Youth viewpoint: Before a new social contract Without a solid legal framework and competent government, talk of a new social contract is hot air, writes Ayman Ismail* Five decades ago, the 1952 Revolution ushered in a new social contract between the new Free Officers government and the people of Egypt, with a broad socio- economic vision and Egypt envisioned at the forefront of Arab nationalism, anti- imperialism and resistance to the Israeli project. The government would take the lead in social and economic development by providing jobs, land ownership, and industrialisation; would guarantee free education and healthcare; and would provide a socially equitable society, as opposed to the feudal society that preceded it. In exchange, the people would provide strong political support and acquiescence. This social contract dominated for two decades, where Egypt created a new middle class that is highly dependent on government institutions. A whole new generation owes its rise from serfdom to this social contract. It was a time of rapid upward social mobility. This social contract came under major attack three times: the first came with President Sadat's "open door" policies in the 1970s; the second came with the World Bank-driven Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in the 1990s; and the third came with current liberal reforms that started four years ago. Each of these waves witnessed privatisation of state-owned enterprises, pushing more economic and social services towards the private sector. However, despite these changes, most of the past legacy, in institutions and culture, continued to survive for three decades. We were never able as a society to acknowledge that we had moved beyond the social contract of the 1960s, which was and still is widely popular. And we were never able to agree on the kind of arrangement that would replace it. We have free education that is neither free nor equitable, and a public healthcare system that is deteriorating by the day. However, we have neither the political will nor a social consensus on what should replace these ailing institutions. Today, the social contract debate is mostly confined within the context of an ongoing policy debate between proponents of maintaining the welfare state model versus proponents of a Laissez-faire model with less government intervention. For example, the Egypt Human Development Report 2005 called for a new social contract that sets a 10-year vision for Egypt based on a welfare state model. In 2006, the Cabinet Information and Decision Support Centre (IDSC) established the Social Contract Centre based on this effort, with the objective of "redefining the relationship between the state and the citizen, widening the democratic space to advance decentralisation and an enabling environment for citizens' participation and dialogue." At the same time, several leading writers and intellectuals also called for revisiting Egypt's social contract. However, I would argue that this policy debate is secondary to two other major issues that form the core of any social contract or policy reform: improving the competency of government institutions and bureaucracy; and restoring the basic rule of law. Any policy reform requires strong and competent government institutions and bureaucracy to implement -- this is not the case in Egypt today. Most of our government institutions are bloated with over- employment; government employees often lack the necessary skills for managing and delivering public services; and there are no performance incentives and little accountability. The result is a clear failure on two fronts: first, the deterioration of social services, most notably healthcare and education, a deterioration that is responsible for a rapid decline in the standard of living for many Egyptians; second, the inability of the government to effectively and quickly implement any reform policies. Indeed, the bureaucracy has become so bloated to the point that it has developed a mind of its own. Policy directives flowing from the top of the government take forever to flow through layers of government bureaucracy and reach the bottom where they actually get implemented. The result is that declared government reforms are not effectively and timely implemented. On both counts, the government loses credibility for its inability to deliver social services and its inability to implement its promised reforms. This calls for a major administrative change. For the government to be able to implement any social contract or policy agenda, it needs an able, competent and agile bureaucracy. Over the past decade, the government has implemented several reform programmes, including capacity building and technical assistance programmes by many international aid agencies as well as the Ministry of Administrative Development. However, most of these efforts were narrow in scope and limited in their effect. What is needed is a broad administrative reform programme that examines the whole government bureaucracy. We need to reassess the legal mandate of each and every government agency; identify the resources, financial and human, required to deliver these mandates; and redesign each agency for these mandates. This major reform would be tough to implement as it would touch on every government agency, and would significantly affect levels of employment. However, it is necessary for Egypt to make any significant progress, and for the government to deliver on its commitments as well as implement any reform policies. The second major issue is re-establishing the rule of law in its broadest sense, which is at the core of any social contract. This includes protecting people's property rights; the ability to implement and enforce contractual agreements; and the respect for laws and regulations in general. Today, we have descended into an unprecedented level of unruliness and chaos. This is most visible in our streets, where traffic laws and discipline have all but disappeared; in our urban environment, where building codes and zoning bylaws have ceded to squatter settlements that surround Cairo and other major cities; and in our neighbourhoods where individual safety and security is coming under attack from thuggery and sexual harassment. No social or economic development can prosper in an environment like this, despite any good intentions of policies or politicians. Restoring the basic rule of law is a daunting task that requires both institutional reform and cultural change. On the institutional side, there is a dire need for reforming the judiciary to accelerate the litigation process and ensure the implementation of court rulings. There is also a need for separating the civil responsibilities of the police force from political/national security duties, which have come to dominate their effort in the past decades. These civil responsibilities include maintaining law and order on the streets, enforcing court rulings, and fighting crime. On the cultural side, we need to re-establish the public's respect for rules and laws, which will only happen when they see them applied in a fair and egalitarian way, with respect for the human dignity of each individual guaranteed, regardless of their connections or affiliations. Implementing any social contract, old or new, requires these two prerequisites: a major administrative reform that restores the government's ability to implement its commitments and policies, for a state that cannot deliver what it promises is one that lacks credibility; and a reestablishment of the rule of law as the basic tenet of our society, for a state that does not secure the safety and property of its citizens will lack their support. Any discussion of policy reform or new social contracts will not go very far without addressing these two issues. * The writer is a PhD candidate in International Economic Development at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
