Abdel-Moneim Said* indulges in some crystal ball gazing Predictions are a nightmare, for social scientists and journalists alike. As far as Egypt is concerned, though, they may well be more accurate than elsewhere, given the amazing continuity of the land, in ancient as well as modern times. Over the past three decades Egypt has seemed immune to change. Despite the frenzy of political activity in Cairo since February 2005, involving constitutional amendments, legal changes, presidential and parliamentary elections and the formation of a new cabinet, it is possible to say that nothing has really changed. True, President Hosni Mubarak won a fifth presidential term after competing against 10 other candidates but he did so with a majority close to 88 per cent, little change from the 1999 referendum Mubarak won by a majority of 93 per cent in a contest that had only one name on the ballot. It was not the only continuity with past political reality. The ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) ended the parliamentary race of 2005 with 70 per cent of seats. Parliamentary Speaker Fathi Sorour was re-elected to a third term. Ahmed Nazif, the prime minister, was asked to re-appoint his cabinet. And Safwat El-Sherif, the secretary-general of the National Democratic Party (NDP) and speaker of the Shura Council, retained his political positions. There are other indicators to suggest that politics consisted of business as usual. Only 23 per cent of registered voters participated in the presidential elections and 26.2 per cent in parliamentary elections. These rates are in line with previous elections. Only 24 per cent participated in the 2000 parliamentary elections. If all eligible, as opposed to registered, voters are counted, participation rates drop to 18.6 per cent. Obviously there has been nothing in the frenzy of political activities that Cairo experienced in 2005 that motivated the public to vote. If continuity has been a hallmark this does not mean there are no changes to be noted. Egypt has been changing, partly because of events beyond its borders and partly because of domestic developments, particularly in demographic and socio-economic terms. For decades threats to Egyptian national security have been defined in terms of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Egypt went to war with Israel in 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973. While the 1979 peace treaty with Israel reduced the external threats to Egypt's basic security interests the continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict in different forms and ongoing regional tensions, coupled with the fact that Israel has no defined borders, enjoys superiority in conventional and nuclear weapons and military constraints in Sinai Peninsula, leaves Egyptian security hostage to any Israeli change of mind. Of no less importance, the last three decades witnessed a rise in Islamic militancy linked with acts of terror that peaked during the first half of the 1990s. The Egyptian government then succeeded in curbing and defeating terrorism but the growth in global terror since 11 September means that the threat remains a persistent and pressing concern. In economic terms, since the mid-1970s Egypt has been gradually moving towards a market economy. By 2000 the private sector accounted for 73 per cent of all economic activity. About half of the public sector -- 165 companies -- has been privatised, including those working in areas such as infrastructure, airports and communications, which would have been unimaginable even a decade ago. By 2008 the Egyptian private sector was contributing 62 per cent of the nation's GDP, and was growing at an annual rate of 7.8 per cent. This momentum has given rise to a business class that exercises strong influence in the decision-making process. In social terms Egypt has changed dramatically. Its population has increased to 80 million, twice the 1980 total. Those aged between 15 and 24 make up more than 20 per cent of the Egyptian population. More than two thirds of the population is under 35. These are in general much more educated than in the past. The literacy rate has increased to 72 per cent and the public is better informed by an expanding independent, private and transnational media. Of no less importance, civil society in Egypt has grown immensely in the past few decades. Currently there are 25,000 associations of all types, working across the board, from developmental issues to political advocacy. It is only to be expected that, in political terms, the above should have resulted in a more sophisticated and complex political scene. Political movements, civil society organisations, the media and the growing role of the judiciary have rendered political processes in Egypt much more nuanced than the traditional authoritarian model suggests. Indeed, developments since 2005 constitute a prelude to more fundamental changes that will take place in the following decade. In all likelihood 2009 will be the year in which the contours of the Egyptian political stage will be set. As the 2011 presidential election looms closer, and with mid-term Shura Council and parliamentary elections scheduled for 2010, we can expect political parties to formulate alliances in the coming 12 months that will allow them to mount a more serious challenge to both the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) and the Muslim Brotherhood. In fact, an alliance has already been formulated between the Wafd, Tagammu, Nasserist and Democratic Front parties, now linked in a loose coalition. Next year will show if this gathering will be augmented or, like many past alliances, fall apart. In the 2005 elections the NDP lost some of its dominance and hegemony. Only 145 candidates, or 32.65 per cent of the 444 candidates originally nominated by the NDP, won. They gained just 2,704,829 votes, i.e. 8.5 per cent of registered voters or 32.32 per cent of those who actually went to the polls. This outcome followed the party's dismal performance in the 2000 elections when it gained just 38.7 per cent of seats. It was only by re-admitting NDP defectors who ran as independents that the party was able to raise its representation in parliament. The same tactic, applied in 2005, saw the NDP commanding 70.04 per cent of the total number of seats, still far below the 88 per cent controlled by NDP official nominees and NDP independents in the 2000 poll. In 2009 the NDP will attempt to regain its strength through economic as well as political reforms, including a new election law empowering women and by promoting popular private ownership of national assets. For both the NDP and the civic parties the Muslim Brotherhood will continue to constitute a major challenge, just as they do for the state. In the 2005 parliamentary elections the Brotherhood gained 88 seats, or 19.81 per cent of the total, up from 17 seats, or 3.82 per cent, in 2000. The Brotherhood won only eight seats in the 1984 elections, and 36 in 1987. A de- facto legalising of the Brotherhood is taking place as a result of their increased public standing and permanent presence in the Egyptian and pan- Arab media. In 2009 the Brothers will stress this trend in parliament as well as in the street. But the most important task facing the Egyptian polity during 2009 will be to weather the impacts of the world economic crisis while continuing the process of economic reforms. In the last two decades Egypt witnessed a very measured change towards establishing a market economy. The process, which started with the structural adjustment programme of 1991, gathered momentum with the appointment of Ahmed Nazif's cabinet in July 2004. This process started to bear fruit during Mubarak's fifth term, in terms of growth rates -- seven per cent in 2006/2007, 7.2 per cent in 2007/2008 --,foreign investment -- up from $450 million in 2002/2003 to $11 billion in 2006/2007 and $13 billion in 2007/2008 -- and as Egypt consolidated its position as an emerging market and leading reformer. In 2009 the economic reform process will face the stresses caused not only by the inflationary pressures that were such a feature of the last 12 months but by a decline in foreign direct investments, a process that began in the second half of 2008 and is expected to bite more deeply in 2009. The challenges Egypt faces in 2009 will not be restricted to the domestic front. A new administration in the US will need to be understood and approached with the aim of restoring Egyptian-American relations to their pre- Bush administration warmth. Elections in Israel will result in a new leadership that might take it in the direction of peace or towards war. The major external challenges for Egypt, though, will come from its immediate borders. In Sudan the process of fragmentation is accelerating while in Gaza Hamas is increasingly representative of an accumulation of problems not the least of which is an alliance of radical and fundamentalist forces that extend from Egypt's northern borders to reach Tehran. It is probably safe to predict, then, that 2009 will not be easy on Egypt. It will be characterised by a scarcity of good news. But in the long history of the nation that is not new. Egypt has faced much more difficult years. It will not be much more than a blink of the eye before we are facing a new decade, time to again ask ourselves about what lies ahead for Egypt. * The writer is director of Al-Ahram Centre for Political & Strategic Studies.
