpful in devising a constructive policy, one which would keep Iraq united, free of Iranian influence and bring it back to the Arab fold. With local and general elections next year, Arabs can help negotiate a new more balanced power-sharing settlement between Sunnis, Shias and Kurds and help end the national rift and start rebuilding a unified Iraq. Rich Arab countries may also dangle generous aid in reconstruction projects as incentives to engage Iraqis and make up for the Iranian economic enterprises. Facing up to this fact and drawing the necessary lesson is the only way to ensure that Arabs will not lose Iraq.
