The Middle East is in the throes of a radical transformation and still no one seems to notice, writes Khalil El-Anani* The US did not need the bombardment of Pearl Harbour in 1941 in order to break out from its isolationism and end the ambiguity that had prevailed in the world order during the first decades of the 20th century. Nor did the Soviet Union need the collapse of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989 to underline that it no longer inspired respect and awe among its enemies and friends alike. In both cases indications of developments existed well beforehand. All that was lacking was the acknowledgement. Similarly, the Arabs did not need to be defeated three times by Israel to realise that a new regional order was being constructed, with international approval, aimed at giving Tel Aviv the upper hand in determining the direction of regional interactions for decades to come. This is precisely why Israel threw itself into three wars, determined to prove itself an emerging power that had to be heeded. The primary function of conventional Arab forces for five decades has been to try to reach strategic equilibrium with Israel. Egypt steered this process in the 1950s and 1960s, Iraq and Syria took over in the 1970s and 1980s. In the 1990s the entire process fell apart as the official Arab order, which had arisen essentially to confront Israel, crumbled. Yet many Arabs continue to refuse to acknowledge that a new regional order has been in the making during recent decades, or that what is happening today is more than battles of wills at a time of sudden tension. They close their eyes to the fact that what we are experiencing are the upheavals accompanying the birth of a new regional order built on the ruins of the old Middle East. That Middle East met its demise with the end of the conventional equilibrium between the Arabs and Israel, whether as a consequence of Egypt's decision to withdraw from the game and set a ceiling on confrontations with Israel, a policy that was clear during the recent Gaza crisis, or as a consequence of the disappearance of "old" Iraq and the preoccupation there with ordering new circumstances, remains debateable. It seems to have escaped everyone's notice that three wars in less than six years (2003-2009) have overturned balances and effaced the remnants of the "old" regional order. Against this backdrop it is only to be expected that "emerging" regional forces, such as Iran and Turkey, are not only striving to strike an equilibrium with Israel in the way conventional Arab powers once did, but also to replace these powers. The "new" Middle East exhibits four basic traits. The first is the shift from the centre (Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iraq) to the periphery (Iran and Turkey), ending once and for all the myth of Arab equilibrium with Israel. The primary interactions in the region are essentially non-Arab. They are taking place along three axes: US-Iran, Iran-Israel and Israel-Turkey. In all three the Arabs play, at best, subsidiary roles as encouragers (Syria) or facilitators (Qatar, Hizbullah, Hamas). The US sees no greater threat to its interests in the Middle East than Iran's rise as a regional power. Washington's determination to "appease" Tehran is a clear acknowledgement of the latter's influence and role in managing Arab-Arab interactions. The situation is reminiscent of Eisenhower's stand towards Abdel-Nasser in the 1950s. Then Egypt was accorded a central role in steering regional interplay. Iran is poised to become one of the architects of the new Middle East and tacit recognition of this role will form the bottom line in its haggling with the US. Israel, meanwhile, is "terrified" by an Iran that has steadily extended its tentacles into the Arab world. For Tel Aviv the Arab order is like an ageing lion that has lost its teeth, infinitely preferable compared to the prospect of a highly influential, possibly nuclear, Iran. Turkey is playing on tensions within the region in order to advance its own centrality. At times it acts as a cooling agent in regional and inter-Arab disputes, as exemplified by its mediation between Damascus and Tel Aviv, Hamas and Fatah, perhaps between Hamas and Israel and, in the future, between Tehran and Washington. At other times it tries to outbid the Arabs in championing Arab causes: witness Turkey's prime minister attempting to imbue the confrontation with Israel with an "Ottoman spirit". The second trait concerns strategic transformations in regional security. For all practical purposes notions of Arab regional security have been supplanted by bilateral security arrangements. We can detect three patterns in this regard. The first are Arab regional arrangements, as in the Syrian-Iranian alliance. The second are "functional" security arrangements, which are most clearly illustrated by the alliance between Tehran and new players such as Hizbullah and Hamas. The third are regional-international security arrangements, epitomised by Israeli-US agreements which undermine Arab security from the Bab Al-Mandab to the Mediterranean, and by the security alliance between Israel and major European powers, such as France and Germany, which aims to halt the smuggling of arms to Hamas. Then there is the shift in the model of leader states from an Arab environment to its regional counterpart, as epitomised in both Iran and Turkey. The former is careful not to present itself to the Arab peoples as seeking regional domination but casts itself as a champion of Arab rights and causes, unencumbered by the chains that shackle Arab forces. Put simply, Tehran is striving to become an updated version of Nasser's Egypt, towards which end it has donned the resistance and liberation mantels Nasser once appropriated, and is resolved to acquire nuclear technology in order to restore the lost equilibrium with Israel and up its stock in the Arab street as an Islamic nuclear power. Turkey, too, is careful to avoid giving the impression of an emerging power seeking to extend its influence in its backyard at a time when European doors remain closed. Rather, it presents itself as a concerned and decent friend, keen to lend a hand at a time of Arab weakness. In this regard it has two advantages. It is a Sunni country, which clears it of the taint of sectarianism. Secondly, it is democratic, undermining Israeli claims to regional exclusivity in this respect. Little wonder, therefore, that both Iran and Turkey have won widespread admiration in the Arab world and enjoy public support for the steps they have taken to enhance their regional influence. The fourth trait that characterises the "new" Middle East is the changes in the nature of the concept of the enemy and the consequent replacement, in any practical terms, of collective action with a policy geared towards political axes. Nothing could be more indicative of the end of the old Middle East where Israel was the uncontested enemy. The official Arab consciousness is undergoing a radical transformation with the enemy epithet now applied to other regional powers. If this phenomenon reflects a collective burying of the head in the sand in the face of the threat posed by Israel, it also reflects a failure to contain the potential threats posed by Iran. The meeting in Abu Dhabi a week ago served to underscore the limit on Arab options in dealing with this dichotomy. The foregoing transformations bring grim consequences. Inter-Arab relations are being poisoned as differences in opinion and outlook are portrayed as conflicts over interests and aims. The political climate is being stirred and agitated, by some in order to force a showdown with the traditional enemy, Israel, by others in order to facilitate indirect confrontation with Iran on the pretext of blocking Persian encroachment in the region. A vicious battle is raging behind the scenes over the topography of any new Middle East. * The writer is a political analyst with Al-Siyasa Al-Dawliya magazine published by Al-Ahram.
