Making noise on the sidelines is not politics; rather, politics is about putting rationality before ideology in addressing matters of societal concern, writes Abdel-Moneim Said If anyone had predicted six months ago that the political scene in Egypt would be where it is today he would have met with utter disbelief. When I ventured such impressions to visiting journalists and scholars they would stare at me in amazement, unable to conceive that what they had heard from the Egyptian political fringes was pure fiction. They may also have thought that my remarks were influenced by my professional and political affiliations. At that time, the political atmosphere was charged with thunder and lightening. Opposition factions had joined hands around the promise of a single man whose face beamed over the satellite networks from CNN to the Egyptian Dream Channel and was projected as the image of Egypt's brighter future. The din of their protest actions and social and political agitation drowned out the hum of ordinary Egyptian life, as shaped by the day-to-day pursuits of millions of Egyptians at home and at work. The luminaries that rose to prominence at that particular moment on the shoulders of their supporters and collaborators imagined themselves glimmering ever so brightly in the popular firmament as they pressed with grim determination for no less than a complete overhaul of the Egyptian system of government. It was all so simple, they thought. Just lift emergency law, amend the constitution and implement Mohamed El-Baradei's "seven demands" so that the Nobel Prize laureate could launch his victorious campaign for the presidency and political life in Egypt would change forever. All talk of "hereditary succession" would be history. Democracy and institutionalised government would prevail, corruption would vanish and all would be able to dip equally into the endless pot of justice and freedom. So simple was the idea that it stood miles above anything that might cloud it. From its ethereal heights it saw no existing political culture, no established economic and social structures, no disturbing international situations, no reality shaped by the intricate interweaving of history and tradition, constitution and laws, families and tribes, political parties, the media, ruthless personal ambitions and unevenly balanced weights. In all its pristine simplicity, it was particularly appealing to the young. Those with more experience in public affairs knew that the idea was frightening in its apparent innocence, alarmingly inappropriate to current circumstances and horrifying in its attempt to transcend the boundary between rational government and complete chaos. In all events, it all blew over, as one would expect in a stable country where winds might rage, voices thunder and eloquent slogans blare for a while, after which the clouds dispel and the established norms and basics reassert themselves. Once all the din and bluster about "boycotting elections" subsided, the political scene settled into a contest between three chief forces that will, in fact, take part in the elections: the National Democratic Party (NDP), the opposition Wafd, Nasserist and the Progressive National Unionist Party, and the officially banned Muslim Brotherhood whose individual members are not banned from running for parliament. One might imagine that nothing has changed in the five years since the last elections. The NDP is holding conventions and meetings in order to solve the problem of an excess of candidates. The three civil parties are scrambling to recuperate the ground they lost before turning into a civil opposition. The Muslim Brotherhood has once again hoisted the banner, "Islam is the solution," even as it continues to support El-Baradei and his seven demands, and in spite of the fact that it is a part of the civil movement, the Egyptian Association for Change. Nevertheless, it is possible to discern something new from our country's experience over the past few months if we approach it much as a scientist would a laboratory experiment in which he monitors the reactive processes and assesses the results. Fortunately, some who emerged from the experience felt it important to strike the metal while it's hot and to offer reassessments before the whole affair cooled and was consigned to the oblivion of history. Regardless of whether or how the "revisions" of Hassan Nafaa, professor of political science and general coordinator of the National Association for Change, the statements by Margaret Azr, secretary general of the Democratic Front Party, or declarations on the part of individuals who had broken with the "consensus" of the Gamaa (the Muslim Brotherhood) by deciding in the end to participate in the elections, fit into the greater scheme of political manoeuvres and rivalries, they shed clear light on the entire experience. From them and elsewhere on the political fringes we can draw the following lessons: Lesson 1: The Muslim Brothers, the Association for Change and their colleagues have proven themselves incapable of practicing what they preached. They totally failed to apply their recipes for society on themselves. The Brotherhood calls for order in society while chaos reigns within the group. The Association for Change matches its plea for cohesion and commitment with internal fragmentation and chronic lack of leadership. The opposition ardently yearns for democracy but is plagued by disarray and the inability to take a decision. Its solidarity over the "seven demands" is countered by bitter differences over every other issue. Lesson 2: Honesty with themselves and with the public has never been one of the strongest virtues of those on the political fringes. Against the backdrop of intensifying commotion over the forthcoming elections, people were readying themselves to enter into the official race, armed with the knowledge that political life in Egypt is much more complex than the dreamers imagine. Hence the shock that suddenly overtook the secretary-general of the Democratic Front when he realised that his party's leadership had become captive of its own words, which come easier to it than an awareness of political realities. Instead of honing the party's skills and acumen through real political battles, they had opted for a few minutes' worth of television fame. The Muslim Brotherhood leadership was in for an even greater surprise from those dissidents who chose to believe the play instead of reality, and who opted for political manoeuvres over political action. It is amazing that no one out there in the fringes paused to wonder at how they failed to collect a million signatures on the petition they circulated. Nor was anyone taken aback by how they kept claiming to have won "approximately" a million signatures but refused to back the claim with details, and by the fact that two-thirds of the signatures were acquired electronically, a means which El-Baradei had initially rejected only to turn around and boast of its success. Lesson 3: Major political forces understand the meaning of "political fringes". They know that a fringe group will remain a fringe group until it grasps the plain fact that political influence is not acquired on the steps of syndicate buildings. They also know that as important as it is to have political bases in Cairo and in Alexandria, it is not enough. Political forces build themselves up by reaching out to people in all the provinces and deep into the countryside, which is where fringe leaderships have been reluctant to tread, even though that is where they would find the true mirror of their strength and popularity, as opposed to the eyes of television cameras. Also, as is probably the case with all political fringes around the world, our reputed fringe is strong on lofty words and catchphrases but short on economic and social brass tacks. Therefore, if some of its younger members saw it as the answer to their dreams, they found no one to steer them on the road from dream to reality. Lesson 4: That perpetually agitated and agitating Islamist group is chronically incapable of maintaining a realistic course on its compass. Moreover, it sometimes concocts issues, such as the "succession scenario", with which to tantalise the public, which is constantly left in the dark as to where that group actually wants to steer it. While this group is perfectly clear on the electoral reforms it wants, it consistently shies away from discussing other subjects of concern to society with any degree of clarity, from the relationship between religion and the state, the role of the state in the economy and various foreign relations questions, to subsidies, public education, healthcare and even fighting corruption. Its fear of internal division and the tension between its right and left wings and, specifically, between those of its members who are working for a fully-fledged theocracy and those who prefer a democratic civil state, have worked to keep it on the fringes. It wants to swim in the sea of "change" without getting wet, to tour the desert without getting sand on its feet. Lesson 5: Those on the fringe, collectively, know little about modern Egyptian history. Yes, they will go on about Egypt's flourishing liberal period, but they will not be able to tell you how many fair elections were held during that period. They will dwell endlessly on the eras of Egypt's towering regional presence, but they would never think of mentioning how many times Egypt fell under foreign occupation during those periods. Never have they taken stock of the fact that Egypt's development did not proceed by leaps and bounds or even revolutions. Rather it grew by a long cumulative process whereby industry developed by building one factory after another, educational levels improved with the successive growth of schools and universities, urban development spread with mile after mile of planning and construction, and work and business opportunities increased by company after company, and investment after investment. Perhaps these facts do not sit will with fiery-blooded hotheads on the fringes. Naturally, there are certainly ways to make Egypt progress more rapidly, more daringly and more in tune with the developmental race that has engaged all nations in the world. However, these ways are not discovered or pursued by staying on the fringes and making a lot of noise just to garner some time in the media limelight, but rather by engaging in the political fray, as voters, members of political parties and other civil society organisations, and airing one's views in a rational way on matters of concern to Egyptian society. The sooner the fringes catch on to this basic truth, the sooner they will stop being fringes and enter the heart of the political process.
