The war in Iraq spells trouble at home,says Hassan Nafaa It is unclear whether those in Egyptian corridors of power have a clear vision of the role the country should be playing in the third Gulf crisis. What is clear, though, is that Egypt's actions appear to the outside world as capricious and have consequently become a source of consternation. In the meantime, members of the ruling establishment are making statements that seem almost contradictory. Three factors contribute to this state of affairs. The first is the international situation created by the US's actions. Safeguarding warm relations with the US has been a given of Egyptian policy since President Anwar El-Sadat laid the foundations for the relationship in the wake of the 1973 War. The US, too, has been keen to maintain and consolidate this relationship, thereby permitting Egypt a margin of freedom and manoeuvrability despite diverging views on several matters and crises. In the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US considered Egypt deserving of a share in the spoils of the Cold War victory. Parallel to this, the US's increased involvement in the peace process in the wake of the Gulf War of 1991 contributed to its image as a mediator exerting "its utmost effort" to advance a solution for the Palestinian question. However, the political ascendancy of the ultra-right in the US, owing to the election of George W Bush as president, brought about a coup in American foreign policy that restricted Egypt's margin of manoeuvrability. That this change had taken place was underlined in the aftermath of 11 September. Since then, the US has seemed more interested in having clients rather than partners or allies. At the same time, it became more open in its bias towards Israel and showed less interest than ever before in maintaining special relationships with either Egypt or Saudi Arabia. Egypt, however, acted as though it had not noticed the thorough-going nature of the changes to the international arena since 11 September. Accordingly, it missed signs emanating from several influential capitals, including Paris, Berlin, Moscow and even Beijing. Instead of taking the opportunity afforded by those capitals' stances on the Iraq standoff and working to strengthen international opposition to a military campaign, Cairo waited until the 11th hour for a sign from the US that it compensate Egypt for its projected war losses. Egypt, consequently, lost on both fronts. It received only tidbits from the US, added to which it gave the French and Germans the false impression that it did not support their stance. The second factor is the Arab position. Egypt was careful not to be lured by certain Arab states into a confrontation that could have caused it to overstep bounds it set in the aftermath of the 1967 War. During the current Iraq crisis, Egypt appeared to be hesitating between two opposing trends. The first, which was publicly led by Kuwait, but privately acceded to by many other Gulf countries, called for full support to the US's inexplicably obstinate position. The second approach, promoted by Syria, but secretly supported by several Arab nations, threw its weight behind Iraq, highlighting Baghdad's cooperation in implementing Security Council Resolution 1441. Although Egypt developed trade relations with Iraq, making it one of the top destinations for Egyptian exports, it was unable to establish parallel political relations that would have enabled it to effect an Arab reconciliation and thereby avert the divisiveness and polarisation plaguing the Arab fold. Hence, on the Arab front, Egypt was caught in the middle. The Gulf position, bearing the hallmarks of US machinations, was unpopular on the Arab street. The Syrian position, though free of US entanglement, went beyond Egypt's capabilities. An Arab consensus having been ruled out, Egypt's predicament was not helped by Saudi Arabia's vacillation over its own stance. Consequently, regardless of the position Egypt took, it would not be able to put one trend decisively ahead of the other, but would only further polarise and divide the Arabs. This third Gulf crisis, then, shows Egypt's inability, for the first time since its return to the Arab fold, to lead the Arab order, whether through relying on its individual weight or forging an alliance with Syria and Saudi Arabia -- the core Arab states. The third factor is the Egyptian domestic scene. The current Gulf crisis began to unfold against a backdrop of domestic turmoil characterised by a surge in the cost of living -- owing to misguided financial, economic and social policies -- and widespread corruption in many sectors and on the part of several public figures. On another level, the Egyptian masses were increasingly unable to contain their hostility towards US policies in general, and those towards Iraq and Palestine, in particular. The public was even less prepared to give the US the benefit of the doubt when it continued to claim that Iraq was being intransigent in the face of its evident flexibility. Egyptians consequently watched in agony as Iraq destroyed its missiles in spite of the US's evident determination to attack the Gulf country. Meanwhile, Israel, which has a huge arsenal of all manner of weapons of mass destruction, is wreaking havoc in the Palestinian territories. Under these circumstances, the Egyptian masses longed for a strong official position that would mobilise Arab energies to defend the nation's dignity, but, the official position fell short of the people's aspirations. Although many believed, myself included, that Egypt made a concerted and sincere effort to avert a war, the fact that official statements made on the eve of the war did not explicitly condemn the US and instead put the onus on Iraq for the escalation of tensions, cast a long shadow over the government's position. Such statements also provoked considerable comment and speculation in Cairo's cafés. Some people suggested that Egypt had adopted the US position wholeheartedly and joined forces with Gulf countries to remove Saddam Hussein from power. Although I do not believe such conjecture because there is no evidence to support it, such speculation further clouded the already ambiguous official position. Many opined that this fumbling position was evidence that the "realist" discourse of Egypt's policies under the leadership of President Mubarak was reaching an inescapable crisis. President Mubarak came to power following President El-Sadat's assassination -- one of the most violent incidents in Egyptian history. He took the reins of power at a time when his predecessor's policies had brought the country dangerously close to a crisis. After the success of October 1973, President El-Sadat promised his people that he would accomplish what Gamal Abdel-Nasser had left undone. El-Sadat, then, set himself the task of achieving a just and comprehensive peace, development, and democratisation. However, at the time of his death, El-Sadat had only achieved a partial peace settlement that entailed unjust conditions and caused Egypt to be isolated from the Arab and Muslim worlds; the country's economic and social infrastructure was flagging and its democracy had imprisoned the figureheads of all political trends. Hence, President Mubarak was handed the difficult task of redressing the various problems without upsetting its delicate equilibrium. He sought to bring Egypt back into the Arab fold without overturning the settlement process, implement an economic reform programme that did not impinge on the Open Door policies, and rebuild bridges with the Soviet Union without harming Egypt's relationship with the US. Mubarak was successful in achieving many of these goals. Under his leadership, Egyptian diplomacy was able to make the world order prior to 11 September work to its benefit without making any fundamental changes to the foreign policy vision pursued by Egypt under El-Sadat. This vision rested on two pillars. First, the readiness of Israeli society to accept a settlement for the Middle East conflict, and second, the US's willingness to pressure Israel to reach a settlement while at the same time supporting Egypt's development. Today, though, these pillars seem to have collapsed for good, implying that Egypt, along with the Arab world as a whole, may be entering a difficult period of rebirth that will entail extensive changes because so many core issues have long remained unresolved. Peace was not achieved, development is being sabotaged by some of those who oversee it, and there is little hope remaining for the stunted democratisation and political reform processes. God only knows if change will take place through upheaval like that which occurred in 1952 and 1981. Perhaps change will occur through gradual and peaceful steps, the likes of which have not been witnessed since 1952. We pray the latter will prove the more inspiring path for the political establishment during such turbulent times. The writer is professor of political science at Cairo University
