Chess is a perfect model for the complex strategies involved in the US-Iranian-Russian stand-off, observes Mustafa El-Labbad With Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's tour to various world capitals the new US administration has launched its campaign to rectify Washington's global image. The most important of her meetings will be the one with her Russian counterpart in Geneva and which is meant to serve as a "getting reacquainted" session in order to smooth the way for Barack Obama's meeting with Dmitri Medvedev during the forthcoming G20 summit in London. US-Russian relations had seriously deteriorated as a consequence of ex-president George Bush's determination to deploy a missile shield in Central Europe. Although the Bush administration had claimed that the purpose of the missile shield was to counter a possible threat from Iran, Moscow believed that it was actually aimed at Russia and its strategic depth in Eurasia. Also, Moscow interprets the stationing of missiles in Poland as an indication that it is no longer a buffer zone, as it had been prior to World War II and afterwards, a status that Russia regards as vital to its national security. Clinton has already hinted on several occasions that Washington may reconsider the question of the ballistic shield in Central Europe if Moscow, in turn, relinquishes its support for Iran's nuclear programme. Given Russia's strategic interest in the dismantlement of the missile shield, which would give it vital breathing space in Eurasia, it is likely that Moscow will be prepared to discuss the details of a possible deal including the Iran issue. Any sign of progress on this matter will emerge following the talks between Hillary Clinton and Sergei Lavrov. Russia's stance on the Iranian nuclear question is a key card in negotiating with the US. The dispute with Georgia, which Russia resolved with the occupation of Ossetia and Abkhazia, is of minor significance to Washington in view of Georgia's limited strategic importance and its lack of energy resources. The Iranian nuclear issue, on the other hand, is high on the Obama administration's priorities and it is a problem that the administration wants to resolve by means other than Bush's brinksmanship and threats of military action, which ultimately worked to Iran's advantage. US strategic analyses (which proliferated around the time of the 30th anniversary of the Iranian revolution) emanate from the premise that removing Iran's Russian cover would leave Iran exposed and in a far weaker negotiating position on the nuclear issue which, in turn, would facilitate Obama's task of making a major breakthrough in US-Iranian relations without having to pay too high a political cost. Clearly, the less the Obama administration has to give in return for Tehran halting its nuclear enrichment activities the higher his domestic stock will climb and the easier it will be to push his policies through the complex machinery of the US decision-making process. A deal with Russia would involve dismantling the missile shield, halting NATO's encroachment into Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and signing a new nuclear armaments agreement. A tall order, but one which Obama must pursue, as the US desperately needs Russia to serve as an alternate route to Pakistan for forces and equipment into Afghanistan. In all events, Moscow will not be as easy to budge on the Iranian question as Washington might hope. Continued Russian-Iranian cooperation in armaments would give Moscow an excellent means for retaining leverage in its complex relations with Washington, which extend well beyond normal diplomatic and commercial bonds into the realm of global strategic chess games. Every time Moscow hints that it will send advanced S-300 missiles to Tehran, it strengthens its bargaining position vis-à-vis the US. On the other hand, in the event of a possible thaw between Washington and Tehran, Russia's relations with Tehran would naturally weaken since Tehran would no longer need the "international cover" Moscow offers it in the face of international pressures. For this reason, one can envision attempts on the part of Moscow to cut deals with Washington that would work to keep it poised between the US and Iran. For its part, Iran will move to join the Russian and Chinese-led Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and commit itself to its security arrangements. This would bolster its regional position, which has strengthened considerably over the past years, while it waits to see the results on the US-Russian front. Tehran might also try to revive Russia's mediating role between itself and Washington, even though it knows Moscow's intentions very well. Russia would stand to gain tactically from such a role, but Iran would also benefit, at least in the short term, since it would gain additional time to push its nuclear programme forward. The ins and outs of the US- Russian-Iranian triangle are dizzyingly complicated. They are far more important than the smiles and handshakes in front of television cameras.
