By Hassan Nafaa * Simply because the US is the most powerful nation in the international arena today does not automatically imply that it is the most capable of bearing the responsibility of leadership and that it should consequently be called upon to bear that mantle. Leadership calls for additional qualifications. First, the country should be willing to exercise leadership and capable of sustaining the responsibilities and consequences of its role. Second, it should be morally and ethically qualified. Finally, it should enjoy the confidence and respect of the international community, or at least of the majority of the world's peoples, so that its authority emanates from reverence for its status and support for its principles rather than from the exercise of brute force and vengefulness. I do not believe that the US meets these conditions at present. A cursory glance at US foreign policy positions and practices since the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War is sufficient to realise how inconsistent and haphazard US policy is. While in certain matters the US appears staunchly resolute and determined to assume sole command, in most other issues it is hesitant, indeed reluctant, to involve itself at all. While US policy may, on occasion, appear to conform with the rules and principles of international law and humanitarian values, in most cases it is simply a response to motives and interests that have little bearing on any moral standards, and in fact often clash with any concept of ethics. Moreover, it is rare that US foreign policy receives majority support from the international community, although it has certainly been capable, on numerous occasions, of inflaming the anger and hostility of most of that community's members. It is not odd, therefore, that US foreign policy has reached a dead end in most, if not all, of its target areas. In the Middle East, the policy of dual containment against Iran and Iraq failed miserably, a failure openly recognised by influential sectors within American political circles and within the administration itself. The Middle East peace process, which the US was so intent on steering single-handedly, has curled up and died. In this instance, it was not the political forces customarily antagonistic to US policy that were responsible for this failure, but rather, Israel, the US's closest ally in the region and, indeed, in the entire world. It was Israel that openly challenged US policy and succeeded in defeating the US peace initiative. In fact, the Israeli prime minister's threat to "burn Washington" should the administration attempt to pressure Israel into responding to the US initiative amounted to nothing less than a stinging slap in the face. Elsewhere throughout the world, US foreign policy objectives have resulted in one fiasco after the other. Its bid to prohibit nuclear weapons collapsed, not only because of the US administration's practical support for the Israeli nuclear programme, but also, more specifically, because both India and Pakistan succeeded in conducting nuclear tests. Its various sanctions campaigns around the world, whether waged independently or under the aegis of the Security Council, have begun to fizzle out, as is the case with Iran and Libya, or have miscarried entirely, as is the case with China and Cuba, forcing the US to make strategic or tactical changes. To compound this practical failure, the campaigns have only succeeded in undermining any vestiges of moral authority the US might once have enjoyed, and in revealing it to be a nation without mercy or conscience. The consequences of the sanctions, particularly those imposed on Iraq, have been nothing less than genocide. At the same time, the US has been unable to contain the crises that have begun to envelop its friends and allies in various parts of the world. The border war between Eritrea and Ethiopia is the most recent example. The opportunism and short-sightedness that have characterised US foreign policy have undermined the US's international standing and credibility, generating an increasingly universal desire to challenge America's will. Russia has expressed reservations against many US policies, particularly those pertaining to the expansion of NATO and the extraction of petroleum from the Caspian Sea. France has voiced numerous objections to US policy, notably with regard to Iran, Iraq and Africa. China has expressed its displeasure with American policies on human rights and arms exports. Most countries of the Third World are becoming increasingly bitter vis-à-vis American arrogance and tyranny. Kofi Annan's successful bid to force the US to back down from waging another strike against Iraq and the Organisation of African Unity's intervention on behalf of Libya are two tangible manifestations of the growing antipathy toward US leadership of the world order. Clearly, no sooner had the US assumed the helm of world leadership than it began to flounder. Yet its shaky grip on the helm is not a passing infirmity, nor the product of sudden, unpredictable shifts in the tides of history, and therefore reversible. Rather, its incompetence has deeper roots in the structural foundations of US foreign policy. These structural flaws are numerous, but they centre around two fundamental issues. The first is the strong and deeply rooted isolationist tendency in American politics and society. The second is the powerful influence of the Jewish lobby at all levels of the US decision-making establishment. American isolationism has its origins in the founding of the nation by waves of European immigrants keen on creating a new society different from that of their countries of origin. The new society coalesced into a kernel of 13 states that fought a war of liberation, establishing their independence; that kernel expanded westwards and southwards until, ultimately, it became the federation of 50 states. With impressive speed, the young nation established itself as the most powerful in history, by virtue of its human and natural resources. Initially, however, it had no imperial ambitions and was particularly reluctant to embroil itself in the labyrinth of European problems. The attitude was embodied in the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 which embedded the political and ideological foundations of isolation deep within the American psyche and world view. World War I forced the US to break out of its isolationism; its contribution to the victory of the allied forces, in conjunction with its growing European interests, gave rise to a new, internationalist spirit epitomised by President Wilson. This new trend encouraged the idea that US interests and international stability required active US participation in the formulation of a global order for collective security based on mutual guarantees. The new internationalism could not gain sufficient momentum, however, and ingrained isolationism prevailed to prevent the US from joining the League of Nations that was to embody the new global order. World War II brought the US out of isolation once again, although its late entry into the war was again testimony to the considerable hold this orientation continued to have in the US. The victory of the allies in World War II, in conjunction with the emergence of the threat of Soviet world domination, militated against a return to isolationism. As long as the Cold War prevailed, isolationism took a back seat. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, it was not surprising to find the spirit of isolationism reasserting itself. Nothing could have illustrated this more than the 1992 presidential elections. It is true that American voters rejected the pure isolationism of Republican Party nominee Buchanan, but isolationism has so affected the American electorate that no presidential or congressional candidate can ignore its swelling tide. Even now, the battle is raging between the "new isolationists", who fear the consequences of the US immersing itself even further in the role of the world's policeman, and the "new idealists", who fear that America might drop its guard in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, endangering not only international stability but US security itself. The result of this tug-of-war has been a highly pragmatic, opportunistic foreign policy. The US intervenes aggressively to protect American interests, defined in the broadest possible terms by the political elite's ability to agree on certain points; it refrains from intervening in anything else, regardless of the danger to others, if there is no apparent direct threat to its own interests. What we have, in effect, is a hybrid interventionist-isolationist policy fueled by a single motivating force: unadulterated, cynical self-interest. Interventionism has reared its head in the form of a variety of devices intended to deter any other power from attempting to elbow the US away from its position at the helm of the world order. In the process, it has sought all means to undermine the current order in international security and legitimacy. The latest manifestation of this interventionism was the cruise missile assault carried out (with no consideration for international law) on two members of the United Nations, Sudan and Afghanistan, in response to terrorist attacks committed by political opposition groups. American isolationism, on the other hand, is evidenced by the US's refusal to intervene in many global events and its reluctance to sacrifice American human or material resources to matters that do not directly touch upon its security or national interests. The most tangible manifestations of this have been the evacuation of forces from Somalia immediately after the first US victims fell, American reluctance to send forces to Bosnia, and its refusal to intervene in Rwanda in spite of the atrocities being committed there. The second central factor affecting the structure of American foreign policy relates to the unprecedented ability of organised Jewish groups to reach all levels of decision-making, to influence think-tanks, the media and other civil society institutions to an unprecedented degree. I do not believe there is any need to substantiate this claim. Suffice it to say that through this influence Israel has become a domestic policy issue to the US. This means that the US no longer has any alternative but to adopt all Israel's policies as its own, regardless of whether or not they conform to the declared goals of the State Department. It remains to be seen how Jewish influence has undermined the US's capacity to lead the world order. Its effect is epitomised in the "Israeli exception". Clearly, the explicit goals of US foreign policy are often admirable, and could well serve as models to which the international community might aspire. The fight against terrorism, the diffusion of a human rights culture, the ban on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: these are all lofty and compelling aims. The US, however, insists on making exceptions for Israel in all these domains, and this has completely undermined the credibility of its own commitment to these aims. International terrorism has become a crime that invites the harshest punishments, as long as those who commit it are not Israelis. When Israelis commit what would otherwise be considered an act of international terrorism, the US argues that it was acting in self-defence. Human rights violations deserve universal condemnation, and those who perpetrate them should be penalised; yet the daily human rights abuses Israel commits, the theft of Palestinian land, the destruction of Palestinian homes, the arbitrary detention, torture and murder of the Palestinian people rarely arouse US condemnation, nor even compassion for the Palestinians' plight. If an Arab country, regardless of how close it is to the US, is even suspected of attempting to acquire materials or technology that could conceivably be applied to the production or development of weapons of mass destruction, it will provoke a major international crisis. Meanwhile, America's weapons arsenals and research institutes are open to Israel, which can help itself to the materials and technology it needs to produce nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. In sum, the growing prevalence of the isolationist trend within US decision-making circles has rendered the US increasingly reluctant to bear the responsibilities of leading the world order. Its selective interventionism, in conjunction with the "Israeli exception", has sapped its credibility as an unbiased leader capable of contributing to laying the foundations for a just international order, and has further undermined any respect for the principles of international law. These inconsistencies have emptied US foreign policy of any moral content; the double standards which guide this policy render that country doubly unqualified for the mantle of world leadership. *The writer is professor of political science at Cairo University.
